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Abstract
This thesis examines rmsreal decisions using a large panel of unquoted euro area rms
over the period 2003-2011. To this end, this thesis is composed of ve chapters in which
three are the main empirical chapters. They assess the dimensions of rm behaviour
across di¤erent specications. Each of these chapters provide a detailed discussion on the
contribution, theoretical and empirical background as well as the panel data techniques
which are implemented.
Chapter 1 describes the introduction and outline of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents
an empirical analysis on the link between nancial pressure and rmsemployment level.
In this set-up, it is explored the strength of nancial pressure during the nancial crisis.
It is also tested whether this e¤ect has a di¤erent impact for nancially constrained and
unconstrained rms in the periphery and non-periphery regions. The results of this chapter
denote that nancial pressure exerts a negative impact on rmsemployment decisions
and that this e¤ect is stronger during the crisis for nancially constrained rms in the
periphery.
Chapter 3 analyses the cash policies of private and public rms. Controlling for rm size
and other standard variables in the literature of cash holdings, empirical ndings suggest
that private rms hold higher cash reserves than their public counterparts indicating a
greater precautionary demand for cash by the former. The relative di¤erence between
these two type of rms decreases (increases) the higher (lower) is the the level of nancial
pressure. The ndings are robust to various model specications and over di¤erent sub-
samples. Overall, this chapter shows the relevance of rms size. Taken together, the
ndings of Chapter 3 are in line with the early literature on cash holdings and contradict
the recent studies, which nd that the precautionary motive to hold cash is less pronounced
for private rms than for public ones.
Chapter 4 undertakes an investigation on the relation between rmsstocks of inven-
tories and trade credit (i.e. extended and taken) whilst controlling for the rmssize, the
characteristics of the goods transacted, the recent nancial crisis and the development of
the banking system. The main ndings provide evidence of a trade-o¤between trade credit
extended and rmsstock of inventories. In other words, rmsprefer to extend credit
in the form of stocks to their nancially constrained customers to avoid holdings costly
inventories and to increase their sales levels. The provision of trade credit by the rms also
depends on the characteristics of the goods transacted. This impact is stronger during
the crisis. Larger and liquid banking systems reduce the trade-o¤ between the volume of
stocks of inventories and the amount sold on credit. Trade credit taken is not a¤ected by
rmsstock of inventories. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the thesis. It provides
the main contributions, implications and future research of each empirical chapter.
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 General background and motivation
In a world where markets are perfect, the behaviour of the rm does not depend on
its nancial situation. In reality, though, nancial markets are imperfect. Traditional
standard issues in nance such as taxes, transaction costs or information asymmetry shape
how managers deal with rmsnancial activities. Deciding whether or not to invest in
new projects is a problem which rms face on a day-to-day basis, especially small rms.
Over the recent decades, the corporate world has witnessed several changes in the in-
ternational markets. For instance, in Europe one of the most noticeable aspect was the
creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the common
currency by a number of states which formed the euro area. Capital markets were in-
tegrated and currency risks were eliminated within the euro area countries (Bris et al.,
2009). The euro area experienced a rapid economic development with a decline of the
level of unemployment and an increase of the labour force participation (Lin, 2016). The
nancial system also grew dramatically in size. In fact, the total assets of the banking
system corresponded to over 200% of euro area Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007
compared with less than 100% in the U.S. (Shambaugh, 2012). Firms witnessed a decrease
of their cost of capital and at the same time were faced with an increase of the range of
borrowing.
The outbreak of the global nancial crisis in August 2007 and its intensication in
September 2008 with the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers brought signicant changes
to the economy. In the the euro area, labour markets were strongly hit. Employment
decreased sharply and the government debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 66% to 93%
(Economides and Moutos, 2013). At the same time, banks faced liquidity shortages due
to their inability to access wholesale funding, and therefore secure assets (Wehinger, 2014)
Consequently, non-nancial corporations, especially small rms were faced with major
problems in obtaining external nance. Between 2008 and 2011, Small and Medium-Sized
rms (SMEs) saw their bank loans cut by 47%. During this period, rms applied for
alternative sources of nance such as trade credit and other types of informal lending (see
amongst others Casey and OToole (2014) and McGuinness (2015)). The aforementioned
scenario should have an impact on the overall economy of the eurozone. In fact, SMEs
are considered to be the backbone of the European Union (EU) economy. They represent
99.8% of the rms and contribute to 55.8% of the value added and 67% of the employment
level (Kaya, 2014).
Understanding how rms behave has been a devoted line of research within the nancial
literature. Scholars have examined how the availability of internal and external nance
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can inuence rmsnancial decisions. Financial corporations use internal and external
funds to nance their projects. However, the cost of external nance depends on how
much rms are subject to capital market imperfections (see amongst others Stiglitz and
Greenwald (1993), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Jensen (1986)). For example, in a
pionner work Fazzari et al. (1988) test the e¤ect of capital market imperfections on rms
behaviour and highlight that rms which face a greater wedge between the cost of internal
and external nance need to relay more on their internal funds. Such rms are called
nancially constrained and their internal funds are fundamental to nance their projects.
Subsequent studies have provided evidence that rmsnancial positions have an im-
pact on its xed investment, employment and R&D decisions (see amongst others Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Young (2007)). On the other hand, extant research
also establishes that monetary policy, credit risk and macroeconomic uncertainty are some
of the channels through which the cost and availability of external nance have an impact
on rmsnancial decisions (see amongst others Almeida et al. (2004), Acharya et al.
(2012)). Hence, the imperfection of capital markets along with other linking mechanisms
are relevant aspects which can provide valuable information for policy makers in the future.
1.2 Outline and contribution
In light of the motivation which is outlined above, this thesis contributes to the eld of
nancial economics by exploring new aspects of rmsemployment decisions, cash holdings
and trade credit of rms. These applications are presented in three self-contained chapters
(chapters 2-4). These chapters explore a sample of mainly unquoted euro area rms for
the period between 2003 and 2011. All chapters employ the system Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator as a estimation methodology.
Overall, Chapter 2 examines the e¤ect of a rm-specic interest rate (i.e. interest
burden) on the level of rmsemployment with an emphasis on nancial constraints and
the recent crisis. Chapter 3 investigates the di¤erences in cash holdings of private and
public rms taking into account the e¤ect of nancial pressure. Chapter 4 tests the extent
to which rmsstock of inventories have an impact on trade credit with a focus on rms
product characteristics, credit crunch and nancial development.
Through Chapter 2 the literature of nancial constraints and employment is extended.
The chapter employs an unbalanced panel of 150,258 euro area rms. The value added
is threefold. First, it is tested whether the response of employment to nancial pressure
(measured by interest burden) is stable across crisis and more tranquil years. Previous
studies denote that interest burden is a representative measure of rmslevel of nancial
pressure since a higher value of interest burden can be considered as an indicator that
a rm is charged with a higher external nance premium (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999;
Guariglia et al., 2015). Studies within the literature on employment consider the link
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between employment and interest burden using only single-country data for U.K., Spain
or China (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia,
2009). However, the role of the crisis is not researched. This is also an important issue
since in the presence of structural changes, the e¤ect of interest burden during the crisis
and non crisis years should be signicantly di¤erent. The results of Chapter 2 show that
higher levels of interest burden are associated with lower levels of employment, especially
during the crisis.
Second, Chapter 2 also considers the country-level heterogeneity since interest burden
is unlikely to a¤ect all euro area economies in the same way. The countries are split into
periphery and non-periphery economies for crisis and non crisis periods. This permits to
draw conclusions for the euro area as a whole and also to compare the interest burden-
employment nexus across di¤erent economies within the eurozone. Empirical ndings
suggest that only rms at the periphery of the euro area during the crisis are a¤ected by
changes in the interest burden.
Third, in Chapter 2 it is studied how the relation between interest burden and employ-
ment unfolds across time for rms which are more or less likely to su¤er from nancial
constraints. Firms are divided into nancially constrained and unconstrained based on
three dimensions of rm-level heterogeneity. The idea is that rms which face di¤erent
wedges between internal and external costs of capital might also respond di¤erently to
changes in the interest burden. Results show that the impact of interest burden on em-
ployment is stronger for rms classied as nancially constrained and operating in the
periphery countries during the nancial crisis.
The focus of the next chapter shifts from employment to cash holdings decisions and
the contribution is also threefold. Chapter 3 bridges the gap between the literature of
cash holdings and nancial constraints highlighting the importance of the precautionary
motive for hoarding cash. Several explanations have been provided in the literature for
the reasons for rms to hold cash which are mainly related to the precautionary motive.
Firms with a restricted access to borrowing are expected to hold more cash as a precaution
against potential cash ow shortfall in the future (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Private rms
are typically smaller and are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry and
higher transaction costs (Ferrando and Griesshaber, 2011).
The rst contribution of this chapter is that it takes into account a recent puzzling
and controversial result in the empirical literature of cash reserves. The few studies which
compare the cash holdings of private and public rms demonstrate that the former hold
less cash than the latter (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). This goes against the
main literature on cash holdings. To unravel the aforementioned issue, Chapter 3 main
focus is on the cash holdingsdi¤erences among private and public rms. It employs an
unbalanced panel of 120,796 rms, over 90% of which are not quoted in the stock market.
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This is a crucial characteristic since these rms are more likely to su¤er from information
asymmetry.
The ndings of Chapter 3 provide evidence that private rms hold more cash than
their public counterparts. This nding is robust in various model settings. Next, this
chapter investigates the role of nancial pressure (calculated as coverage ratio) on the
cash holdingsdi¤erences of private and public rms. This hypothesis is motivated by
Acharya et al. (2012) who argue that changes in the level of credit risk a¤ect cash holdings
decisions of the rms. In doing so, this chapter provides a systematic analysis of the link
between nancial pressure and cash holdings at the micro level. Results show that the cash
holdingsdi¤erential between private and public rms forms a U-shape. In addition, the
speed of adjustment to target cash levels is introduced to further understand the behaviour
of private and public rmscash reserves. The results point out that both private and
public rms adjust to their target cash levels whilst private rms adjust quicker than their
public counterparts.
In Chapter 4 it is proposed an analysis to trade credit, i.e. an alternative source of
short-term nancing. This chapter builds on the theoretical and empirical literature o¤
trade credit. The chapter tries to empirically link two theoretical explanations for the
reasons for rms to extend and take trade credit. It focus on the inventory management
motive and the diversion value of traded goods. According to the former, rms prefer to
sell their stock on credit to their nancially constrained customers rather than accumulate
costly stock of inventories (Bougheas et al., 2009). On the other hand, the latter refers
to the fact that suppliers of trade credit have an advantage relative to banks in nancing
their customers. Goods which are repossessed have more value for suppliers than to the
banks. Firms in the di¤erentiated industries produce more specic products than those in
the standardised ones making the seller-buyer relation closer to the former rather than in
the later (Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). This chapter employs an
unbalanced panel of 136,489 rms. The contribution is threefold.
The rst contribution of Chapter 4 is to empirically test whether the inventory man-
agement motive is inuenced by the characteristics of the goods transacted and the level of
nancial constraints rms face. Empirical ndings show that nancially constrained rms
(i.e. small rms), especially those in the di¤erentiated sector o¤er more trade credit than
larger rms. This provides evidence that the inventory management motive is related to
the characteristics of the goods sold and the size of the rm. These characteristics have
no e¤ect on trade credit taken.
Secondly, Chapter 4 explores the role of the recent nancial crisis on the trade-o¤
between trade credit and inventories. The objective is to determine whether the crisis
magnies the inverse relation between the volume of stock of inventories and the amount
which is sold on credit. The results point out that during the turmoil period, there is a
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signicant higher e¤ect of inventories on trade credit extended only.
Thirdly, Chapter 4 also builds on the literature of nancial development by taking
into account the role of nancial development (i.e. bank development) on the trade-o¤
between inventories and trade credit. This chapter tests whether country-level nancial
development mitigates the impact of the inventory management motive. In this chapter
it is argued that rms in a more developed banking system may nd it easier to access
capital markets and therefore resort less to alternative source of nance such as trade
credit. Empirical ndings show that large and liquid banking systems reduce the inverse
relation between the volume of inventory stocks and the amount sold on credit.
Overall, each chapter presents its specic hypothesis, model specication, empirical
results and conclusions. Hence, the reader is able to follow the motivation of each empirical
chapter in a straightforward way. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have been considered for
publication and have been presented to academic peers in conferences. In fact, a working
paper which is derived from Chapter 2 is available online in the discussion paper series of
the Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow. Chapter 2 has been presented
at the 2014 Financial Engineering and Banking Society Conference in Surrey. Chapter 3
has also been presented at the 1st Symposium on Quantitative Finance and Risk Analysis
(QFRA) in Greece and at the 6th National Conference of Financial Engineering and
Banking Society (FEBS) 2015 Conference in Greece. This chapter is currently under
review at the Small Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal.
The remainder of this thesis is structure as follows. Chapter 2 presents the empirical
analysis on the relation between interest burden and employment decisions. Chapter 3
denotes the empirical analysis for cash holdingsdi¤erences of private and public rms.
Chapter 4 tests empirically how trade credit (i.e. extended and taken) is a¤ected by rms
stock of inventories. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the general conclusions, implications and
possible future research.
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2 Chapter 2: The impact of nancial pressure on euro
area rm-level employment
2.1 Introduction
The nancial credit crisis that started in August 2007 and reached the peak in September
2008 had a strong impact on the economy of the euro area. The events that unfolded
after the Lehmans crash in September 2008 adversely a¤ected the euro area banking
sector through sharply increased funding cost and deteriorated liquidity conditions. On
the other hand, the cost of bank borrowing for rms and the volatility of the nancial
markets increased to levels rarely seen before (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In late
2008, non-standard policies were adopted by the euro area countries in order to provide
liquidity to nancial and non-nancial rms (Reichlin, 2014). However, the sovereign
debt crisis initiated in Greece, gradually spread to the EMU countries and particularly to
those in the periphery. In e¤ect, Greece, Ireland and Portugal resorted to nancial rescue
programs in 2010-2011.
According to the Eurostat, the euro area has experienced a fall in the GDP between
2008 and 2009 by 4%. Furthermore, labour markets also su¤ered. The level of employment
in the EU decreased sharply since the rst quarter of 2008, with a contraction of 4 million
(Hijman, 2009a). These events were particularly more severe to the so-called periphery
countries. Hijman (2009b) refers that since March 2008 Spain and Portugal were the most
a¤ected countries. Euro-area economies faced a rise of unemployment at very di¤erent
points in time. For instance, the unemployment rate for countries such as Spain and
Italy increased in May 2007, whereas Greece and Portugal started to experience a rise of
unemployment in the second quarter of 2008. Additionally, euro area banks drastically cut
credit on loans to non-nancial institutions. These events constrained the access of euro
area rms and especially SMEs. These rms generally lack of access to capital markets
and rely on banks for borrowing. Therefore, the access to external nance is vital to these
rms in order to maintain their day-to-day business and obtain long-term investment and
growth goals (Ferrando and Griesshaber, 2011).
SMEs are also crucial to the European economy and especially to the so-called pe-
riphery countries. Due to the nancial stress that the periphery countries face, the cost
of borrowing for such rms is higher. The latest European Central Bank (ECB) gures
indicate that the access to nance for periphery SMEs is more constrained than for the
non-periphery ones.1 For example, Iyer et al. (2014) show that during the 2007-2009 -
1In a report for ECB, Wymenga et al. (2012) show the average of SMEs employment and their real
value added from 2008 to 2011. The results indicate that countries such as France and Germany performed
above the average of the EU-27 for both SMEs employment and SMEs value added. Conversely, Portugal
and Spain perform below the average of the two indicators.
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nancial crisis period, the supply of credit for Portuguese rms decreased, especially for
smaller rms with weaker banking relations. Clearly, it seems that the access to nance
during the crisis is more di¢ cult for rms in the periphery. The market instability and
discrepancy among the countries, gives the motivation for this chapter.
A limited number of pre-crisis studies show that nancial pressure through a rm-
specic interest rate (i.e. interest burden) a¤ects rms labour decisions (Nickell and
Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia, 2009). These studies
refer that a higher interest burden indicates that rms are charged with a higher external
nance premium (Guariglia et al., 2015). Under this scenario, the nancial burden of debt-
servicing is expected to a¤ect rmslabour and nancial decisions. Notwithstanding, these
studies do not expand to the recent nancial crisis and they employ single-country datasets
which makes it di¢ cult to draw conclusions about the euro area as a whole, or to establish
comparisons on the experience of periphery versus non-periphery countries.
To this end, Chapter 2 focuses on the employment behaviour of rms which face
changes in their nancial conditions associated with tight monetary policy and nancial
constraints. The present chapter employs a large panel of eleven euro area countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain) during the 2003-2011 period, where the majority of the rms are not
quoted on the stock market.
The chapter makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it explores whether
the relation between nancial pressure and employment has strengthened during the recent
nancial crisis. The motivation behind this study originates from the nancial accelera-
tor theory of Bernanke et al. (1996). The authors show that when nancial conditions
deteriorate and rms rely heavily on external nance, the cost of borrowing rises. Firms
are nancially constrained if their external nance is too costly or their internal nance is
insu¢ cient (Von Kalckreuth, 2001). Consequently, when the access to external nance is
more expensive, existing interest payments increases. Therefore, all kind of rmsinvest-
ment, including the hiring of new employees may decrease (Mojon et al., 2002).
Second, motivated by recent developments in the euro area, the sample is divided into
periphery and non-periphery economies to test for di¤erences in the exposure of employ-
ment to nancial pressure. Periphery economies are likely to exhibit higher sensitivities of
employment to nancial pressure compared with their non-periphery counterparts, since
the former economies su¤ered disproportionately during the crisis.
Third, the chapter explores whether the employment level of di¤erent type of rms may
be a¤ected di¤erently by nancial pressure. There is an establish literature which pro-
vides evidence that nancial constraints originated by information asymmetry and agency
problems have a signicant impact on rms activities such as xed capital investment
and inventory investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Carpenter et al., 1998). The main reason
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for this is that rms which face nancial constraints have more di¢ culties in obtaining
external nance. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 explores for the rst time the role of nancial
constraints on the relation between nancial pressure and employment decisions. To this
end, it is tested the e¤ect of nancial pressure on employment by distinguishing between
more or less nancially constrained rms. To ensure robustness of the results this chapter
considers three di¤erent dimensions of rm heterogeneity (i.e. bank dependence, size and
rmslegal status).
The rest of Chapter 2 is organised as follows. Sub-section 2.2 reviews the relevant
theory and the extant empirical studies. Sub-section 2.3 summarises the research design
while sub-section 2.4 shows the model specication. Sub-section 2.5 discusses the empirical
methods and sub-section 2.6 elaborates on the dataset. Finally, sub-section 2.7 provides
the results and the main conclusions of this chapter are given in sub-section 2.8.
2.2 Literature review
One of the dominant themes in the nance academic literature is the concept of capital
marketsperformance. According to the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958),
under the assumption of perfect capital markets, rmsnancing policy is irrelevant. The
same point is emphasized by Stiglitz (1974), who shows that, in a perfect setting, the
market value of a rm is not inuenced by its nancial decisions. The key aspect in both
of these papers is that, in a perfect market, rms can easily obtain external nancing at
a fair price.
When the assumption of perfect markets is abandoned, nancial decisions become im-
portant. In such alternative setting, capital market imperfections can inuence rms
nancial status, especially for those more nancial constrained. In the presence of asym-
metric information, credit markets can give the balance sheet conditions of borrowers a
role to play in the business cycle, through their impact on the cost of external nance
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) develop a theoretical framework to explain how nancial
constraints and investment behaviour work. The rst approach is the credit view. This
suggests that reserve requirements on bank deposits may regulate the ability of banks to
grant loans. As a result, the borrowing and spending decisions of bank dependent rms
are a¤ected. The second approach is the nancial propagation mechanism. It explores the
idea that an initial decrease in the aggregate economic activity initiated by tight money
increases the impact on the borrowing and spending decisions of small rms. These rms
are more sensitive to credit market frictions. Hence, academic literature, nonetheless,
largely suggests that liquidity constraints are even more important to more vulnerable
rms (Myers, 1984).
In the following sub-sections it is presented the theoretical background as well as the
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key empirical studies on nancial constraints and employment decisions.
2.2.1 Theoretical background
Market imperfections play a specic role on rmsability to raise funds. In an imper-
fect market setting, there is a wedge between internal and external costs of funds due
to asymmetric information and agency costs (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). The pecking
order theory of Myers (1984) refers that information asymmetry has an impact on rms
availability of internal funds. Firms undertake investment without recurring to external
nance. However, in this scenario, it is relatively more expensive to invest due to transac-
tion costs, tax issues and costs associated with problems of asymmetric information (Allen
and Santomero, 1997). Firms seeking to nance new investments prefer to use funds ac-
cording to a hierarchy (i.e. internal funds, debt and equity issuance). This creates a gap
between the cost of internal and external funds.
Conicts between managers and shareholders also inuence rmsinvestment decisions.
The free cash ow model of Jensen (1986) suggests that managers have an incentive to
build up cash to increase the amount of assets under their control. The implementation
of projects which maximises managersown utility can lead to over-investment problems
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). In other words, rms with higher free cash ow are more likely
to invest in unproductive projects due to agency problems. Managers can spend money on
their own projects reducing rmsvalues. Firms facing nancial constraints may undertake
optimal investment decisions and be creative in improving capital e¢ ciency (Almeida et al.,
2013).
These problems can be particularly severe to SMEs. These rms can su¤er from higher
information opacity than larger ones. Capital market imperfections also limit the access
to bank lending for rms with lower nancial health (Hoshi et al., 1991). Bernanke et al.
(1996) develop a hypothesis to test the e¤ect of credit market imperfections on rmscost
of borrowing. The authors dene this mechanism as the nancial accelerator or credit
multiplier. In a context of nancial pressure, corporate investmentcyclical volatility is
strongly concentrated in specic periods which are followed by other periods of sharp
decline. Firms depending mainly on external nance, have higher costs of borrowing.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), demonstrate that a tightening monetary policy can also
damage rmscreditworthiness. A weak monetary system signicantly increases negative
shocks and inuence the ability of central banks to stabilise the economy. In other words,
a deterioration of rmsbalance sheet has an impact on rmsnancial stability. This
leads to an increase of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Mishkin, 2001).
Consequently, obtaining external funds from nancial institutions may be di¢ cult to small
and younger rms.
Another strand of the literature links nancial constraints with rmslabour decisions.
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Stiglitz and Greenwald (1993) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) develop a New Keynesian
model which includes nancial and labour market imperfections. They explore the e¤ect
of adjustment costs and information asymmetry in rmslabour demand and employment
uctuations. According to the authors, nancing attitude to risk and the optimal level
of output explain rmscorporate behaviour. The existence of information asymmetry
makes rmsability to raise funds in the external capital markets restricted (Stiglitz and
Greenwald, 1993). Firms not quoted in the stock market only have access to debt nancing.
This can increase the probability of bankruptcy for rms. Such bankruptcy aversion
inuences rms labour demand. If rmsnancial position is weak, labour demand is
lower due to the probability of higher risks of nancial distress in the future (Arnold, 2002).
In fact, the uctuation in labour demand may inuence the level of rmsemployment
and production.
In a similar model, Arnold (2002) identies a relation between nancial constraints and
employment. Following Stiglitz and Greenwald (1993) , the author develops a rational ex-
pectation model with nancial constraints. The model assumes that managers are strictly
bankruptcy averse and workers e¤orts rely on the real wage rate they are paid. The author
concludes that employment decreases for rms which face nancial constraints caused by
information asymmetry. In other words, labour demand and employment uctuates due
to changes in investment.
Overall, the aforementioned studies provide theoretical evidence that rmsinvestment
decisions and level of employment may vary according to the nancial pressure that rms
face. The majority of the empirical studies have focused on the extent to which rms
investment decisions are constrained by the availability of nance. Few studies have also
questioned the role of nancial constraints on rmsemployment level and recently, the
empirical literature has explored this issue on the nancial crisis. The next sub-sections
shed light on this debate by revising the main empirical studies on the nancial constraints
literature.
2.2.2 Financial constraints and Q investment models
Empirical literature on nancial constraints focuses mainly on the e¤ect of cash ow
sensitivity on rmsinvestment. The impact of nancial constraints on rmsinvestment
behaviour relies on the seminal paper by Fazzari et al. (1988). The authors extend the
neoclassical investment model and consider the e¤ect of Tobins Q, nancing constraints
and investment on the basis of rms retention behaviour. The Tobins Q approach is
employed as the stock market valuation of the rm to measure future returns to capital
(Johansen and Juselius, 1994). Fazzari et al. (1988) consider that investment spending
depends on the availability of cash ow. In other words, under imperfect capital markets,
cash ow has an impact on investment due to a nancing hierarchy in which internal
10
capital has an advantage cost over external capital (Myers, 1984).
Fazzari et al. (1988) use a sample of 421 manufacturing U.S. rms for the period of 1970
to 1984. They estimate two di¤erent Q models and classify rms according to di¤erences
in Tobins Q. The authors partition the sample according to rmslevel of dividends. In
particular they identify rms with lower dividends as most constrained(i.e. small and
young) and rms with higher dividends as unconstrained(i.e. listed and mature). This
a priori division allows Fazzari et al. (1988) to investigate the existence of a shadow price
di¤erential between internal and external nance (Calormiris and Hubbard, 1995). Firms
which have lower internal funds (i.e. short dividend payout ratios) are more sensitive to
uctuation in their cash ow. Fazzari et al. (1988) refers that information problems in the
capital markets lead to rmsnancial constraints on investment. Especially, for those
rms which retain most of their income. In e¤ect, rms use external nance to smooth
investment when internal nance uctuates. The results show that investment-cash ow
sensitivities are higher for rms classied as being more nancially constrained. The
authors conclude that capital market imperfections inuence rmsinvestment behaviour.
Particularly, for small and young rms which retain nearly all of their income.
A number of studies support Fazzari et al. (1988) main conclusions. They nd a
positive relation between cash ow and investment. For instance, Hoshi et al. (1991)
investigate the role of banks in corporate investment and internal funds. They use a
sample of Japanese rms and split the rms as Fazzari et al. (1988). The sub-sample of
rms is divided according to the Keiretsu a¢ liation (i.e. bank a¢ liated and una¢ liated
rms).2 For a panel of 145 manufacturing listed rms, the authors employ a regression
model which includes measures of liquidity, Tobins Q and lagged production. The results
indicate that strong ties help to alleviate liquidity constraints. Specically, Japanese
banks are considered as a primary source of external nance for bank a¢ liated rms.
Independent rms show more problems to raise capital. Thus, investment is more sensitive
for independent rms comparing with the bank a¢ liated ones. According to the authors,
this discrepancy is related to the asymmetric information of capital markets.
Schaller (1993) tests a Q model for liquidity constrained rms. The model employs age,
ownership, collateral assets and group a¢ liation. Using a sample of 212 Canadian rms
from 1973-1986, Schaller (1993) divide the sample according to the aforementioned rms
specic characteristics. The empirical ndings demonstrate that in contrast with mature
rms, younger rms pay a higher price to equity nance and their investment spending
is more a¤ected by liquidity. The results are in line with the idea that mature rms are
less likely to face information asymmetry. As rmsage increases, lenders get additional
information about rmsquality, adjusting the terms of nancial constraints. Therefore,
2Note that in the Japanese system, a main bank acts as a monitor and rms are members of large
industrial groups (i.e. Keiretsu). See Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) for details.
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for mature rms the costs of external capital should be lower (Brito and Mello, 1995).
The concentration of ownership is also important for the investment sensitivities of rms
cash ow. Schaller (1993) shows that rms pay more for new equity if the ownership is
disperse. The less concentrated the ownership of the rm, the higher is the risk faced
by an investment. Thus, the wedge between the cost of internal and external nance
increases. The author refers that rms investment spending without collateral assets
shows higher sensitivity to liquidity. The availability of collateral decreases the relevance
of information asymmetry between rms and potential lenders. Firms which invest less
in standardised assets are most subject to nancial constraints. Finally, the authors show
that group a¢ liation has an inuence on rmsinvestment-cash ow sensitivities.3 The
results indicate that equity nance is less costly for rms belonging to the industrial groups
and that their investment is less constrained in contrast with independent rms. Overall,
Schaller (1993) denote that information asymmetry inuences rmsinvestment behaviour.
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) investigate whether internal nance has an impact
on Research and Development (R&D) investment for a sample of 179 small, high-tech U.S.
rms. They test the importance of cash ow on R&D investment for rms between the
period of 1983 and 1987. In their study, the authors employ the following specication
models: the within-rms Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the between-rm OLS and the
instrumental variable method. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) refer that the within-
rms OLS avoids the possibility of correlation between internal nance (i.e. cash ow)
and R&D since the estimator controls for unobservable rm e¤ects. Not using a between-
rm OLS estimator can remove most of the sample variance which can lead to biased
results.4 Finally, the instrumental variable regression model controls for the high adjust-
ment cost bias of R&D. The GMM estimator which is proposed by Hansen (1982) is also
employed. This technique avoids serious sample-selection, simultaneity and measurement
error problems which can occur with a large dataset (Whited and Wu, 2006).5
Empirical ndings show a statistically signicant relation between R&D investment
and the use of internal nance for U.S. small rms. This is inconsistent with previous
empirical studies on R&D investment (Mueller, 1967; Elliot, 1971). However, these studies
investigate the same issue for samples of large rms. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)
interpret their results as evidence that contrary to small rms, large ones have an easier
access to debt nancing. Large rms generate cash ow in excess of investment needs.
3Note that Schaller (1993) employs the classication scheme suggested by Hoshi et al. (1991) The
authors classify rms membership as either group or non-group a¢ liated and consider group a¢ liated
rms as those which have strong stable group ties (i.e. Keiretsu groups).
4Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) claim that these estimates provide evidence on the extent to which
the within-rm estimates are biased downward due to the unresponsiveness of R&D to the transitory
component of cash ow.
5Note that the GMM estimator formalised by Hansen (1982) makes use of the orthogonality conditions
to allow for e¢ cient estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (Baum, 2001).
12
The authors conclude that the availability of cash ow (i.e. internal nance) is the main
determinant of investment for small R&D rms.
2.2.3 Financial constraints and Eulers investment models
A second set of the literature also uses a similar approach to Fazzari et al. (1988). These
studies employ a set of Euler equations. Contrary to Tobins Q, the Euler equation con-
siders the use of the stock market valuation of the rm to measure the marginal cost
of capital in the next period (Johansen and Juselius, 1994). Whited (1992) investigates
the role of debt markets estimating Euler equations. Using rm-level panel data of 325
manufacturing U.S. rms, the author employs the GMM estimator formalised by Hansen
(1982). Di¤erent nancial ratios are employed to test rmsinvestment behaviour. Firms
are considered nancially constrained if they have higher debt-to-assets and interest cov-
erage ratios. Euler equations are estimated for rms which are grouped according to the
aforementioned ratios. Whited (1992) nds that nancial variables are only signicant
for constrained rms (i.e. rms with low debt-to-asset and interest coverage ratio). The
impact of bond ratings on rmsbehaviour is also explored. Whited (1992) refers that
rms information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders decreases if rmsdebt is
rated. The sample is then divided into rms with and without corporate bond ratings.
The results suggest that for both groups, the credit ratio is less signicant than for the
group of the nancial ratio variables.
Bond and Meghir (1994) also investigate the investment-cash ow sensitivity. They
estimate an Euler equation for optimal capital accumulation in the presence of adjustment
costs. A panel of 626 unquoted U.K. manufacturing rms is employed over the period of
1974-1986. Using a GMM estimator, the authors split the sample into constrained and
unconstrained rms. The results demonstrate that cash ow has a negative inuence on
nancial constrained rms and it is not signicant for unconstrained rms. These ndings
are inconsistent with the Euler investment model.
Hubbard et al. (1995) use a sample of 428 manufacturing U.S. rms from 1976-1987
and an Euler equation of investment. The authors employ a GMM estimator on rms
discount factor through the dividend payout and borrowing constraints. The sample of
rms is divided a priori according to the following categories: higher and lower payout
ratios (i.e. unconstrained and constrained rms). Hubbard et al. (1995) nd a signicant
relation between investment-cash ow sensitivities for nancially constrained rms. The
results are insignicant for rms with low payout ratios. The authors also explore whether
investment for low payout rms is susceptible to capital market frictions. In this scenario,
low payout rms are separated in order to isolate the mature ones. The results suggest
that xed investment of mature rms is successfully described by the Euler equation for
market imperfections. Finally, an alternative model is estimated. In this model, rms
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cost of funds depends on a measure of tightness o¤ aggregate credit conditions and cash
ow. Results suggest that nancially constrained rms are a¤ected by credit markets
conditions.
2.2.4 The Kaplan and Zingales critique
Sub-section 2.2.2 shows that a number of studies have supported the argument of Fazzari
et al. (1988), i.e. that there is a positive relation between nancial variables and rmsac-
tivities which is stronger for rms which su¤er from higher levels of nancial constraints.
Fazzari et al. (1988) introduce the cash ow variable to explore whether information
asymmetry has an impact on the accumulation of rmsinternal funds. The approach of
Fazzari et al. (1988) shows that rms with positive investment cash ow sensitivities are
characterised as being nancially constrained since it is costly for these rms to obtain
access to external nance. In other words, the authors show that the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash ow is higher for the group of rms which are classied a priori with a low
payout rate. This view is challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The authors have
raised questions regarding the interpretation of investment cash ow sensitivity as a mea-
sure of nancial constraints. They suggest that positive investment cash ow sensitivities
may not reect nancial constraints as it is argued by Fazzari et al. (1988). Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) suggest that corporate investment is less sensitive to uctuations in cash
ow for nancially constrained rms.
To provide evidence on their argument, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) re-examine the
sample of 49 low-dividend payout rms from the work of Fazzari et al. (1988). In other
words, the authors test both Euler equation and Q model only on the sample of rms
which Fazzari et al. (1988) identify as nancially constrained. In contrast with Fazzari
et al. (1988) which have identied nancial constraints based on the payout policy of rms
as a classication criteria, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have classied rms as nancially
constrained based on operating performance. They consider public statements of Chief
Executive O¢ cer (CEO) regarding the access to credit of rms. Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) use a measure based on qualitative information which is gathered from rmsannual
report or 10-K for each of the sample year.6 Contrary to Fazzari et al. (1988), the
authors divide manufacturing rms in three di¤erent categories (i.e. nancially, possible
and not nancially constrained).7 Empirical results show that 85% of these rms cannot
be classied as nancially constraints. They have raised their investment level by using
6Note that all U.S. publicly held rms are required to le an annual report or 10-K by the Security
Exchange Act (SEC) of 1934. Both form 10-k and the annual shareholders report include nancial
statements and other data which denotes rmsaccounting personnel and its independent auditors. Firms
are also required to disclose whether they have di¢ culties nancing investments.
7As it is explained in sub-section 2.2.2 Fazzari et al. (1988) split the sample of rms as follows: rms
with low dividends "most constrained " (i.e. small/young) and rms with high dividends "unconstrained"
(i.e. listed and mature).
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credit lines and internal funds. In other words, less constrained rms actually exhibit
greater investment cash ow sensitivities. In this scenario cash ow is capturing investment
opportunities not capture by Tobins Q. Hence, the authors raise some doubts about the
rationale and interpreation of the study of Fazzari et al. (1988).
In response to this criticism, Fazzari et al. (2000) provide a set of arguments for the
reasons why the results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are misleading and not conclusive.
For example, they refer that the results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are based on a very
small sample of rms which makes it di¢ cult to support the magnitude of the results (i.e.
the authors only use the low dividend payout sample of rms). Fazzari et al. (2000) also
argue that the classication criteria which is used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is in
fact subjective and not clear. The former employ statements of managers about the rms
liquidity and access to external nance but the weights which are used for the di¤erent
criteria are not specied. Fazzari et al. (2000) also denote that the classication scheme of
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) reects the degree of nancial distress a rm faces rather than
the degree of nancial constraints. According to the authors nancially distressed rms
should exhibit lower sensitivity to cash ow since they may face restrictions by creditors
when using internal funds for investment. The argument of Fazzari et al. (2000) is that in
the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), rms which face nancial distress are removed
from the sample, and as a result very few observations should fall in the aforementioned
constrained category which is dened by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). To sum up, Fazzari
et al. (2000) refer that the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in not theoretically and
empirically accurate.
Overall, these results have led to an intense debate on how to analyse the sensitivity to
cash ow and which classication criteria should be used to dene nancially constrained
and unconstrained rms. In the next sub-sections it is discussed the subsequent studies
on these issues.
2.2.5 Q and Eulers investment models: Subsequent debate
The following studies try to explain and reconcile the ndings of the two abovementioned
views. For example, Cleary (1999) uses a larger sample and classify rms according to
their ability to raise external nance. The author employs a classication index similar to
the Z-score model of Altman (1968) to determine rmsnancial status.8 Using a sample
of 1,317 listed U.S. rms, Cleary (1999), classify rms which reduce dividends payments as
nancially constrained. The author considers that the rmsclassication changes every
period to account for rms which nancial status changes continuously. The ndings
8In a seminal paper, Altman (1968) develops the Z-score model for predicting bankruptcy. The author
combines ve di¤erent nancial ratios. They are dened as follows: X1= working capital/total assets;
X2= retained earnings/total assets; X3= earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; X4= total share-
holdersequity/total debt; X5= total revenue/total assets.
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suggest that more creditworthy rms present higher sensitivity of investment-liquidity.
The results provide a strong support for the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ndings.
Gomes (2001) develops a structural model of investment behaviour in order to simu-
lated data with a Q model with asymmetric information. Using 12,323 observations of
U.S. rms, the author shows that the existence of nancial constraints is not su¢ cient to
establish cash ow as an indicator of nancial constraints. In the model, optimal invest-
ment is sensitive to cash ow and Tobins Q. Gomes (2001) demonstrates that cash ow
is important only if Tobins Q is ignored but without any market frictions cash ow is sig-
nicant. According to the author, the success of previous cash ow augmented regressions
are related to the combination of a measurement error in Tobins Q and identication
problems in a linear regression framework.
Consistent with Gomes (2001), Alti (2003) creates a model of investment behaviour
exploring the impact of rmsgrowth and investment using data from the same sample of
Fazzari et al. (1988). Younger rms are considered as nancially constrained. According
to Alti (2003), these rms face higher uncertainty regarding their growth prospects. The
results indicate that investment is sensitive to cash ow in environments with no nancial
frictions. The author report that young and small rms (i.e. with higher growth rates and
lower dividend payout ratios) present higher sensitivity to cash ow. Young rms with
higher growth rates show higher levels of Tobins. These ndings are inconsistent with
Fazzari et al. (1988).
The previous studies suggest that least nancially constrained rms present higher
investment-cash ow. This is inconsistent with the investment-cash ow sensitivity sug-
gested by Fazzari et al. (1988). As such, investment-cash ow sensitivity cannot be seen
as an evidence of corporate nancial constraints.
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) study the inuence of negative cash ow observations
on the investment sensitivities of non-nancial and non-utility U.S. listed rms. Firstly,
based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), they use a subset of Fazzari et al.
(1988)sample. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) perform a model specication which
is given by Tobins Q. Secondly, the authors investigate the empirical ndings of Cleary
(1999). Specically, they consider a measure of nancial constraints (i.e. Z-score) and a
discriminant analysis for the sub-sample of dividend payout ratios.
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) attribute the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
and Cleary (1999) to the existence of negative cash ow observations from the samples.
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) show that such negative observations, inuence invest-
ment cash ow sensitivities of nancially constrained rms. After dropping the negative
observations, empirical ndings suggest a positive relation between nancial constraints
and cash ow. This is in line with the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary
(1999)).
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Other authors demonstrate that the results regarding rmsinvestment-cash ow sen-
sitivity depend on the choice of the proxy for nancial constraints. For instance, Whited
and Wu (2006) develop an index of nancial constraints. It is based on a GMM estima-
tor of an investment Euler equation. The index avoids the introduction of measurement
bias since it does not include Tobins Q as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). In each year,
rms are classied according to the index of Whited and Wu (2006). Firms with higher
levels of nancial constraints belong to the higher half of the distribution whereas rms
with lower levels of nancial constraints are located in the lower half. The authors nd
that rms with higher levels of nancial constraints are associated with higher exposure
to external nance. These rms are characterised as being small, under-invest and do
not present bond ratings. The results are inconsistent with the ndings by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997).
In a related study, Almeida and Campello (2007) consider a new theoretical assumption
which allows to test empirically the link between nancial frictions and rmsinvestment.
The authors assume that tangible assets increase rmsability to achieve external funding.
This helps rms to increase their investment when imperfect access to credit is considered.
Almeida and Campello (2007) refer that these assets mitigate contractibility problems, i.e.
they increase the value that can be taken by creditors in default states.
Using a sample of 18,304 rm-year observations frommanufacturing rms for the period
between 1985 and 2000, the authors test the impact of tangibility on investment-cash ow
sensitivities on di¤erent proxies of nancial constraints. The authors use a similar model
to Fazzari et al. (1988) but include an interaction term which accounts for the impact of
asset tangibility on the investment-cash ow sensitivities.9 Almeida and Campello (2007)
use the switching regression framework instead of dividing rms a priori. In other words,
they add the access to credit of nancially constrained rms with investment equations.
The results suggest that asset tangibility increases with investment-cash ow but only
for nancial rms. Interestingly, the switching regression estimator also demonstrates that
rms with higher asset tangibility have a higher probability of being nancially uncon-
strained.
Contrary to previous studies, Guariglia (2008) explores the investment-cash ow sensi-
tivity on a panel of unquoted rms. Using an unbalanced panel model of 7,534 unquoted
U.K. rms for the period 1993-2003, the author employs an error-correction method instead
of a Q investment model. Guariglia (2008) refers that the error-correction specication
allows a more exible specication since it is less likely to su¤er from misspecication prob-
lems. The author explores the extent to which internal and external nancially constrained
rms have di¤erent sensitivity of investment to cash ow. The impact of investment on
9The authors use expected liquidation value of rmsoperating assets (i.e. cash, accounts receivables,
inventories and xed capital) based on Berger et al. (1996).
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internal nancial constrains is tested. The sample of rms is divided according to rms
cash ow-to-capital ratio.
Additionally, the impact on external nancial constraints is also explored. The author
splits the sample using rmssize. Cash ow is used to investigate the degree of internal
and external nancial constraints which rms face. A rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is
employed. This approach is dened by Arellano and Bond (1991). It considers unobserved
rm heterogeneity, estimates the equation in rst-di¤erences and controls for possible
endogeneity problems.
Similarly to Whited and Wu (2006), the results also show that the sensitivity of
investment-to-cash ow depends on criteria which is considered. Guariglia (2008) shows
that when proxies for external nance constraints are used (i.e. size, dividend payout)
the results are consistent with Fazzari et al. (1988). However, if the classication is based
on the level of internal funds, the investment-cash ow relation is U-shaped. In terms of
internal nancial constraints, these ndings support those by Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
The combination of internal and nancial constraints indicates that investment sensitivity
is higher for the externally nancially constrained rms (i.e. rms with higher level of
internal funds).
In a similar study, Spaliara (2009) explores the sensitivity of the capital-labour ratio
to nancial factors. The author investigates the relation between the capital-labour ratio
with cash ow, leverage and collateral for a set of constrained and unconstrained rms.
Spaliara (2009) uses a sample of 17,350 manufacturing rms over the period 1994-2004.
The sample of rms is split by size, age and bank dependence. As Guariglia (2008), the
author employs a rst-di¤erence GMM estimator. The results indicate that nancially
constrained rms show a higher sensitivity of their capital-labour ratio when comparing
with their unconstrained counterparts.
Another strand of the literature has also accounted to the e¤ect of an exogenous change
in the supply of external nance on rmsbehaviour. For example, Von Kalckreuth (2001)
explores the impact of interest rates and monetary policy on the xed investment of
German rms. Using an unbalanced panel of 6,408 rms for the period between 1988 to
1997, the author employs an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model to capture the
e¤ect of the investment-capital ratio. The model also includes the ratio of cash ow-to-
capital stock as a proxy for rmslevel of nancial constraints. Results demonstrate that
nancially constrained rms present lower user cost sensibility. The results indicate that
there is no sensitivity to cash ow for both sub-samples.
Mojon et al. (2002) study the e¤ect of changes in the monetary policy on euro area
rmsinvestment behaviour. The authors use a rm-specic interest rate (i.e. implicit
interest rate) and employ a sample of rms from France, Germany, Italy and Spain for
the period between 1983 and 1988. The authors estimate the e¤ect of changes in the rm-
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specic interest rate on rmsinvestment using two di¤erent estimators, i.e. the within
estimator and the instrumental variable estimator.
Empirical ndings show that rm-specic characteristics have an impact on the interest
rate that rms are charged. In particular, the results suggest that the average interest rate
is statistically signicant and higher for small rms. The results do not show that small
rmsinvestment is more sensitive to changes in the user cost of capital than investment
of large rms. Mojon et al. (2002) conclude that these results provide little evidence that
the monetary policy in these euro area countries during this period has an heterogeneous
e¤ect on rms.
Arslan et al. (2006) study the relation between nancing constraints and investment-
cash ow sensitivities. They focus on the level of rmscash holdings as the main clas-
sication variable to distinguish between nancially constrained and unconstrained rms.
According to the authors, higher cash holdings indicates that rmsare able to obtain
protable investment opportunities.
The authors use a sample of publicly traded Turkish rms for the period between 1998
and 2002. They focus their analysis before and during the nancial crisis to test the role
of cash reserves in a scenario with higher level of information asymmetry and higher costs
of external nance.10 Arslan et al. (2006) construct a cash model which captures capital
market imperfections to explore the target cash level of each rm. Following the investment
model of Fazzari et al. (1988), the sample of rms is divided in nancially constrained and
unconstrained categories based on di¤erent proxies, i.e. size, age, dividend payouts and
business group a¢ liation.
The empirical results indicate that the impact of nancial constraints on rmsinvest-
ment is related to the level of cash rms hold. Financially constrained rms have higher
investment-cash ow sensitivities than their unconstrained counterparts, especially during
the crisis.
Blalock et al. (2008) focus on the nancial constraints issue for rms during the emerg-
ing market nancial crisis in East Asia in 1997.11 The authors use foreign ownership to
test if capital market imperfections limit the level of investment in Indonesia. The authors
identify the e¤ect of nancial crisis on rmsperformance using the value added, invest-
ment and employment. Blalock et al. (2008) perform a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach.
The method compares changes in the outcome in the domestic-own exporters and non-
exporters groups, before and after the nancial intervention. They conclude that capital
10According to Akyüz and Boratav (2003) the volatility of the nancial markets and banking sector in
Turkey lead to a nancial crisis. Turkey experienced a nancial crisis during the 2000-2001 period.
11Baig and Goldfajn (1999) refer that the Asian nancial crisis started in July 1997, with the devaluation
of Thailands currency after the bankruptcy of Thailands largest nance company (i.e. Finance one).
A second sub-period of the crisis started in November 1997, after the collapsed of the stock market of
Hong Kong. This crisis led to the collapse of economic growth in several East Asian countries. Financial
intervention was provided by the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
19
market imperfections reduce exporterinvestment and amplify emerging market crisis.
Chava and Purnanandam (2011) investigate the credit contraction in the U.S. in 1998
which originated in Russia. The authors estimate a model which considers rm-specic
factors. In particular, the authors use demand shocks proxies (i.e. protability and growth
rates) and a supply shock proxy (i.e. rmscapital). The results reveal that banks which
are a¤ected by the crisis reduce their supply of credit.
Görg and Spaliara (2014) study the e¤ects of rmsborrowing ratio, nancial health
and their export exit from 2000 to 2009. They use an unbalanced panel of 14,533 U.K.
rms and employ a log-log hazard model. The model is based on the version of the Cox
proportional hazard model. This model assumes that the hazard function for separate
samples converges with time (Jenkins, 2005). The authors show that during the crisis
period, the impact of rmsinterest payments on the risk of export failure is higher in
comparison to the tranquil period (2000-2006). They refer that rms with higher borrow-
ing ratio, are likely to exit the export market during the crisis period. Görg and Spaliara
(2014) conclude that the deterioration of rmsnancial position increases the hazard of
export exit of U.K rms.
Recently, Guariglia et al. (2015) investigate the link between interest payments and
rmschances of survival. Using a panel of U.K. rms from the period between 2000 and
2009, the authors employ a complementary log-log model to capture the probability of
rms failure. Guariglia et al. (2015) demonstrate that the debt-servicing costs have a
direct e¤ect on rmssurvival. The empirical results show that during the recent credit
crisis, the relation between rmsinterest payments and their change of survival is higher.
The authors conclude that changes in the debt-serving costs a¤ect mainly rms which are
young, non-exporting and depend mainly on external nance.
Overall, the aforementioned studies provide a promising framework to examine the
cash ow-sensitivity of rms, especially in the context of the recent nancial crisis. It is
clear that the sensitivity of investment-cash ow varies according to the level of nancial
constraints rms face. Thus, studying euro area rms reaction to the nancial crisis
provides a privileged opportunity to contribute for this on-going debate.
2.2.6 Financial constraints and employment decisions
Empirical research regarding the determinants of employment at a rm level is limited.
One of the rst contributions in this domain belongs to Nickell and Wadhwani (1991). The
authors develop an employment model in the presence of bargaining and wagese¢ ciency.
They explore whether insider and outsider forces are relevant to determine wage (Graaand
and Lever, 1996). The authors classify insider forces based on prices and productivity and
measure outsider determinants as unemployment and alternative wages. Using a sample of
219 quoted U.K. manufacturing rms over the period 1972-1982, the authors employ a rst
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di¤erence GMM estimator. Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) demonstrate that employment
is negatively related to rmsown wage and that it decreases with the rmsleverage ratio.
Sharpe (1994) investigates rmsnancial structure on the cyclicality of their employ-
ment policies. The author estimates pooled regressions using 2,192 manufacturing U.S.
rms on annual net sales, number of employees, rmssize and leverage. Firstly, to avoid
problems of endogeneity, the author employs macroeconomic variables (i.e. consumer price
index, ination rate, ratios of sales and growth). Sharpe (1994) considers that employ-
ment growth and sales are interrelated since changes in employment a¤ect the level of
sales. As such, the use of macroeconomic variables allows the separation of rmssize and
leverage on unexpected shock to rmsdemand (Basset et al., 2010). Secondly, Sharpe
(1994) groups industries according to the historical covariance between their sales and the
Gross National Product Average (GNP). The set of high covariance industries includes all
the durable goods industries (Campello, 2003). The empirical ndings show a signicant
relation between rmsleverage and the cyclicality of rmsworkforce. The results indi-
cate that although leverage increases rmsemployment sensitivity, the inuence on sales
is higher for rms producing durable goods. Small rms quickly lay o¤ workers during
a recession. Sharpe (1994) attributes the results to the existence of hiring and training
costs. The costs induce healthy rms to save labour whilst small rms are willing to adjust
their workforce more since they face higher opportunity costs of capital.
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) investigate the impact of nancial pressure on rmsbe-
haviour in the form of employment decisions, wage settlements and productivity growth.
Using an unbalanced panel model of 670 manufacturing U.K. listed rms, the authors
employ a labour demand equation from a quadratic adjustment cost model.12 The model
follows a standard production function. Firmsoutput is a function of employment, capital
and a multiplicative technological factor. Sharpe (1994) obtain a reduce form of the em-
ployment demand equation which stands as the basic equation of their empirical analysis.
The impact of nancial pressure is measured by the ratio of interest payments to cash ow
(i.e. borrowing ratio) and a Treasury Bill yield. In order to avoid endogeneity problems,
the authors use a set of instruments for the nancial determinants. Specically, they use
the borrowing ratio two or three years lag and the Treasury Bill yield to ensure that both
nancial variables are uncorrelated with current employment shocks. Exogenous variables
(i.e. short term demand, price and cost expectations) are included in the employment
equation.13 The labour demand equation is employed with the rst-di¤erence GMM esti-
mator by Arellano and Bond (1991). The empirical results indicate that nancial pressure
has a negative impact on employment, wages and a positive impact on productivity. Nick-
12Note that in the standard quadratic adjustment cost model,Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) create a log
approximation of a standard quadratic model. In their model, the employment of year t depends on the
previous employment level. All the future levels of desired employment are adjusted by a discount factor.
13Information is collected from the publish data by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
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ell and Nicolitsas (1999) also divided the sample in two equal size groups (i.e. above and
below the median) for the average employment, ratio of dividends to assets and the ratio
of debt to capital stock. The results suggest that there is no di¤erence between small and
large rms regarding the e¤ect of the borrowing ratio. The same outcome is obtained for
higher and lower dividend rms.
After the publication of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) a number of studies provide em-
pirical support on how nancial pressure a¤ects rmsemployment decisions. For instance,
Benito and Young (2007) investigate rmsnancial pressure through the level of dividend
payments, propensity to issue new equity and rates of investment. Their empirical strat-
egy is to examine the role of dividends, investment and the use of new equity nance as
functions of rmsnancial characteristics. Firstly, to develop a dividend equation, the
authors follow Bond et al. (1996). Benito and Young (2007) consider a model in which
dividends are normalised by rms sales and capital stock.14 Secondly, the investment
equation is based on Blundell et al. (1992) and includes a nancial pressure (i.e. the bor-
rowing ratio).15 Benito and Young (2007) use a panel of U.K. listed rms between 1980
and 1998 and employ a dynamic GMM estimator. The authors nd a negative relation
between dividends and cash ow. Results also show a negatively inuence of dividends on
investment rates and the level of indebtedness. Firms more likely to issue equity present
lower levels of cash and high levels of investment and debt. Benito and Young (2007) refer
that the results indicate the inuence of debt-servicing costs on dividend payments and
investment expenditures.
Drawing on the work by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Benito and Hernando (2008) ob-
tain the same empirical ndings as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) but for Spanish rms.
The authors use the labour demand equation derived by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) also
employing nancial factors. The model of Benito and Hernando (2008) di¤ers from the
one of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). Firstly, the authors consider as nancial variables
not only borrowing ratio but also cash ow, liquidity and net indebtedness. Secondly,
they consider a demand shock proxy measured as the growth in log of real sales. Using a
panel model over the period 1985-2001, they employ the labour demand equation with a
system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This method considers
the estimator with the level equations together with Arellano and Bond (1991) usual lag
di¤erences (Baum, 2001). Consistent with the previous empirical ndings by Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999), the borrowing ratio has a signicant and negative inuence on employ-
14Bond et al. (1996) explore the behaviour of a sample of 1,218 U.K. industrial and commercial rms in
order to verify if the presence of surplus advance corporate tax (ACT) inuences rmsdividend payments.
As such, their regression model relates dividends to prots and rm size and both dividends and prots
are divided by total sales in order to compare measures between small and large rms.
15Blundell et al. (1992) estimate a Q model of investment. The measurement error in the average
Tobins Q is corrected when it is serial uncorrelated by using lagged values of average Q as instrumental
variables.
22
ment. The results suggest that the borrowing ratio a¤ects rmsnancial constraints,
and therefore, has an impact on labour demand. Benito and Hernando (2008) do not
nd a signicant inuence of liquidity, cash ow and net indebtedness on Spanish rms
employment. Regarding the demand for exible and rigid labour, the authors show that
temporary employment is more volatile for Spanish manufacturing rms and permanent
labour contracts are una¤ected by nancial factors.
In a complementary paper, Caggese and Cuñat (2008) explore how hiring and ring
cost are related with nancial constraints and inuence rmsemployment policies. They
use a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing rms for the period 1995-2000.
The model considers the impact of nancial constraints on employment decisions, xed-
term and permanent employment. The regression model uses a qualitative measure of
nancial constrains which is based on a survey to rms . The authors use capital and
sales as control variables in all regressions. Results indicate that xed-term contracts are
used more intensively by nancially constrained rms. Financially constrained rms also
present a higher volatility of total employment comparing with the unconstrained ones.
Fixed-term contracts are more volatile than permanent contracts. The authors conclude
that nancial market imperfections denote an increase in expected ring cost which makes
permanent contracts implicitly more expensive.
Recently, Chen and Guariglia (2009) investigate whether nancial factors have an im-
pact on rmslevel of employment. The authors use a sample of 16,000 Chinese manufac-
turing rms over the period of 2000 to 2005. Chen and Guariglia (2009) follow the model
of employment by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and use six nancial factors (i.e. cash
ow, interest burden, collateral, leverage, interest coverage and borrowing ratios). The
system GMM approach is employed. The sample is dened in two ways. First, the authors
split rms according to their ownership (i.e. rms owned by the state, foreign investors,
collective and private investors). Secondly, rmsare divided by their geographic location
(i.e. east, central and west). Chen and Guariglia (2009) refer that di¤erent ownerships can
be associated with di¤erent pension schemes and benets. This can a¤ect rmslabour
costs. Furthermore, rmslocation can also have an impact on the level of employment.
Labour regulations may be di¤erent across the regions. The empirical results indicate
that the six nancial factors inuence rmslevel of employment. In particular, Chen and
Guariglia (2009) refer that the debt-servicing costs ratios (i.e. interest burden, borrowing
and coverage ratio) have a negative impact on the level of employment. This is consistent
with the role of economic uctuations by the monetary policy channel. In terms of rms
ownership, the empirical ndings suggest that interest burden is not signicant for any of
the sample ownership categories. However, the authors show that the level of employment
for foreign owned rms is negatively related to cash ow and leverage. Collective rms
increase their level of employment with their leverage and private rms show a positive
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relation with collateral, cash ow, borrowing and coverage ratio. Eastern rms reduce
their level of employment with an increase of the coverage ratio and collateral. Interest
burden has also a negative inuence on central rmslevel of employment. Finally, all the
nancial factors are not signicant for western rms.
2.2.7 Employment level and labour market regulation
Research on labour markets also sheds light on how job creation is a¤ected by credit
market frictions. Acemoglu (2001) investigates whether the availability of credit markets
to provide loans to new rms a¤ects the level of employment. The author follows Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and classies sectors according to rmsdependence on U.S. credit.
The share of European countries employment through data provided from Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also considered. Acemoglu (2001)
employs a two-sector search model. This approach indicates that in the presence of a
technological shock the ability of rms to take advantage of the new technology depends
on the status of the credit markets. The author refers that, in a rigid credit market, new
rms cannot borrow cash and as a result, unemployment increases. In a exible credit
market, funds may be channel quickly to new rms. In this scenario, rms can create
employment and avoid losing their workforce. The results show that since the 1960s
the rate of unemployment is always higher for rms in Europe which are more external
dependent. The author refers that nancial constrains are considered as obstacles to
employment. It hinders new investment especially for rms which create jobs.
Another strand of the literature, also demonstrates that nancial factors inuence
employment decisions. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) analyse interaction between product
and labour market regulation on employment. A sample of OECD countries between 1980
and 2002 is employed. The authors consider that the employment rate depends on the
determinants which a¤ect both demand and supply of labour. Following the work of
Layard et al. (1991) the authors use a bargaining model. The model assumes that real
wages are the result of a bargaining process between employers and employees with a
labour demand schedule (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005).16 They conclude that product
market deregulation is more e¤ective at the margin in highly-regulated markets.
Berger and Danninger (2007) posit that when labour market policies are less restricted,
product market deregulation is more e¢ cient. The authors investigate the e¤ect of growth
employment. They use aggregate sector employment and regulation data from 1990-2004.
Data is collected from a panel of OECD countries. The authors use an unrestricted dy-
namic model of employment growth with interaction e¤ects between product and labour
16Note that Layard et al. (1991) create an employment model which imposes a nominal rigidity in the
form of sticky price expectations and includes the variable money. The model permits to trace out the
e¤ect of shocks that has its origins outside of the labour market.
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market regulation. The results indicate that when labour market policies are less re-
stricted, product market deregulation is more e¢ cient. The e¤ect on employment is higher
when deregulation includes both labour and product markets.
Nickell et al. (2005) show that unemployment across OECD countries is explained by
shifts in labour market institutions. The authors use a regression equation which considers
interactions between institutions and factors. According to the authors, these interactions
can explain the deviation of unemployment in the short run (i.e productivity and wage
shocks). The results indicate that employment protection, labour taxes and unemployment
benet system increases unemployment. Finally, Fiori et al. (2012) study a dynamic panel
model for OECD countries over the period 1980-2002. The empirical ndings suggest a
negative relation between product and labour market regulation. The authors conclude
that employment increases when barriers to entry are reduced.
In a contribution to this area of the literature, Belke and Fehn (2001) examine the
impact of venture capital markets on nancial constraints. They compare employment
behaviour in continental European countries with Anglo-Saxon economies for the period
1986-1999. Belke and Fehn (2001) use a model which includes macroeconomic indicators
(i.e. unemployment rate) institutional labour market variables (i.e. employment protec-
tion index) and venture capital investment time series (i.e. venture capital investment).
They nd that employment protection increases unemployment. Results also indicate that
venture capital a¤ects employment growth. Belke and Fehn (2001) refer that a less develop
venture capital delays the creation of new rms, and penalises the creation of employment.
Recent research explores the inuence of nancial and labour market factors in a multi-
country framework. Rault and Vaubourg (2012) estimate a panel Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) model of 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. The authors document
that in countries such as Belgium, Italy and Spain, nancial factors inuence the impact
of labour market exibility or increases unemployment. Empirical ndings for Austria,
Finland and Portugal show the opposite e¤ect. Moreover, Gatti et al. (2012) estimate a
dynamic panel model for twenty OECD countries from 1980 to 2004 and employ a GMM
estimator. The results suggest that interactions between labour and nancial factors also
have an impact on unemployment. An increase in the stock market capitalisation reduces
unemployment for weak labour market institutions (i.e. union density and wage bargaining
centralisation). Finally, an increase in intermediated credit creates more unemployment
with strongly regulated and coordinated labour markets.
Overall previous empirical studies suggest that labour market decisions have an impact
on the level of employment. Thus, it is relevant to investigate whether labour markets
disparities help explain employment changes of European rms.
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2.2.8 The nancial crisis
In this sub-section the most recent empirical literature is described which links the e¤ect
of the recent nancial crisis with rmsnancial decisions. Sub-section 2.2.8.1 shows the
recent studies based on surveys whereas sub-section 2.2.8.2 refers to studies on rm-level
data on this issue.
2.2.8.1 Studies based on surveys
Recent studies have considered the use of surveys to investigate rms real decisions
during the crisis. To begin with, Campello et al. (2010) study the impact of the global
credit crisis on listed rms which face credit constraints. They use a survey of 1,050
corporate managers in U.S., Europe and Asia from December of 2008. The authors nd
evidence that rms forego protable investment opportunities during the crisis as a result
of binding external nancing constraint. However, they show that nancially constrained
rms are forced to use their cash holdings during the crisis and cut their planned dividend
distributions. Campello et al. (2010) refer that nancially constrained rms cut more
on investment, technology and even employment in comparison with unconstrained rms.
The authors denote that rms which face nancial constraints restrict investment since
they are constrained before and during the crisis.
Similar, Campello et al. (2011) survey corporate managers regarding rmscredit lines.
They investigate rmslines of credit during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis from 31 countries
in North America, Europe and Asia. Results show that rms which are considered small,
private, non-investment and unprotable present higher lines of credit during the crisis
period. Moreover, Campello et al. (2011) study whether rmscash and protability have
an impact on the use of credit lines. First, they employ OLS regression models in which
they regress lines of credit on cash ow and rm-specic measures.17 Results show that
rms which have enough internal funds do not use lines of credit. According to the authors,
rms appear to substitute cash reserves for investment at lower levels of credit lines.
Campello et al. (2012) explore the relation between access to credit and investment
decisions during the nancial crisis. They conduct two surveys on a total of 600 managers
in 20 countries in Europe and North America. Their aim is to investigate the impact of
corporate liquidity on investment for the European sample in the middle of the crisis.18
Using a two-step GMM the regression assumes the CFOs planned percentage changes
in capital expenditures on cash holdings. Line of credits and indicators such as rm
17Campello et al. (2011) employs two dependent variables. The rst corresponds to the ratio of credit
lines to the sum of lines of credit and cash reserves. The second is the ratio of unused credit lines to the
sum of unused lines of credit and cash holdings. Firms-specic measures include investment growth, size,
credit ratings and the ease of access to credit.
18Campello et al. (2012) collect surveys conducted in the rst and second quarters of 2009.
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size, ownership and nancial constraints are also employed. The results show that access
to external liquidity signicantly a¤ects corporate investments for rms with large cash
reserves. The authors refer that internal and external sources of liquidity play an important
role in planning investment and employment during the crisis.
Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) study the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis on the transi-
tion from employment to unemployment, using rm size and nancial needs. They study
three di¤erent recession periods in the U.S. (i.e. 1990-1991, 2001 and the 2007-2009 re-
cessions). Using the Current Population survey (CPS) to capture unemployment status,
the dependence on external nance is dened as the proportion of capital expenditures
which is nanced with external funds.19 During the 2008-2009 nancial crisis, rm size
and external nancial dependence are divided into three di¤erent categories according to
the distribution of external nance dependence. The results show a monotonic relation
between the propensity of becoming unemployed and rm size. The empirical ndings
are only valid for industries with high external nance dependence. Duygan-Bump et al.
(2015) also identify a monotonic relation between external nance and changes in unem-
ployment only for small rms. Finally, the ndings for the recession of 1990-1991 support
the empirical ndings. The results indicate that unemployment is found among workers
who belong in rms depending more on external nance. Conversely, the 2001 reces-
sion has no impact on unemployment. As the authors state the core of the recession is
the technological sector and not the banking sector as in the 1990-1991 and 2007-2009
recessions.
Finally, Hetland and Mjøs (2012) examine the relation between credit constraints and
rms investment crisis for a sample of Norwegian private rms. As Campello et al.
(2010), the authors employ a survey of 500 Norwegian rms from the autumn of 2010.
They investigate to what extend rms that are more or less nancially constrained are
more likely to reduce investments due to reduced access to credit. Based on Almeida et al.
(2004), the authors employ a model which tests whether nancial constraints cause a
demand for hedging against future cash ow shortfalls.20 They refer that changes in credit
availability a¤ect investment the most for rms which are less nancially constrained.
2.2.8.2 Firm-level studies
The recent empirical literature also focused on the role of the nancial crisis at a rm-
level setting. One set of the studies explore rmsinvestment decisions during the crisis.
For example, Duchin et al. (2010) explore the impact of the crisis on corporate invest-
ment, during the rst year of the crisis (i.e. July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008). A sample of
19Duchin et al. (2010) dene the dependence on external nance as in Cetorelli and Strahan (2006).
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) dene the dependence on external nance as the proportion of capital
expenditures nanced with external funds.
20Almeida et al. (2004) use the cash ow sensitivity of cash holdings to test for nancial constraints.
Please refer to Chapter 2 sub-section 2.3.5 for details on this study.
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26,421 quarterly observations for 3,668 U.S. listed rms is used to compare rmsinvest-
ment policies before and during the crisis. The sample of rms is split in three di¤erent
groups (i.e. internal nancial resources, external nancial constraints and dependent on
external nance). To measure nancial constraints, the authors employ the indicators of
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006). Firmssize is measured by total
assets, payout ratio and bond ratings. The results demonstrate that unconstrained and
constrained rms show a decrease in the level of investment after the crisis. This decrease
is higher for rms which face nancial constraints.
Duchin et al. (2010) also test rms dependence on external nance based on the
method of Rajan and Zingales (1998).21 The results indicate that the level of investment
decreases after the crisis for rms which present higher levels of information asymmetry or
belong to industries depending on external nance. The authors also extend the sample
period to March 2009. Results are robust to the previous ndings, and therefore conrm
that corporate investment continues to decrease.
Almeida et al. (2012) investigate the impact of the crisis on U.S. listed rms in-
vestment. The authors use long-term debt maturity to identify the impact of nancial
contracting on rmsbehaviour. A Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence (DID) matching estimator is
employed. The results indicate that rms which have their long-term debt maturing after
the third quarter of 2007, decrease their investment in comparison to the rms which debt
matures over the rst three quarters of 2008.
Claessens et al. (2012) explore whether changes in the external nancing, domestic
demand and international trade have an impact on rmsinvestment conditions, sales and
prots. The authors use 7,722 non-nancial rms from 42 countries between 2007 and
2009. Firmsdependence on external nance is dened based on capital investment and
working capital.22
Empirical ndings suggest that the crisis has a higher negative impact for rms with
a greater sensitivity to demand and trade. The results show that rms sales and the
availability of working capital decreases during the crisis. However, the authors do not
nd any signicant e¤ect of the crisis on capital investment.
Vermoesen et al. (2013) investigate nancial constraints of Belgium SMEs during the
crisis. Using a sample of 2,354 rm-year observations between 2006 and 2009, the authors
explore the e¤ect of nancial constraints on SMEs investments. Vermoesen et al. (2013)
21Rajan and Zingales (1998) employ a proxy for external nance dependence at an industry level for a
sample of U.S. rms. They dene the dependence on external nance as capital expenditures minus cash
ow from operations divided by capital expenditures.
22Working capital is dened as in Raddatz (2006). Raddatz (2006) denes the index for working capital
based on the notion of Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC). According to Gentry et al. (1990), CCC measures
the number of days which funds are devoted to inventories and receivables, less the number of days which
payments to suppliers is deferred. The external nance dependence on capital investment is based on the
methodology develop by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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employ a xed-e¤ects model and show that SMEs investment in Belgium decreases in 2009.
Empirical ndings also indicate that a negative credit supply shock a¤ects the behaviour of
Belgium SMEs. Vermoesen et al. (2013) refers that these ndings show that SMEs invest
less when faced with higher proportion of long-term debt which needs to be renewed in
the short-run. Long-term debt maturity structure is only signicant for SMEs with higher
probability of nancial constraints.
Other empirical studies consider the role of bank lending on rmsemployment and
investment decisions during the crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) investigate the
lending to corporate U.S. rms during 2007 and 2008. The results demonstrate that
banks in the U.S reduce lending to the corporate sector during the recent nancial crisis.
The decrease of lending is related to the shortage of credit supply by the banks. Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010) refer that this decrease occurs despite the large infusion of liquidity
by the Federal Reserve System (FED). The authors show that banks with better access
to deposit nancing decrease their lending. These banks do not provide credit to new
rms. In other words, rms which belong to more constrained banks have di¢ culties in
obtaining new credits from less constrained banks.
Liu et al. (2012) study the impact of the global nancial crisis on 970 Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Similar to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) they dene nancial
crisis period from August 2007 through December 2008. Tobins Q is used as a proxy for
changes in the rm value. The sample of rms is divided into four di¤erent groups (i.e.
SOEs with and without bank debt; non-SOEs with and without bank debt). The results
indicate that SOEs with bank loans perform better during the global nancial crisis. They
also experience a poor performance during the pre-crisis period. According to the authors,
the positive bank debt e¤ect is similar to the results on corporate diversication found by
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015). Firms with poor liquidity su¤er more during crisis
period. Liu et al. (2012) refer that state ownership mitigates nancial constraints during
times of nancial crisis.
In another nancial-crisis relate paper, Kathle and Stulz (2013) explore U.S. rms
bank nancing and investment policies. They use quarterly data for the period of 1983
to 2010. Cross-sectional variation in rmsinvestment and nancial policies during the
crisis are also employed. The authors estimate matching and regression models. Firms
are split into three di¤erent types of bank dependence (i.e. bank-dependent, small and
high leverage rms without credit rating). The results suggest that bank-dependent rms
do not decrease their capital expenditures more severely than matching rms (i.e. bank
or credit dependent) before April 2009. Kathle and Stulz (2013) also provide evidence
that net debt issuance does not decrease during the rst year of the crisis. The debt
issuance does not decrease more for matching rms. Bank-dependent rms show higher
cash reserves during the crisis when compared with non-leveraged rms.
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Garicano and Steinwender (2013) study the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis on
corporate investment and use a sample of 1,800 Spanish manufacturing rms from 1990 to
2010. The authors divide rmsinvestment decisions in two di¤erent categories (i.e. short-
term and long-term investment). Garicano and Steinwender (2013) employ a di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach to compare the behaviour of credit constraint rms The model
predicts that rms which are credit constrained reduce long-term investment by more
than short-term in order to secure rmssurvival. The results demonstrate that Spanish
manufacturing rms a¤ected by credit constraints have a tendency to reduce investment
with a medium-to-long term pay-o¤. In other words, rms prefer investments that pay-
o¤ in the near future (i.e. advertising and product innovation) rather than those which
pay-o¤ is long or (i.e. process innovation, capital investment and information technology).
The authors also explore the e¤ect of the crisis on labour market decisions. The results
show that after the crisis, credit constrained rms cut on employment and not wages. As
the authors state, the results are in line with previous evidence on the rigidity of wage
bargaining in Spain. Garicano and Steinwender (2013) show that rms increase their
prices signicantly during the crisis.
Bentolila et al. (2013) explore employment changes from 2006 to 2010 and the e¤ect
of bankscredit constraints. The authors use a sample of banking relationship of over
217,000 Spanish rms with approximately 230 banks. A di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach
is employed to capture the real e¤ect of the credit crisis. The aim is to compare rms
level of employment before and after the crisis. Firms are split according to their level
of exposure to weak banks.23 Results indicate that weak banks decrease rms level of
employment from 8% to 36%. On the other hand, Spanish rms which rely on a single
bank are not adversely a¤ected by the weakness of the bank.
Similar, Chodorow-Reich (2014) investigates the e¤ect of bank lending frictions on em-
ployment during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis. The author uses a dataset which combines
information on a sample of 2,000 U.S rms. The results show that smaller rms which
have pre-crisis relations with less healthier banks present stronger credit constraints after
the crisis. On the other hand, these rms present lower levels of employment comparing
with those which have a relation with healthier banks. The author shows that withdrawal
of credit can explain between one-third and one-half of job losses at SMEs, especially after
the the Lehmans crash in September 2008.
Greenstone et al. (2014) investigate the role of U.S. bank lending to small U.S. rms
after the 2008 nancial crisis. They construct a measure which predicts the level of lend-
ing supply during the crisis. This measure is based on the changes of U.S. bank lending
to small rms and the predetermined credit market share. The authors use the Com-
23The authors measure exposure to banks as the pre-crisis ratio between rmsloans from weak banks
and its asset value.
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munity Reinvestment Act (CRA) disclosure data from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) to construct the variable.24
Greenstone et al. (2014) develop a modied version of a shift-share model as in Bartik
(1991).25 Specically, the authors test a model which separates the demand and supply
e¤ect to bank lending during the crisis. The results show that the credit supply shock is
associated with the a decrease of credit from banks to small rms, especially during the
2008-2010 period. The supply of credit also has an impact on the real economy during the
crisis. Greenstone et al. (2014) nd that rmsemployment level decreases after the hit
of the crisis. This decrease corresponds to 20% of the employment decline in rms with
less than 20 employees.
McLean and Zhao (2014) explore whether the access to external nance varies over
time and if this access has an impact on rms investment and employment decisions.
First, the authors consider whether low investor sentiment and recessions have an impact
on the nancial constraints that rms face, and therefore, inuence rmsreal decisions.
This is based on previous studies which show that the cost of external nance depends on
the investor sentiment and the business cycle.
To test their assumptions McLean and Zhao (2014) employ a sample of U.S rms for
the 1965-2010 period and employ a cross-sectional yearly investment model. An OLS with
clustered standard errors is implemented. In this model, the authors assume that rms
investment depends on Tobins q and cash ow. The authors interact di¤erent measures
of economic conditions and investor sentiment with Tobins Q and cash ow to account
for the business cycle and investor sentiment. McLean and Zhao (2014) use two di¤erent
proxies for economic conditions (i.e. the economic expansion and the increasing industrial
production) and two di¤erent measures for investor sentiment (i.e. the sentiment index of
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the consumer sentiment index).26
Results show that both the business cycle and investor sentiment have an impact on
the cost of external nance. Specically, McLean and Zhao (2014) nd that in period
24Greenstone et al. (2014) also note that the CRA obliges banks a determine asset threshold to report
small business lending each year as well as Census tract.
25Bartik (1991) employs a method of isolating local labour demand. In other words, these shocks are
changes in national employment by industry which are weighted by state specic industry weight. This
is based on the 1980 state-level industry output shares.
26Economic expansion is measured as a yearly indicator. It assumes the value of 1 if at least 6 out of 12
months represent an expansion period according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
and 0 otherwise. Industrial Production is a dummy variable. It is 1 when industrial production growth is
average positive during the previous 12 months and, 0 otherwise.
Regarding the investor sentiment, the authors use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) index which has 6 main
components. They are as follows: closed-end fund discount; New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) share
turnover; the number of initial public o¤erings; the average rst days return of initial public o¤erings;
the equity share in new issues; and the dividend premium (i.e. the di¤erence in average market-to-book
ratios between dividend payers and non-dividend payers). Finally, the University of Michigans consumer
sentiment index is constructed based on telephone interviews in the U.S..
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characterised with low nancial costs, investment is less sensitive to Tobins Q and more
sensitive to cash ow.
In addition, the authors also explore the impact of nancing costs on rmsemployment
decisions. They re-estimate the aforementioned model of investment. The dependent
variable investment is replaced with an employment variable. Empirical ndings also
suggest that in periods of recessions and low investor sentiment employment growth is
more sensitive to Tobins Q and less sensitive to cash ow.
Benmelech et al. (2011) explore the e¤ects of nancial constraints, maturing debt
and bank deregulation on rm employment decisions. They use a sample of 51,608 rm-
year observations of U.S. publicly listed rms from 1970-2009. Firstly, based on Fazzari
et al. (1988) they estimate di¤erent types of regressions to examine the sensitivity of
employment decisions to cash ow. Their ndings suggest that nancial constraints are
important in determining rm-level employment decisions. Benmelech et al. (2011) show
that the level of employment has a positive relation with cash ow. Secondly, the authors
explore whether the e¤ects of nancial constraints on employment vary with the nancial
leverage of the rms. They use the DID approach and classify rms in two di¤erent groups
based on rmsleverage. The empirical results indicate that the sensitivity of employment
to cash ow is higher for rms with higher nancial leverage. Finally, the authors focus
on the impact of bank deregulation on unemployment. Based on the work by Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), Benmelech et al. (2011) use cross-sectional and time-series variation
to analyse the impact of bank deregulation on state-level unemployment rates. They
conclude that bank regulation is associated with a reduction of unemployment.
Finally, Carvalho et al. (2015) consider a sample of 1,564 publicly trade rms from 34
countries to investigate the link between rm and bank returns. They divide and classify
rms according to their lending relation with banks (i.e. weak, medium and strong). Using
a cross-sectional estimation, the authors explore how the cost of bank distress is related to
the information asymmetry of the rms. In particular, Carvalho et al. (2015) employ two
proxies for borrower information asymmetry (i.e. size and number of analyst following a
rm). The authors measure both proxies at the end of 2006 and show that information
asymmetry only increase the e¤ect of bank distress for rms with medium or strong lending
relations. Similar to Almeida et al. (2012), Carvalho et al. (2015) employ rmsshort-
term debt at the end of 2007 to capture how rms with large maturity debt react during
the crisis period. The results indicate that rms in the high short-term leverage category
present a positive relation with bank abnormal stock returns. Thus, rms with higher
levels of debt maturity are the most a¤ected by the bank supply shock.
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2.3 Research Design
The next sub-sections describe the theoretical framework of the employment model as well
as the main empirical variables which are used in this chapter.
2.3.1 Theoretical framework
The starting point for the empirical analysis of this chapter relies on the empirical em-
ployment model by Benito and Hernando (2008). The authors follow the model of Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1999) which can be derived from a basic production function for a rm i :
Y i= Aif(N i, Ki) (2.1)
Where Y represents the output, N the number of employees, K rmscapital stock
and A production e¢ ciency. Assuming an imperfect capital market and ignoring nancial
factors, the equilibrium of the level of employment is as follows:
Yi= Aif(N i; Ki) =W i(1 + t)=P i (2.2)
WhereWi is the wage cost of rm i, which is presumed to be determined prior to the hir-
ing of employees, t is the payroll tax rate, Pi is the price of the output, andKi= (1  ) 1 ,
where  corresponds to a demand elasticity. The right-hand side of the equation may vary
over the cycle as a result of the inuence of  , i.e., current or future expected demand.
Thus, the equilibrium of employment nit can be express in the following log-linear format:
nit= 0+1kit+2(wit pit) + 3dit+i+t (2.3)
Where nit, kit, wit, pit represent the logarithms of the number of employees, capital
stock, wages and price, respectively. dit is the demand e¤ect which is associated with
k for rm i at time t. i indicates a rm-specic e¤ect capturing the individual rms
characteristics which are xed over time, i.e. e¢ ciency. t represents the time e¤ect,
controlling for all the factors which are common to all rms, i.e. payroll tax rate and
business cycles.
If nancial factors are not taken into account by the standard quadratic adjustment
cost model then it is expected that the actual employment would be inuenced by past
employment and the current expectations of future equilibrium employment.27 To create
27The standard partial adjustment or quadratic adjustment models imply the inuence of past, actual or
desired employment on current employment: nt nt 1 = k(nt  nt 1), with 0 < k < 1 being the fraction
of the gap nt   nt 1 that closed in the period. This means that the past, actual or desired employment
have an e¤ect on current employment, nt = k nt +(1  k) nt 1 =
P1
j=0(1  k)jnit. Sargent (1978) shows
that this adjustment model can also be derived as the solution to rmsdynamic prot maximisation,
assuming that there are quadratic costs of adjusting the workforce (King and Thomas, 2006).
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an observable model of employment, the stochastic processes of all the variables need to be
specied in equation (2.1). As such, the following assumption of an autoregressive model
AR (1) process is considered:
kit=a0it+ki;t 1+"1it (2.4)
wit pit=boi+b1(wi;t 1 pi;t 1) + "2it (2.5)
dit=coi+c1dit 1+"3it t= i;t 1+"4it (2.6)
Where "1it, "2it, "3it, "4it are all iid errors.
The reduced form of the employment equation based on equation (2.1) takes the fol-
lowing form:
ni;t= o+1ni;t 1+p2kit+p3(wit pit) + 4dit+i+t+"it (2.7)
Where  parameters incorporate the parameters set for k,w   p,and d processes above-
mentioned.
Furthermore, the labour demand equation which is derived from a quadratic adjust-
ment cost model can then be augmented with nancial factors (fit) into the following
equation:
ni;t= 0+1ni;t 1+2kit+3(wit pit) + 4dit+f it+i+t+"it (2.8)
However, a more general model should be considered. The aforementioned equation is a
simple AR (1) model, while the processes creating k, w   p and d can be more complex.
For instance, it may be necessary to consider more lags in the equations for the variables
set above (Chen and Guariglia, 2009). The parameter w might dependent on changes or
levels of demand. As Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) points out, the quadratic cost model
may not hold in reality. Therefore, equation (2.8) may be rewritten as:
ni;t=0+1ni;t 1+2kit+
1X
j=0
2j(wi;t j pi;t j)
+ 02Et(wi;t+1 pi;t+1)+
1X
j=0
2j3jdi;t j+
0
3Etdi;t+1+
+4fit+i+t+"it (2.9)
Where, Et indicates the expectation at time t.
Equation (2.9) may contain some endogeneity problems (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999).
In particular, demand shocks, employment, and wages may inuence nancial factors and
rm-specic variables (Chen and Guariglia, 2009). Benito and Hernando (2008) include
growth of real sales in their model to control for demand shocks. To avoid potential
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endogeneity, the authors also employ deeper lags on the nancial variable indicator, as
well as, on the dependent variable of employment. Finally, year dummies are also included
to control for time e¤ects. The equation takes the following format:
ni;t= 0+1ni;t 1+2ni;t 2+3wi;t 1+4wi;t+5ki;t+6i;t+X
0
i;t 1+	t+"it (2.10)
Where i indicates rms i = 1; 2:::T;N i and t represents year t = 1; 2:::T; n is the log
average rm during the year, w is the log average wage of the rm, w is the log average
of wage growth, k is the log of capital stock,  is the demand shock proxy which represents
the log of sales growth and , 	t represents a time e¤ect year dummy. "it is the error term.
Finally, X 0i;t 1 represents the nancial factors.
To explore the role of nancial factors on labour demand, Benito and Hernando (2008)
also include a set of nancial variables in their employment model. They consider cash
ow, liquidity, interest burden and the ow borrowing ratio of the rms. Hence, the au-
thors investigate how a ceteris paribus increase of the nancial pressure variable a¤ects
employment, wages and productivity behaviour controlling for other rm-specic charac-
teristics.
2.3.2 Variables Denition
The literature denes the dependent variable of employment as the total number of em-
ployees at the balance sheet data of the rms (Benito and Hernando, 2008; Yazdanfar
and Salman, 2012; Garicano and Steinwender, 2013). Conversely, the nancial variable
interest burden is dened as a measure of nancial pressure in order to account for the role
of rm-specic interest rate on employment. In e¤ect, following previous studies (Nickell
and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Görg and Spaliara, 2014), the variable
interest burden is measured as the ratio of interest payments to cash-ow. This is thought
to be an e¢ cient index since it provides evidence of a direct impact of interest rate on
rmsnancial position. For example, Benito and Whitley (2003) demonstrate that the
average interest rate on nancial debt in the U.K. has a negative e¤ect on rmsnancial
health. Chen and Guariglia (2009) show a signicant inverse relation between the level
of employment of Chinese rms and the level of interest burden, coverage and borrowing
ratio. Spaliara (2009) provides evidence of a direct e¤ect of rm-specic interest rate on
the capital-labour. The author shows that interest burden has a higher impact on the
capital-labour ratio of rms which are more nancial constrained. Recently, Guariglia
et al. (2015) show that the ratio of interest payments to total debt a¤ects the survival of
U.K. rms. Overall, previous empirical studies suggest a direct impact of interest rate on
rmsnancial position. Consequently, it is expected that an increase in rmsinterest
burden (or rm-specic interest rate) should lead to lower levels of employment.
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In addition to the nancial pressure indicator, other rm-specic characteristics are
also considered in the employment literature. The lead variables of wage and sales are
included to control for future expectations (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). Following the
work of Benito and Hernando (2008) wage is dened as the cost of employment divided by
the number of employees and deated by the GDP deator whereas sales is dened as total
sales deated by the GDP deator. Finally capital is dened as the logarithm of xed
assets minus depreciation, working capital less provisions normalised on the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). Previous studies nd a negative relation between wage, sales and
the level of employment while capital is positively related to employment (Nickell and
Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia, 2009).
2.4 Model specication
Sub-section 2.4 presents the empirical models of this chapter which test the e¤ect of a
rm-specic interest rate on rmsemployment decisions.
2.4.1 Baseline
The baseline model follows a quadratic adjustment cost employment model. The aim
is to test for the impact of nancial pressure on rms employment. This model has
been augmented to account for nancial factors as it is explained in sub-section 2.3.1.
The specication model follows the work of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and
Hernando (2008) and takes the following form:
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1 + 3wit + 4it + 5wit 1 + 6kit + it (2.11)
where i = 1,2,. . . , N refers to a cross-section of units (rms in this study) and t =
1,2,. . . , T refers to time period. n is the log average rm employment during the year,
w is the log average wage of the rm, w is the log average of wage growth, k is the log
of capital stock,  is the demand shock proxy which represents the growth of real sales,
capturing demand shocks. IB represents the key explanatory variable interest burden.
This variable is a proxy for the role of nancial pressure on employment. It is measured
as the ratio of interest payments to cash ow.
The error term it comprises a rm-specic time-invariant component, encompassing
all time-invariant rm characteristics likely to inuence employment, as well as the time-
invariant component of the measurement error a¤ecting any of the regression variables; a
time-specic component accounting for possible business cycle e¤ects; and an idiosyncratic
component. To control for the rm-specic time-invariant component of the error term
the equation is estimated in rst-di¤erences. To account for time-specic component time
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dummies are included (in addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies)
in all our specications. This is a common procedure in the literature (Brown et al., 2009).
Finally, country dummies are also included to control for institutional di¤erences between
countries.
Following the previous studies (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando,
2008), it is expected that nancial pressure (in the form of interest burden) to have a
negative e¤ect on rmsemployment decisions.
2.4.2 Financial crisis
The baseline empirical specication examines whether interest burden has a negative im-
pact on rmsemployment decisions over time. However, it does not take into account
whether this e¤ect varies with the state of the economy. To do so, a dummy variable
Crisist is constructed and it takes the value of 1 over the period 2007-2009, and 0 oth-
erwise. To understand whether interest burden di¤ers across crisis and tranquil periods,
the variable interest burden (IB) is interacted with the Crisist and (1  Crisist) terms.
Thus, equation (2.11) is re-formulated as follows:
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisist + 3IBit 1  (1  Crisist)+
+ 4wit + 5it + 6wit 1 + 7kit + it (2.12)
This test is motivated by the nancial accelerator theory according to which deteriora-
tions in economic conditions increase the costs of nance, weakening rmsbalance sheet
positions (Bernanke et al., 1996). Thus, under this assumption, if rms face higher levels
of debt-servicing costs, they may have the need to decrease their workforce. Therefore, it is
expected that the interaction terms during the crisis/non-crisis periods to be signicantly
di¤erent and stronger in the former than in the latter (j2j > j3j).
2.4.3 Periphery versus non-periphery
Next, it is investigated the extent to which an increase in the interest burden may have a
di¤erent e¤ect across periphery and non-periphery rms, controlling for the crisis. To test
this hypothesis, the model in equation (2.12) is augmented with interactive terms which are
linked to a periphery dummy (Peripheryi). The dummy is equal to 1 if the rm belongs
to the periphery countries (i.e. Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and 0 otherwise.
This classication scheme is a common practice in the literature on European countries.
For example, Bris et al. (2009) dene Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal as the weak
euro area countries. This classication is based on these countries currency performance
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when comparing to the German currency in the pre euro period. Consistent with this
view, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) assume these countries as the peripheral countries.
According to the authors, these economies have experienced a signicant deterioration in
the value of fundamentals which is crucial for ensuring long-term EMU membership since
the introduction of the euro in 1999. The following specication model is estimated:
nit = 1+ 1nit 1+ 2IBit 1 Crisist Peripheryi+ 3IBit 1  (1 Crisist) Peripheryi+
+ 4IBit 1  Crisist  (1  Peripheryi) + 5IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1  Peripheryi)+
+ 6wit + 7it + 8wit 1 + 9kit + it (2.13)
It is expected that an increase in the interest burden to have a more severe impact
on the level of employment for periphery rms than for their non-periphery counterparts
during the crisis (j2j > j4j). The argument for this expectation is that during the
turmoil period, banks tightened their lending standards and charged rms with higher
interest rates, especially in the periphery countries (Lane, 2012; Ferrando et al., 2015).
This means that it is likely that periphery rms su¤er from higher levels of information
asymmetry and they are more responsive to changes in debt servicing costs, especially
during the crisis.
2.4.4 Financial constraints
In addition, it is considered the impact of nancial constraints on rms employment
decisions during and outside of the crisis. Following the established literature on nancial
constraints and to ensure the robustness of the results, three di¤erent dimensions of rm-
level heterogeneity are used: bank dependence, size and rms legal status. Firms are
di¤erentiated into more or less bank dependent; small and large; private and public. This
separation scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative information of the rms.
Firstly, the sample of rms is divided according to an indicator of rmslevel of bank
dependence, called mix. Following the literature (Spaliara, 2009; Guariglia and Mateut,
2010) this indicator is based on the ratio of rmsshort-term debt to total liabilities. The
higher the mix, the more bank dependent the rm is. A dummy variable BankDepit is
employed. It takes the value of 1 if rm is mix falls in the top 50% of the distribution
of the mixs of all rms which belong to the same industry as rm i and year t, and 0
otherwise. Thus, bank dependent rms are considered to be less nancially healthier than
their less bank dependent counterparts. As banks signicantly cut credit towards rms
during the nancial crisis, it is expected that more bank dependent rms for whom access
to external nance is expensive or limited to su¤er more.
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Secondly, the sample of rms is partitioned into small and large rms, using rms
real assets as a sorting device. Specically, a dummy variable Smallit is constructed.
It assumes the value of 1 if rmsreal assets are in the bottom 50% distribution of rms
operating to the same industry as rm i and year t , and 0 otherwise. Spaliara (2009) refers
that smaller rms are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. Thus, they
are more likely to su¤er from capital markets imperfections than their larger counterparts.
Finally, rms are sorted every year into public and private based on their legal status.
A dummy variable Privatet is employed which assumes the value of 1 if a rm is private
within each industry at year t and, and 0 otherwise. Gao et al. (2013) denote that
private rms have a more di¢ cult access to external nance and they rely more on their
internal funds when comparing with their public counterparts. This indicates that if access
to external funds is restricted, private rms should su¤er from higher levels of nancial
constraints in their ability to respond to changes in the external nancial conditions.
Overall, the resulting dummy variable Constrainedit is equal to one if the rm is classied
as nancially constrained within each industry at year t, and zero otherwise. The model
is dened as follows:
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisist  Constrainedit+
+ 3IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  Constrainedit + 4IBit 1  Crisist  (1  Constrainedit)+
+ 5IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1  Constrainedit) + 6wit + 7it + 8wit 1 + 9kit + it
(2.14)
This specication captures the impact of nancial constraints on the response to nan-
cial pressure during and outside of the crisis. It is anticipated that changes in the interest
burden to exert a stronger impact on employment in the case of nancially constrained
rms, especially during the turmoil period (j2j > j4j).
2.4.5 Financial constraints, nancial crisis, periphery and non-periphery
Next, it is explored whether during crisis/non-crisis periods, changes in the interest burden
a¤ect di¤erently the level of employment across periphery and non-periphery rms which
are characterised by di¤erent degrees of nancing constraints. Equation (2.14) is re-
estimated by splitting the sample of rms according to their location, i.e. periphery and
non-periphery.
It is expected that the di¤erential response of interest burden would be stronger for
nancially constrained rms in the periphery area when comparing to the same group
of rms in the non-periphery economies, especially during the turmoil period. As it is
explained in sub-section 2.4.3, the incremental idea is that rms in the periphery region
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should face higher borrowing costs, especially during the turmoil period. As a consequence,
they are more likely to be associated with higher degrees of informational asymmetry and
are less likely to access external nancial markets.
2.4.6 Robustness checks: Additional control variables
To ensure the strength of the main empirical specications, in Chapter 2 it is considered
a set of di¤erent robustness. As a rst test, equation (2.11) and equation (2.12) are re-
estimated with additional controls. To be specic, it is included a set of rm-specic
characteristics as well as country-specic macroeconomic indicators. The former controls
for rmsoverall balance sheet position (Benito and Hernando, 2008). The latter accounts
for aggregate pressure. The aim is to test whether the main ndings remain unchanged.
The models are re-estimated as follows:
nit= 1+1nit 1+2IBit 1+3Xit 1+4wit+5it+6wit 1+7kit+it (2.15)
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisist + 3IBit 1  (1  Crisist)+
+ 4Xit 1  Crisist + 5Xit 1  (1  Crisist) + 6wit + 7it + 8wit 1 + 9kit + it (2.16)
Where, Xit 1 represents the control variables which are implemented. They are as
follow: Cflow which is dened as the ratio of cash ow to capital stock. Liq which is
measured as cash and equivalents normalised on capital stock. Netdebt which is dened
as liabilities plus long term debt normalised on capital stock minus cash and equivalent
divided by capital stock. Bondy which is the 10-year sovereign bond yield of the country.
Unem which is the annual average unemployment rate of the country. It is expected
that the impact of interest burden on rms employment level to remain negative and
statistically signicant, especially during the nancial crisis.
2.4.7 Robustness checks: Alternative measure/instrument for interest bur-
den
Next, as a further robustness check, equation (2.11) and equation (2.12) are estimated
with a di¤erent proxy for the variable interest burden (IBit 1). Consistent with the work
of Benito and Whitley (2003) an implicit interest rate is used. The ratio is measured
taking into account a three year moving average of the data on the total debt variable,
centred on the current year and use this as the denominator.
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In addition, equation (2.11) and equation (2.12) are also re-formulated but with an
alternative instrument. Following the work of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) the instrument
is calculated as the product of debt-to-capital ratio two or three years lagged and the
contemporaneous change in the 10-year government bond yield. This measure enables the
use of exogenous shifts in the interest rates which have been inuenced by government
policy (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). The implementation of deep lags of the debt-to-
capital ratio is used to ensure that they are uncorrelated with the contemporaneous shocks
in employment.
2.4.8 Robustness checks: Alternative crisis period
So far the nancial crisis has been dened for the years between 2007 and 2009. To ensure
that the results are not driven from the way the nancial crisis is dened, equation (2.12)
is re-estimated considering a more narrower denition of the crisis. A new crisis dummy
(Crisisnt ) is employed. It assumes the value of 1 for the 2008-2009 period, and 0 otherwise.
The equation takes the following form:
n = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisisnt + 3IBit 1  (1  Crisisnt )+
+ 4wit + 5it + 6wit 1 + 7kit + it (2.17)
It is expected that the negative e¤ect of nancial pressure (in the form of interest
burden) on employment to remain statistically signicant and stronger during this crisis
period.
2.4.9 Robustness checks: Two phases of the crisis
In this chapter it is also explored the two phases of the recent nancial crisis. They corre-
spond to the earlier credit crisis and the later euro area sovereign debt crisis. The aim is
to test the di¤erential impact of nancial pressure on employment level for periphery and
non-periphery rms during these two phases. Two crisis period dummies are implemented:
Creditt and Debtt. The former takes the value of 1 over the period 2008-2009, and 0 oth-
erwise. Similarly, the latter assumes the value of 1 for 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. These
dummies correspond to the credit and the debt sovereign crisis, respectively. Equation
(2.11) is re-formulated as:
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nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1 Debtt  Peripheryi + 3IBit 1  Creditt  Peripheryi+
+ 4IBit 1 Debtt  (1  Peripheryi) + 5IBit 1  Creditt  (1  Peripheryi)+
+6IBit 1(1 Debtt Creditt)Peripheryi+7IBit 1(1 Debtt Creditt)(1 Peripheryi)+
+ 8wit + 9it + 10wit 1 + 11kit + it (2.18)
It is expected that during the sovereign debt crisis, the variable interest burden has a
higher impact on rmsemployment, especially in the periphery. This test is motivated by
the euro area sovereign debt crisis which unfolded in 2010. In fact, between 2010-2011 the
eurozone entered in a second recession due to the sovereign debt crisis of the peripheral
countries. Bank loans to rms decreased sharply and economic condence hit a new low
with the bailout of Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Reichlin, 2014).
2.4.10 Robustness checks: SMEs vs non-SMEs
Thus far, the previous sections have investigated if there is a di¤erential e¤ect of nan-
cial pressure on employment of nancially constrained and unconstrained rms. As an
additional check and to ensure robustness, an alternative classication scheme is used.
Specically, the sample of rms is split into SMEs and non-SMEs. Equation (2.11), equa-
tion (2.12) and equation (2.13) are employed for a sample of SMEs and non-SMEs rms.
A dummy variable SMEsit is used. It takes the value of 1 if the rms have less than
250 employees and a total revenue equal of less than e50 million, and 0 otherwise. This
denition follows the one by ECB. It is anticipated that SMEs, in the periphery su¤er
from higher levels of nancial pressure especially during the crisis. This is based on the
argument that SMEs have more di¢ culties in obtaining external nance than their larger
counterparts (Beck et al., 2006) and that rms in the periphery countries are charged with
higher interest rates during the turmoil period (Van der Zwan, 2014).
2.4.11 Robustness checks: Alternative cut-o¤ points
Finally, in the main specication in sub-section 2.4.4, the 50th percentile is used as a cut-
o¤ point to dene nancially constrained and unconstrained rms. To test the robustness
of these results, the sample of rms is divided with the 75th percentile as alternative cut-o¤
value. In the same vein, bank dependent (small) rms are classied as those whose bank
dependence (total assets) are on the top (below) 75 % of the distribution of all the rms
in that particularly industry and year, and zero otherwise. The models from sub-section
2.4.4 and 2.4.5 are employed for this di¤erent criteria and it is expected that the results
to remain robust to the previous splitting criteria of 50%.
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2.5 Model estimation
2.5.1 Dynamic panel model
The key modelling technique which is employed in this chapter is the regression using panel
data methods. There are several benets from using panel data. According to Baltagi
(2013), such technique allows us to:
1. Control for individual heterogeneity;
2. Use more data, obtain more variability, reduce collinearity among the variables
of interest and increase the number of degrees of freedom;
3. Better study the dynamic behaviour of the variables and the relation between
them;
4. Identify and measure e¤ects that are not detectable in pure cross-section or
time-series data;
5. Construct and test more complicated models than those allowed by employing
purely cross-section or time-series data.
Some panel datasets, especially those employing individuals or rms, usually su¤er
from missing data. This is more common some combination of cross-sectional unit and
time period(s) (Wooldridge, 2006). In this dataset, information is missing for some of
the sample rms in certain years. As a result, the panel is unbalanced. The unbalanced
panel structure has the benet of partially mitigating potential selection and survival bias
problems (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008).
Literature on employment commonly uses dynamic panel data models (Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The rationale for estimating the model in a dy-
namic panel data setting can be attributed to the lagged value of the dependent variable
and the lagged values of the explanatory variables (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Con-
sequently, the models which are dened in sub-section 2.5 include lagged values of the
explanatory variables, as well as, the time path of the dependent variable employment in
relation to its past value. Next it is discussed the estimation method implemented in this
chapter.
2.5.2 Estimation methodology
In this chapter all the equations are estimated using the system GMM estimator by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).28 The specication model which is
dened in sub-section 2.4.1 makes the simple OLS estimator upwards biased and inconsis-
tent since the lagged level of employment is correlated with the error term (Verbeek, 2012).
The within-groups estimator is also not appropriate due to inconsistency and downward
28All the regressions are performed in Stata using the command xtabond2 developed by Roodman
(2009).
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bias (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). More importantly, the employment model may su¤er
from endogeneity. Firm-specic variables are likely to be inuenced by employment, wage,
productivity shocks and the lagged dependent variable is automatically endogeneous due
to the presence of the lagged error in the equation (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). For this
reason, the most appropriate techique for the abovementioned specication is the GMM
estimator.
The implementation of the GMM estimator provides a number of advantages. Firstly,
it controls for the endogeneity of the regressors. Secondly, it accounts for unobserved ef-
fects and the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as regressors. The rst-di¤erence
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) uses the rst-di¤erences of the explanatory
variables to remove the unobserved rm-specic e¤ects, time-invariant, industry-specic
and country-specic e¤ects. The rst-di¤erence GMM estimator requires that the regres-
sors are used as instruments (i.e. using deep lags of the explanatory variables). The aim
is to control for simultaneity bias of the explanatory variables and the correlation be-
tween the lag dependent variable and the error term. However, as it is noted by Blundell
and Bond (1998), this estimator can create considerable bias. It can su¤er from a weak
instrument problem if the the lag dependent variable follows a random walk. In a sce-
nario that the time dimension of the sample is small , the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator
performs poorly since lagged levels of the variables are weak instruments for subsequent
rst-di¤erences.
The system GMM estimator is a more e¢ cient estimator. It combines in a system the
equation in the rst-di¤erences with an equation in levels. It makes use of the lagged levels
of the regressors as instruments in the di¤erenced equation, and the lagged di¤erences of
the regressors as instruments in the levels equation. One of the advantages of the system
GMM is that it reduces the potential bias and inaccuracy associated with the use of
the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator. It improves e¢ ciency and a signicant reduction in
nite sample bias comparing with the simple rst-di¤erence GMM approach (Blundell and
Bond, 1998).
In the employment models of Chapter 2 rm-specic variables, including interest bur-
den may su¤er from some endogeneity issues since they are likely to be inuenced by
employment wages and demand shocks (i.e. sales growth). To avoid the bias which is
associated with this endogeneity problem, Chapter 2 follows Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)
and takes deeper lags of the explanatory variables as instruments in the equations in rst-
di¤erences and in levels. In other words, the use of deeper lags of interest burden may
overcome for the possibility of simultaneity bias.
The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends on two di¤erent criteria. First,
the Sargan test (also known as J test), which is a test for overidentifying restrictions.
Under the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with
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degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters.
Second, the GMM estimator can only be appropriate if there is no serial correlation in the
rst-di¤erenced residuals. In the presence of serial correlation of order n in the di¤erenced
residuals, the instrument set of the equation in the rst-di¤erences should be restricted
to lags n+1 and deeper (Roodman, 2009). To check for the existence of nth-order serial
correlation in the di¤erenced of the residuals the m(n) test is implemented. The m(n) test
is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no serial correlation
of the di¤erenced residuals. In Chapter 2 it is reported the rst-(m1 ) order and the fourth
order-(m4 ) test for serial correlation of the di¤erenced residuals in the tables. At the
same time it is used four (and deeper) lags of the regressors as instruments. The use of
deeper lags is a common procedure in the literature. This enables the research to improve
the specication tests of the models (Chen and Guariglia, 2013; Guariglia et al., 2012).29
Country, industry, time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies
are also included in the instrument matrix.
Finally, it should be noted that the system GMM estimator is sometimes weak when it
is used on large samples. Blundell et al. (2001) demonstrate usingMonte Carlo experiments
that this test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments for the system
GMM, especially for large samples. Chen and Guariglia (2013) conrm this nding using
a large panel of Chinese rms.
2.6 Data
The dataset for this chapter is drawn mainly from Amadeus database, the World Bank
and the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Union (i.e. Eurostat). These are combined in
order to shed light on the e¤ect of interest burden on the level of employment of euro area
rms.
This sub-section is divided in four parts. The rst part, elaborates on the main source of
nancial variables. The data collection construction and descriptive statistics are described
in the next sub-sections.
2.6.1 Source of rm-level data
The dataset is drawn from the annual accounting reports from the 2012 version of Amadeus
(Analyse Major Database from European Sources) database by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD).
The database comprises nancial information on 19 million public and private rms across
European countries. 30 Currently, Amadeus covers 43 European countries (EU-28, Be-
larus, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia,
29Note that in Chapter 2, I have also tested all baseline specication models restricting the number of
instruments to t-4 to t-6 or t-4 to t-7. Unfortunately, the Sargan test does not improve.
30See http://amadeus.bvdinfo.com for details.
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Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine).
BVD collects and transforms all information into standardised format of annual ac-
counts before the data is inserted on Amadeus. The information is gathered from all
register o¢ ces of rms respective countries. 31 Firmsnancial statements are issued
annually at the end of March. The accounts cover the period from January to December.
Employment data are given as in 31 December of each year (Faggio and Konings, 2003).
There are multiple advantages to using Amadeus database. Firstly, it allows us to compare
information within a country as well as across countries since all variables are consistent
with each other.
Secondly, it covers both listed and unlisted rms. However, the very majority of the
rms in Amadeus database are unlisted. Thirdly, it also provides up to ten years of
detailed information on accounting and ownership data per rm, although information
can vary by country (Huyghebaert and Luypaert, 2013). Amadeus database contains
information regarding consolidated and unconsolidated accounts in a format of 26 balance
sheet and 26 prot and loss account items, as well as 32 standard ratios which cover the
major items of prot and loss and balance sheet accounts (i.e. assets, turnover, labour
costs). In addition, Amadeus includes detailed ownership information, namely the names
and countries of all shareholders (with greater than 5% shareholdings). Supplemental
information is also available on subsidiaries.
This database also provides other rm-level information. Particularly, it o¤ers data on
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and allocates rms according to the
European industrial classication (NACE rev. 2). Conversely, it also contains information
on the year of incorporation, legal status, quoted/unquoted indicator, activity codes and
location of the rms. Amadeus also classify rms in di¤erent categories. In other words,
rms are considered very large, large, medium and small if they match specic criteria.
The dataset which is implemented in this thesis includes all the four type of rms. Details
on this classication follow in Appendix A.1.
Nevertheless, the Amadeus data set does have some limitations. Firstly, reporting
statements di¤er across countries. Secondly, small and medium rms are allowed to draw
up bridged balance sheets and income statements, namely some information might be
omitted. For instance, Denmark does not disclose any rmsaccounting information for
more than 5 years (Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008). The collection of the data can also be
a¤ected when rms stop reporting their nancial statements. Amadeus places a missing
for the 4 years following the last included ling. However, these rms are not removed
from the database unless there is no reporting for at least ve years, which can create
some potential survivorship bias (Klapper et al., 2004).
Information is also not backlled for new rms entering the database in a given year
31For instance, the Kamers van Koophandel in the Netherlands.
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and rms only appear in the database if they full the minimum size requirements. Gómez-
Salvador et al. (2004) refer that it is not possible to distinguish between newly created rms
and rms that simply enter the sample at a given period t, but were already operating in the
period before. On the other hand, each release of Amadeus only contains the listing status
of a rmscurrent year (Gómez-Salvador et al., 2004). This indicates that the database
does not report past yearsinformation status. Hence, for rms which have changed listing
status over the ve-year sample period, their information may be misclassied (Klapper
et al., 2004).
Overall, the key advantage of Amadeus is that it provides information which is uniform
and enables the cross-border analysis. As such, given the unique nature of the nancial
development and market structure of European countries, this dataset allows the researcher
to explore how labour market decisions are formulated across di¤erent European rms.
2.6.2 Data collection
The data for this chapter is mainly collected from Amadeus database for all rms from
the annual accounting reports. The initial sample covers all rm-year observations from
private and public rms. Information is available for a period between 2003 and 2011,
corresponding to a nine year period.
Information comprises the following eleven euro area countries: Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Germany.
It should be noted that Greece is dropped from the dataset due to missing data on wages.
This is a common procedure in the literature. Firms which do not have complete records
on the main variables of interest are dropped from the dataset (Carpenter and Guariglia,
2008).
Firms with only unconsolidated statements are considered to avoid double counting.
This is a standard procedure in the literature of nancial constraints (Guariglia, 2008;
Guariglia et al., 2015). As a result, this approach ensures that the majority of the rms
in the sample are small. In fact, approximately 70% of the rms which are included
in the dataset are not traded on the stock market. In the dataset the majority of the
rms are unlisted, and therefore particularly likely to face nancial constraints (Guariglia,
2008). Following Blundell et al. (1992) and based on a two-digital NACE classication,
all manufacturing rms are also included in the sample.32
In addition, it is also used the category "legal form" from Amadeus database. The
aim is to use the information in this category to construct the variable Privatei which is
dened in sub-section 2.4.4. To dene this variable, two steps are required. Firstly, in this
32Note that the authors allocate rms according to one of the following nine industrial sectors: metal and
metal goods; other minerals and mineral products; chemical and man made bres; mechanical engineering;
electrical and instrument engineering; Moto vehicles and parts; other transport equipment; food, drink
tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather and footwear; and others.
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thesis private and public rms are dened under the new standardized legal form category.
In Amadeus, since 2012 rms are classied based on nine legal forms.33 To account for
this issue and following the suggestion from the BVD technical support, these new nine
categories are considered under the old system classication which only denes rms as
public and private. 34
Secondly, information on the "legal form" category is static. In other words, the dataset
only reports contemporaneous information (i.e. the rmlatest status) rather than rm
historical information. Thus, if a rmlegal status is changed, this is updated in Amadeus
database but the previous information is removed. Since the separation between public and
private rms is crucial (it is used as a scheme to dene nancial constraints), this chapter
follows the work of Akguc and Choi (2013) and classies rms based on a contemporaneous
measure. For each rm it is checked its Initial Public O¤ering (IPO) date and de-listing
from the stock market date during the sample period. Firms are reclassied as public or
private based on this information.35
Finally, the GDP deator is collected from the World Bank dataset and the CPI is
obtained from the Eurostat. In the dataset, the GDP deator is used to deate the
variables real sales and wage whereas the CPI is normalised on the capital stock variable.
The ten-year bond yield and the unemployment rate which are used in sub-section 2.4.6
are also obtained from Eurostat. After combining the appropriate Amadeus items, the
initial sample consists of 1,916,694 rm-year observations. This large panel of nancial
data on euro area rms is particularly relevant since unquoted rms su¤er more of nancial
constraints (Guariglia, 2008).
2.6.3 Sample selection process
Following normal selection criteria in the literature observations with negative sales and
assets are dropped (Tsoukas, 2011). To control for the potential of outliers, observations
in the one percent tail for each of the regression variables are also excluded. Firms with
less than 3-years of observations are also dropped from the sample. Such procedure is a
common practice for dynamic models (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia, 2008).
In the sample, entry and exit (death) of rms are allowed and the use of an unbalanced
panel partially mitigates potential selection and survivorship bias (Guariglia and Mateut,
33Firms are classied based on the following categories: public limited, private limited, partnerships,
sole proprietorships, public authorities, non-prot organisations, branches, foreign and other legal forms.
34According to the dataset providers, private limited, sole traders/proprietorships, partnerships, public
authorities, non-prot organisations and branches are normally classied as private rms. However, it is
not possible to conrm in which public/private categories foreign rms, other legal form and rms with
unknown/unrecorded situation fall.
35For example, if a rm had an IPO in 2009 and it also has accounting information from 2003 to 2011,
Amadeus database classies the rm as public throughout the sample period. Thus, in this case in this
thesis the rm is reclassied as private from 2003 to 2008 and as public from 2009 to 2011. The same
methodology is employed for the de-listing case.
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2010).
The nal panel, which is unbalanced, covers 3,678 rms from Austria (corresponding to
21,347 observations), 3,964 rms from Belgium (corresponding to 32,202), 2,626 rms from
Finland (corresponding to 20,024 observations), 22,820 rms from France (corresponding
to 176,771 observations), 35,081 rms from Germany (corresponding to 200,373 observa-
tions), 830 rms from Ireland (corresponding to 6,123 observations), 49,433 rms from
Italy (corresponding to 361,887 observations), 151 rms from Luxembourg (corresponding
to 998 observations), 5,343 rms from Netherlands (corresponding to 39,382 observations),
5,617 rms from Portugal (corresponding to 39,965 observations) and 20,715 rms from
Spain (corresponding to 148,966 observations) and . Finally, the total number of observa-
tions for the sample period is of 1,048,028. 36
2.6.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 describes statistics of all the variables which are used in the empirical models for
the entire sample. Number of observations, means, standard deviations and percentiles of
the rm-specic variables and the nancial indicator are presented. Table 2.2 and Table
2.3 show the aforementioned statistics for rms outside and during the crisis and for non-
periphery and periphery economies, respectively. Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 describe the
number of observations, means and standard deviations for periphery and non-periphery
countries before and during the crisis period, respectively. The p-values of a test of equality
of means are also reported.
Table 2.1 indicates that there are a total of 434,446 observations remaining in the
sample when outliers and rms with missing values are dropped. The main variable of
interest in the analysis, interest burden, has a mean of 0.300 and a median of 0.126 with a
standard deviation of 0.658. This result is within the boundaries of the literature on em-
ployment (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia,
2009). A similar pattern is observed for the capital stock variable. The employment level
in the sample has a mean of 3.244 and a median of about 3.178, and the 75th and 25th
percentile values of 3.912 and 2.565. In other words, among all people which are employed
during the 2003-2011 period, the table shows that the level of employment grew more at
the 75th percentile than those at the 25th and 50th percentiles. Furthermore, the level of
wage growth for workers at the median is positive but closer to zero and workers at the
75th percentile see their real earning grow more 4%. Interestingly, the gures in Table 2.1
also illustrate that the average sales growth is 0.046 and at the median is negative and
only positive for levels of sales above the median.
36See Appendix A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5 and A.6. for the denition of all the variables used in this chapter,
number of rms per country, number of observations per country, the number of observations per year
and the total structure of the panel, respectively.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: Full sample
Full sample
Obs. Mean St. dev 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
n (employment) 646,044 3.244 1.074 2.565 3.178 3.912
IB (interest burden) 800,965 0.300 0.658 0.026 0.126 0.394
w (wage growth) 434,446 0.016 0.199 -0.053 0.012 0.080
 (sales growth) 865,118 0.046 0.264 -0.075 0.024 0.143
w (wage) 601,424 3.479 0.388 3.271 3.507 3.728
k (capital stock) 1,037,042 6.256 1.601 5.196 6.343 7.465
Notes: This table presents the number of observations, sample means, standard deviations, the 25th percentile, the median
and the 75th percentile for the all sample (column 1 to 6), respectively. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition
of the variables.
Turning to Table 2.2, it is clear that average level of employment is lower during the
crisis period when comparing with the tranquil period. However, during the crisis period
the workforce level remain the same at the 75th percentile of the distribution whilst the
level of employees at the 25th and the median percentiles has decreased signicantly.
Regarding, the interest burden variable, outside of the crisis, 75% of the rms in the
distribution have a lower interest burden than during the crisis period. Similarly, 50%
of the rms also have a higher value of interest burden during turmoil period than in
the non-crisis period. This may suggest that rms in the distribution may su¤er from
nancial constraints, especially during the crisis. The average wage growth is signicantly
lower during the crisis than outside of the crisis. The mean of wage growth is 0.027 before
the crisis and closer to zero during the turmoil period. This suggests a cut on wages
during the 2007-2009. Interestingly, for rms at the 25th percentile of the distribution,
the wage growth is negative and below the median and only positive for those rms
above the median. In other words, the workforce which earns less (those at the 25th
percentile) is faced with a decrease of their wages during the crisis. Similarly, rms which
are located at the 25% percentile of the distribution show a decrease of their sales level.
This decline is even higher during the crisis. Finally, the average of wage and capital stock
decrease during the crisis. The di¤erences between sub-samples are statistically signicant
in all cases. Overall, these statistics are consistent with those described by the Structural
Business Statistics by Eurostat. Specically, in the manufacturing sector, the average
rate of employees decreases from pre-crisis to during crisis and the costs in human capital
increase.37
37See http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=sts_inlb_a&lang=en for de-
tails.
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Table 2.3 provides statistics when the sample of rms is split into non-periphery and
periphery rms. It seems that the average employment level is higher for rms at the
non-periphery than at the periphery of the euro area. It is interesting to note that the
level of employment follows the same pattern for non-periphery and periphery rms across
di¤erent percentile but for any level of the distribution non-periphery rms have higher
levels of employment. The gures in Table 2.3 also show that the average interest burden
for periphery rms is signicantly higher than the average interest burden of non-periphery
rms. In fact, at the 25th percentile non-periphery rms show an average of 0.015 against
the 0.036 for periphery rms. This di¤erence is signicantly higher at the 75th percentile
(i.e. 0.208 against 0.509). This suggests that rms at the euro area periphery pay signi-
cantly more to service their debt than rms in the core. In addition, the average growth
of wages is signicantly higher for periphery rms than for non-periphery ones. To be spe-
cic, the growth of wages for rms at the 25th percentile of the distribution is negative and
below the median for both periphery and non-periphery rms with the former presenting
higher growth rates than the latter. The sales growth variables follows a similar pattern
to the wage growth variable with rms at the periphery having a higher average than
the non-periphery ones. Finally, Table 2.3. also shows that capital stock is signicantly
higher, especially for periphery rms at the 75th percentile of the distribution.
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Furthermore, this chapter also takes into account descriptive statistics for periphery
and non periphery rms across crisis and non-crisis periods. Comparing the descriptive
statistics in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, it is clear that the average level of employment
decreases during the turmoil period only for periphery rms. For instance, during the
non-crisis period for periphery economies (Table 2.4) a rm at the 25th percentile has
a level of employment of 2.56 comparing with a rm at the 75% percentile which has a
workforce of 3.807. During the crisis rms at the 25th percentile and 75th percentile of the
distribution show a level of employment of 3.019 and 3.536 (Table 2.5). Conversely, for
rms at the non-periphery the gures show that the average employment actually increases
with an employment level for rms at the 25th percentile of the distribution positive and
below the median but higher when comparing with periphery rms at the same levels of
distributions. Similar the average growth of wages is signicantly higher for periphery
rms than for non-periphery ones during the non-crisis period. Notwithstanding, when
considering the crisis the average wage growth is negative for non-periphery rms and
closer to zero for periphery ones suggesting that during this period rms cut on wages. In
e¤ect, it seems that the growth of wages for rms at the median is broadly negative and
only positive above the median for both periphery and non-periphery rms which may
indicate a real wage cut during this period. On the other hand, Table 2.4 and Table 2.5
show that the parallel gures of the variable wage are higher for rms belonging to the
core. These statistics are in line with the gures of the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) index which is developed by the OECD. According to this index, adjustments for
the periphery countries in the labour market occur almost exclusively on the wage and
working time, while cores labour market legislation is less rigid.38 Holden and Wulfsberg
(2008) provide evidence in support of the previous statements.
Moving to the interest burden, it is clear that during both sub-periods, rms in the
periphery pay signicantly more to service their debt than rms in the core, especially
during the crisis. For instance, let us consider the distribution of interest burden across
di¤erent percentile during the crisis for periphery and non periphery rms. While at the
non-periphery economies, 75% of the rms in the distribution have an average interest
burden of 0.217, for rms at 75% of the distribution at the periphery show an average
of 0.869. This is consistent with the notion that small rms in countries under stress
su¤er more from asymmetric information problems and therefore have a limited access to
the external nancial markets (Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 2000; Guariglia, 2008). For
these rms, access to external nance is limited and prohibitively expensive. Interestingly,
for both sub-samples, the variable interest burden is lower during the crisis period. Such
results might be related to the measures which are implemented by the ECB during the
38The employment outlook of OECD (2013) shows that countries such as Portugal or Spain have a
higher EPL.
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crisis. In e¤ect, the aims of such non-standard policies rely on the assistance to the banking
sector in order to reduce nancial distress and boost the bank lending to the private sector.
As explained by Ciccarelli et al. (2013), in the EU the fragility of the bank was extremely
important in the 2008-2009 crisis. However, until the end of 2011, there is still substantial
heterogeneity in bank loan conditions and standards for non-nancial borrowers between
distressed and other European countries. These di¤erences are even stronger for small
rms. Thus, policies which are adopted until the end of 2011 might have fallen short of
reducing credit availability problems.
In addition, rms in the periphery have higher average of sales during the crisis period,
while the inverse pattern is observed for rms in the core economies. The median rm at
the periphery (non periphery) shows an average sales growth of 0.038 (0.058) and 0.192
(0.004) for the non-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. What it is also interesting is that
the median rm sales growth is almost zero for both periphery and non-periphery rms
and it is negative below the same median which suggest that sales decrease for those rms
which sell less, especially at the non-periphery area. This statistic suggests that rms in
the periphery might su¤er from higher agency costs of debt. As a result, they sell their
assets in order to provide funds, when alternative sources of nance are too expensive.
These ndings are consistent with Campello et al. (2010) according to which the vast
majority of nancially constrained rms sold their assets in order to fund their operations
in 2008.
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As a robustness check for the preliminary analysis, this chapter includes plots of the
main variable of study, interest burden. Specically, Figure 2.1 shows the average interest
burden for the total sample, Figure 2.2 depicts the average 3-month interest rate and the
average interest rate for loans to non-nancial corporations in the euro area. Figure 2.3
plots the average interest burden for rms in the periphery and non-periphery economies.
Finally, the average interest burden for SMEs and non-SMEs is described in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.1: Average interest burden for the sample of rms in the euro area.
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Figure 2.2: Resident monetary and nancial institutions average lending rates for non-
nancial corporations (maturity less than one year).
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Figure 2.3: Average interest burden across the sample of rms in the periphery and non-
periphery economies.
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Figure 2.4: Average interest burden across the sample of SMEs and non-SMEs in the euro
area.
To begin with, the most noticeable feature between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 is the
similar pattern throughout the period of analysis. It is clear that the interest burden of
rms peaks in 2008 which marks the most intense phase of the global nancial crisis. This
is also true for the 3-month interest rate which is at its highest level during this period.
It can also be observed that the interest burden of rms along with both the 3-month
rate and the loan interest rates to rms gradually decrease during the period that ECB
implemented unconventional monetary policy measures (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Such
a pattern can be at least partially explained by higher liquidity of the banking sector
and increased availability of loans to the private sector (ECBs non-standard measures).
Giannone et al. (2011) o¤er some empirical evidence supporting this view.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the variation in the interest burden over time across rms in
the sample, broken down by periphery and non-periphery economies. The variation in
the interest burden is substantial and rms in the periphery face much higher interest
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payments than those in the non-periphery economies. For the rms in the periphery the
interest burden increased by up to 0.13 percent points during the crisis, compared to only
0.05 percent points for rms in the non-periphery countries. This serves to illustrate the
heterogeneity in the interest rate payments.
Finally, Figure 2.4 demonstrates that SMEs are exposed to higher levels of nancial
pressure, especially during the crisis with the interest burden reaching a peak in 2008.
This goes in line with Darvas (2013). According to the authors, SMEs are more vulnerable
during the crisis since they su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry and face
higher costs of borrowing.
Overall, the preliminary statistics suggest that rmslabour decisions are related to
nancial conditions which are associated with tight monetary policies and the recent nan-
cial crisis. Then, the question that arises is if this pattern is conrmed when controlling
for a number of factors, which play a role in determining rmslevel of employment. In
the section that follows, it is provided the empirical analysis which tests whether the sensi-
tivity of employment to the nancial variable interest burden is signicantly higher. This
is investigated in a per-period (i.e. turmoil, tranquil), in a per-region (i.e. periphery and
non-periphery) and on di¤erent dimensions of rm-level heterogeneity.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 The role of nancial pressure on employment and the nancial crisis
This sub-section investigates the impact of nancial pressure on rmslabour decisions.
Specically, it intends to explore the role of interest burden on the level of employment.
Previous evidence denotes that the cost of servicing debt is related to the level of inventory
investment, rmssurvival and employment decisions (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito
and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia, 2009; Guariglia et al., 2015).
Under tight monetary policies, nancial structure of corporations may change a¤ecting
the real activities of the rms (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). The recent nancial crisis
has led to an increase of the cost of borrowing and consequently a reduction of all kinds
of investment, including the hiring of new employees. On the other hand, such market
conditions might also contribute to a contraction of the workforce in order to avoid poten-
tial bankruptcy of the rms (Chen and Guariglia, 2009). Therefore, this section explores
whether the response of rmsemployment decisions is a¤ected by the level of interest
burden for the sample period between 2003 and 2011. Finally, it also assesses if these
e¤ects are magnied during the recent nancial crisis.
Table 2.6 shows the estimation results for equations 2.11 and 2.12. In column 1,
the nancial variable interest burden (IB) is included in the estimation model to test
for the direct impact of interest payments on rmsemployment decisions. In order to
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control for existing and expected demand, n, k, w, w and are also included in the
both estimations. Column 2 includes the nancial indicator interest burden interacted
with Crisist and (1  Crisist). Finally, tests of equality of means between the interacted
terms are also presented at the bottom of the table. To begin with, the employment
dynamics are captured in the baseline model. For instance, a 10 percent increase of wages
(wit 1) reduces the level of employment by 1.01 percent whereas a 10 percent increase in
sales growth (it) increases rmsemployment level by 0.26 percent.39 These ndings are
consistent with previous work by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando
(2008), which show a negative w and a positive  e¤ect on employment from a panel of
U.K. and Spanish manufacturing rms, respectively.
Table 2.6: Employment, nancial pressure and the crisis
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
n
it 1 0.986*** 0.965***
(106.78) (94.81)
IB
it 1 -0.120**
(-2.23)
IB
it 1Crisist -0.204***
(-2.83)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist) -0.058
(-0.78)
w
it
-1.342*** -0.869***
(-10.56) (-4.72)

it
0.799*** 0.832***
(9.45) (9.02)
w
it 1 -0.101** -0.088*
(-2.38) (-1.76)
k
it
0.017*** 0.020***
(2.86) (2.81)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.020 0.010
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.060 0.080
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.004
All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test
equal to 17 in column 1, 7 in column 2. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for
the denition of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Turning to the analysis of the interest burden, it is clear that rm-specic interest
burden exerts a negative and highly signicant impact on rmslevel of employment. The
result is not statistically but also economically important. The coe¢ cient of - 0.120 implies
an elasticity of employment with respect to interest burden, evaluated at sample means of
39The coe¢ cient of 0.799 indicates an elasticity of employment to sales growth of 0.026 (0.799*0.0328),
where 0.0328 is the mean of sales growth.
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-0.035. A 10 percent increase of interest burden reduces the level of employment by 0.35
percent. The nding implies that nancial pressure in the form of interest burden has
a signicant impact on euro area rmsemployment. This is consistent with the results
of Benito and Hernando (2008) according to who nancial constraints have an e¤ect on
labour demand.
Column 2 of Table 2.6 includes the interactions between interest burden and the crisis
terms. The coe¢ cient of interest burden is negative and statistically signicant only for
the crisis period. The results reinforce the idea that during the crisis, nancial pressure
is more relevant in determining rmslevel of employment. Specically, when comparing
the role of interest burden during and outside the crisis, employment is more sensitive
to the changes of rms servicing debt during the crisis. The economic impact across
the two periods is clear: a 10 percent change of the interest burden variable has an
impact on the level of employment by only 0.08 percent during the tranquil period and
0.32 percent during the turmoil period. The p-values for the di¤erences between the two
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant. Finally, in terms of the control variables all the
non-nancial variables have the expected sign and are highly important determinants of
rmscurrent employment. The Sargan test shows that the model is not misspecied and
the m4 indicates that the instrument sets are valid.40
2.7.2 Periphery and non-periphery
The previous results demonstrate the di¤erential role of interest burden on rmsemploy-
ment decisions during the crisis and outside of the crisis period. Motivated by the above-
mentioned ndings, the aim of this sub-section is to verify whether this di¤erential e¤ect
remains when splitting rms based on their location, i.e. periphery and non-periphery
economies.
Results are presented in Table 2.7. All of the non-nancial variables retain their sign
and signicance regarding rms level of employment. In terms of the role of interest
burden on rmsworkforce, the empirical ndings suggest that rms in the periphery react
di¤erently to the nancial pressure of debt-servicing costs during cyclical uctuations than
their non-periphery counterparts.
It is clear that in the periphery area there is a signicantly di¤erent response of rms
employment to interest burden during the crisis period. Specically, the interaction be-
tween interest burden and the periphery dummy is statistically signicant only for the
40The literature refers that an unrestricted set of lags may lead to a huge number of instruments
with a possible loss of e¢ ciency(Roodman, 2009). To account for this issue, I have limit the number of
instruments used in the system GMM in Chapter 2 to t-4 and t-7 and t-4 and t-6. The value of the sargan
test does not improve for any of the specications. Nevertheless, it should be noted that throughout all
specications (i.e. in Chapter 2 and the following empirical chapters) I have employed one instrument per
variable instead of one instrument per year. This reduces substancially the number of instruments use
and it is a way of dealing with instrument proliferation.
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Table 2.7: Periphery, non-periphery and the crisis
n
it 1 0.988***
(63.21)
IB
it 1CrisistPeripheryi -0.205***
(-3.64)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)Peripheryi -0.094
(-1.52)
IB
it 1Crisist(1-Peripheryi) 0.197
(0.83)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)(1-Peripheryi) 0.202
(0.86)
w
it
-1.270***
(-8.62)

it
0.855***
(8.46)
w
it 1 -0.143***
(-3.90)
k
it
0.017**
(2.56)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.028
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.118
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis periph. vs. non-crisis periph. 0.077
IB crisis non-periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.969
IB non-crisis periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.251
IB crisis periph. vs. crisis non-periph. 0.076
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 15 in column 1. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
turmoil period. During tranquil periods rm-specic interest rate is insignicant. This
result suggests that rms in the periphery group react di¤erently to debt-servicing costs
during cyclical uctuations. This is a novel result which demonstrate the e¤ect of the in-
terest burden on rmsemployment during the recent global nancial crisis. More impor-
tantly, the results reinforce the economic impact of interest burden on rmsemployment:
a 10 percent rise in the interest burden decreases rmsworkforce by only 0.10 percent
during non-crisis times and by 0.27 percent during the crisis period. The p-values for the
equality of the coe¢ cients show a statistically signicant di¤erence between the two point
estimates.
Turning to the remaining interaction terms, results show that for non-periphery rms
the interest burden does not seem to exert any signicant e¤ect on these rms during
the tranquil and turmoil periods. The p-value shows that the coe¢ cients are also not
statistically di¤erent from each other.
Overall, the ndings from Table 2.7 suggest that the impact of nancial pressure on
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employment is stronger for rms in the euro area periphery and during the crisis. These
is consistent with the idea that rms in the periphery are more likely to be a¤ected by the
level of nancial pressure during the crisis due to their limited access to external nance
and tighter credit conditions (Artola and Genre, 2011).
2.7.3 Firm-level heterogeneity
Next, it is provided results on the impact of nancial constraints on the interest burden-
employment nexus during crisis and tranquil periods for both periphery and non-periphery
economies. Three di¤erent dimensions of rm-level heterogeneity are considered: bank
dependence, size and legal status. Table 2.8 presents the results. The comparison across
columns in Table 2.8 permits to explore the specic inuence of each dimensions of nancial
constraints (i.e. based on size, bank dependence, privately held versus public held) on each
of the interactions in the rows.41
To begin with, the interactions between interest burden and nancially constrained
rms show that the point estimates are negative and highly statistically signicant during
the turmoil period. In other words, these ndings suggest that rms for whom access
to external nance is restricted or expensive are more responsive to changes in the debt
servicing costs during adverse economic events. More importantly, these results extend
the empirical ndings of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). The authors show that interest
burden has a higher impact in determining the employment level of rms with higher debt
than for those with lower debt levels. The results also reinforce the economic e¤ect of the
rm-specic interest rate on rmsemployment. For instance, let us focus on row 2 of
column 1. The coe¢ cient of -0.147 denotes an elasticity of employment with respect to
interest burden, evaluated at sample means of -0.0072. A 10 percent rise in the interest
burden decreases the employment level of nancially constrained rms by -0.072 percent.
In addition, results show that the interest rate burden e¤ect is statistically insignicant
for unconstrained rms. This means that for these rms an increase in debt servicing costs
has no e¤ect on employment when comparing to their nancially constrained counterparts
whose employment is signicantly more responsive during the crisis period.
As a nal test, in Chapter 2 it is also considered the role of nancial constraints on rms
employment decisions across periphery and non-periphery economies. Empirical ndings
are presented in Table 2.9. Results suggest that interest burden e¤ect has a negative and
statistically signicant impact on employment decisions for nancially constraints rms
in the periphery during the crisis. Firms which are less bank dependent, large and public
remain largely una¤ected independently of their location and the crisis/non crisis period.
41Note that Finland and Ireland is dropped from the estimation when the criteria private/public is
taken into account. Thus, column 3 presents a small number of observations when comparing with the
other measures in column 1 and column 2. This is due to the fact that public rms in Finland and Ireland
are dropped after the cleaning process.
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To sum up, nancially constrained rms show greater sensitivity to interest burden,
especially in the euro area periphery and during the recent nancial crisis. The ndings
are robust to the inclusion of rmslegal status (i.e. private versus public) as a measure
of rm heterogeneity. This indicates that the results are not drive by demand shocks.
Previous empirical literature demonstrate that capital market imperfections are important
in inuencing rmsreal activities such as investment, inventory, employment and rm
survival (Guariglia, 2008; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia and Mateut, 2010;
Tsoukas, 2011).
Overall, employment consequences of interest rate burden shifts are more important for
nancially constrained rms during the crisis than for their unconstrained counterparts.
The greater sensitivity for the former group of rms rms may result from the greater in-
formation asymmetries in the periphery economies when comparing to their non-periphery
counterparts. This is a new result which complements the ndings of Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999) and Benito and Hernando (2008).
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Table 2.8: Financial constraints and the crisis
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
BankDep Size Private
(1) (2) (3)
n
it 1 0.961*** 0.958*** 0.932***
(82.31) (51.69) (37.74)
IB
it 1CrisistConstraintedit -0.147*** -0.221*** -0.304***
(-2.76) (-3.40) (-3.76)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)Constrainedit -0.088 -0.126** -0.162
(-1.46) (-2.31) (-1.60)
IB
it 1Crisist(1-Constrainedit) 0.020 -0.009 -0.063
(1.07) (-0.16) (-0.47)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)(1-Constrainedit) 0.004 0.010 0.191
(0.16) (0.34) (1.27)
w
it
-1.284*** -1.011*** -0.883***
(-9.82) (-9.08) (-4.67)

it
0.687*** 0.585*** 0.547***
(7.13) (5.34) (8.30)
w
it 1 -0.341*** -0.110*** -0.096
(-3.48) (-4.29) (-1.53)
k
it
0.007 0.007 0.036***
(0.78) (1.48) (6.86)
Observations 399,948 399,948 321,294
Firms 94,395 94,395 74,010
Sargan (p-value) 0.037 0.001 0.019
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.616
m4 (p-value) 0.118 0.043
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis Constrained vs. non-crisis Constrained 0.085 0.010 0.029
IB crisis 1-Constrained vs. non-crisis 1-Constrained 0.361 0.704 0.063
IB non-crisis Constrained vs. non-crisis 1-Constrained 0.202 0.037 0.019
IB crisis Constrained vs. crisis 1-Constrained 0.008 0.003 0.093
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The variable constrainedit indicates in turn Bank Dependent, Small and Private
rms. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments
include all regressors lagged four times or more in column 1 and 2. Instruments in column 3 are all regressors lagged three
times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.
with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 15 in column 1, 18 in column 2, 8 in column 3. m1 (m3) is a test for rst
(third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no
serial correlation. m4 is a test for fourth order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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2.7.4 Additional control variables
So far, Chapter 2 has examined whether interest burden has an e¤ect on rmsemployment
decisions. Following the work of Benito and Hernando (2008), it is tested whether the main
results remain unchanged balance sheet variables are included. A set of macroeconomic
variables is also considered.
Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 report the estimates including the control variables for the
baseline and crisis models. The results in Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 should be compared
with those in column 1 and column 2 of Table 2.6, respectively.
Empirical ndings conrm the results which are discussed in sub-section 2.4.6. The
addition of rm-specic variables (with the exception of liquidity) have no e¤ect on rm-
specic employment whereas the 10-year bond yield and the national unemployment rate
have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on rmsemployment decisions. More
importantly, rm-specic interest rate still exerts a negative impact on rmsemployment
decisions.
Results in Table 2.10 demonstrate that the impact of rm-specic interest rate on
the level of employment remain negative only during the turmoil period. Overall, the
above-mentioned results corroborate the previous ndings. The negative relation between
interest burden and rmsemployment decisions is robust to the addition of a number of
rm-specic variables and well as macroeconomic variables.
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Table 2.10: Baseline model with additional control variables
Cow Liq Netdebt Bondy Unem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
n
it 1 0.975*** 0.971*** 0.975*** 0.981*** 0.945***
(84.50) (93.74) (84.76) (110.49) (64.70)
IB
it 1 -0.074* -0.129*** -0.086* -0.109** -0.151*
(-1.80) (-2.89) (-1.66) (-2.37) (-1.79)
Cow
it 1 0.001
(0.06)
Liq
it 1 0.012*
(1.74)
Netdebt
it 1 -2.162
(-1.03)
Bondy
it 1 -0.711**
(-2.37)
Unem
t
-0.516***
(-6.23)
w
it
-1.052*** -1.167*** -1.110*** -1.211*** -1.305***
(-9.91) (-10.50) (-7.02) (-11.65) (-7.24)

it
0.722*** 0.710*** 0.742*** 0.688*** 0.748***
(9.77) (8.68) (8.00) (7.42) (5.27)
w
it 1
-0.090*** -0.162*** -0.115** -0.114*** -0.135***
(-3.03) (-4.31) (-2.57) (-3.10) (-2.73)
k
it
0.016** 0.033*** 0.001 0.021*** 0.031***
(2.37) (3.92) (0.06) (3.47) (3.54)
Observations 372,109 367,345 305,761 373,651 373,651
Firms 90,786 90,631 81,461 91,037 91,037
Sargan (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.029 0.950
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.208 0.067 0.992 0.283 0.264
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test
equal to 18 in column 1, 18 in column 2, 15 in column 3, 19 in column 4 and 22 in column 5. m1 (m4) is a test for rst
(fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no
serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Crisis model with additional control variables
Cow Liq Ndebt Bondy Unem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
n
it 1 0.964*** 0.955*** 0.988*** 0.968*** 0.973***
(79.01) (71.50) (74.65) (86.27) (114.69)
IB
it 1Crisist -0.126*** -0.157*** -0.156* -0.178*** -0.101***
(-2.81) (-3.54) (-1.70) (-3.67) (-2.32)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist ) -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 0.037
(-1.21) (-1.11) (-0.79) (-1.35) (0.88)
Cow
it 1Crisist 0.012
(0.29)
Cow
it 1(1-Crisist ) 0.027
(0.86)
Liq
it 1Crisist 0.016
(1.23)
Liq
it 1(1-Crisist ) 0.016
(1.32)
Ndebt
it 1Crisist 1.789
(1.50)
Ndebt
it 1(1-Crisist ) 0.870
(1.08)
Bondy
i 1Crisist 3.000
(1.36)
Bondy
t 1(1-Crisist ) 0.286
(1.00)
Unem
t
Crisis
t
-0.272***
(-4.72)
Unem
t
(1-Crisis
t
) -0.466***
(-3.74)
w
it
-1.061*** -1.086*** -1.075*** -1.095*** -0.983***
(-9.86) (-9.61) (-4.89) (-8.95) (-8.84)

it
0.570*** 0.651*** -0.820*** 1.047*** 0.813***
(5.26) (6.45) (5.80) (11.38) (16.54)
w
it 1 -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.116** -0.075*** -0.071**
(-3.65) (-3.81) (-2.16) (-2.85) (-2.32)
k
it
0.028*** 0.040*** 0.022* 0.016*** 0.018***
(3.24) (3.58) (1.84) (3.02) (3.71)
Observations 372,109 367,345 305,761 373,651 373,651
Firms 90,786 90,631 81,461 91,037 91,037
Sargan 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.000
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.303 0.080 0.123 0.152 0.199
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.009 0.001 0.066 0.001 0.000
Cow crisis vs. non-crisis 0.352
Liq crisis vs. non-crisis 0.939
Ndebt crisis vs. non-crisis 0.149
Bondy crisis vs. non-crisis 0.226
Unem crisis vs. non-crisis 0.041
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 6. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
70
2.7.5 Alternative measure of nancial pressure
Next, to verify whether the results are derived from the rm-specic interest rate, a
di¤erent denition of interest burden is considered. Following the work of Benito and
Whitley (2003), an alternative interest burden measure is constructed, the implicit interest
rate. Benito and Whitley (2003) nd evidence of a statistically signicant inverse relation
between the rmsnancial health and the rm implicit interest rate. To this end, it is
employed a moving average of 3-year of the data on the debt variable which is centred on
the current year. This is used as the denominator to calculate the implicit interest rate.
Results are provided in Table 2.12 and should be compared with those from Table 2.6.
Table 2.12: Alternative denition of interest burden
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
n
it 1 0.997*** 0.981***
(63.91) (76.01)
IBd
it 1
-0.073*
(-2.19)
IBd
it 1
Crisis
t
-0.061**
(-2.44)
IBd
it 1
(1-Crisis
t
) -0.011
(-0.41)
w
it
-1.036** -0.791***
(-6.15) (-4.85)

it
0.488*** 0.162
(2.07) (0.72)
w
it 1 0.006 -0.014
(0.16) (-0.46)
k
it
-0.013 -0.004
(-1.28) (0.52)
Observations 363,932 363,932
Firms 86,636 86,636
Sargan (p-value) 0.744 0.129
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.380 0.145
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.021
All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 10 in column 1 and 10 in column 2. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
Empirical ndings show that the negative e¤ect of interest burden on the level of
employment remains statistically signicant even after controlling for the crisis period
(column 2). In fact, the alternative measure of interest burden is also negative and statis-
tically signicant during the crisis period than in the tranquil period. The p-value for the
equality of the coe¢ cients indicate a statistically signicant di¤erence between the two
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coe¢ cients. Overall, the main results are robust to using an alternative measure of the
interest burden.
2.7.6 Di¤erent instrument for interest burden
In addition, it is also considered an alternative instrument for the interest burden based on
the work of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). Table 2.13 presents the results for the baseline
and the crisis models.
Empirical ndings are robust to the results of Table 2.6. Column 1 provides evidence
that the negative relation between interest burden and the level of employment remains
negative and statistically signicant. This e¤ect continues to be stronger only during the
turmoil period. Therefore, it is clear that independently of the instruments set which are
used the results support the main empirical ndings.
Table 2.13: Alternative instrument for interest burden
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
n
it 1
0.986*** 0.972***
(106.85) (99.93)
IB
it 1
-0.109*
(-1.91)
IB
it 1
(Crisis
t
) -0.183***
(-3.65)
IB
it 1
(1-Crisis
t
) -0.031
(-0.91)
w
it
-1.320*** -0.924***
(-10.64) (-5.23)

it
0.811*** 0.866***
(9.21) (10.81)
w
it 1
-0.092** -0.085**
(-2.10) (-2.38)
k
it
0.016** 0.017***
(2.56) (4.01)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.015 0.010
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.047 0.080
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs non-crisis 0.002
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors four times or more with the exception of IB
it 1 . The instrument
for interest burden (IB
it 1 ) is dened as the product of debt-capital ratio two or three years lagged and the contemporaneous
change in the 10-year bond yield. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of
instrument validity. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation,with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 17 in column
1 and 12 in column 2. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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2.7.7 Alternative denitions for the crisis period
So far, the main empirical specications take into consideration the crisis period between
2007 and 2009. As a robustness check of the main analysis, the crisis period is calculated
for the period between 2008 and 2009. Equation (2.17) which is dened in sub-section
2.4.8 is used and the results are provided in Table 2.14.
Table 2.14: Alternative crisis period
n
it 1
0.976***
(106.48)
IB
it 1
Crisisnt -0.139*
(-1.79)
IB
it 1
(1-Crisisnt ) -0.038
(-0.48)
w
it
-1.111***
(-8.89)

it
0.841***
(9.13)
w
it 1
-0.034
(-0.59)
k
it
0.016**
(2.16)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.001
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.124
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.041
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation, with
degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 6. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
The above empirical ndings are consistent with the previous results. Specically,
when comparing the role of interest burden during and outside the crisis, employment
remains more sensitive to changes of rms interest burden during the crisis. The p-values
for the di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients are statistically signicant.
Moreover, the crisis period is also split in two phases of the crisis. Both periods
correspond to the credit (i.e. 2008-2009) and debt (i.e. 2010-2011) crisis, respectively.
Table 2.15 reports the estimates for the model that includes interaction terms between the
interest burden, the periphery and non-periphery dummies, and the crisis and non-crisis
dummies.
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Table 2.15: Two phases of the crisis
n
it 1 0.995***
(54.71)
IB
it 1*Debtt*Peripheryi -0.221**
(-2.55)
IB
it 1*Creditt*Peripheryi -0.139**
(-2.48)
IB
it 1*Debtt
*(1-Periphery
i
) 0.416
(1.38)
IB
it 1*Creditt*(1-Peripheryi ) 0.352
(1.31)
IB
it 1*(1-Debtt -Creditt
)*Periphery
i
-0.210
(-1.30)
IB
it 1*(1-Debtt -Creditt )*(1-Peripheryi ) 0.488
(1.36)
w
it
-1.374***
(-7.70)

it
0.913***
(5.87)
w
it 1 -0.150**
(-2.49)
k
it
0.015
(1.47)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan 0.009
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.130
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB debt crisis periph. vs. credit crisis periph. 0.031
IB debt crisis non-periph. vs. credit crisis non-periph. 0.654
IB credit crisis periph. vs. credit crisis non-periph. 0.076
IB debt crisis periph. vs. debt crisis non-periph. 0.049
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 13. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The latter takes the value of 1 in the years 2010-2011 and 0 otherwise. See
Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Results indicate that the interest burden is not statistically signicant for the non-
periphery countries. The debt-servicing cost ratio plays a signicant role for the periphery
rms during both crisis periods. Particularly, during the debt crisis, interest burden
has a higher e¤ect on periphery rms. Such pattern can be partially explained by the
European sovereign debt crisis of the periphery countries, which have worse bank lending
for rms. This is consistent Reichlin (2014). The author refers that the second recession
is characterised by an unusual decrease of bank loans.
Finally, the p-values for the equality of the coe¢ cients for periphery and non-periphery
during both sub-periods (i.e. credit and debt) indicate a statistically signicant di¤erence
between the coe¢ cients. This means that the main results are found robust in the two
alternative denitions of the crisis.
2.7.8 Alternative classication scheme
As an alternative classication scheme, the sample of rms is di¤erentiated into SMEs
and non-SMEs. Equation (2.11), equation (2.12) and equation (2.13) are re-estimated for
the sample of SMEs and non-SMEs and empirical ndings are presented in Table 2.16 and
Table 2.17.
Starting with Table 2.16, the e¤ect of interest burden is negative and statistically
signicant only for SMEs even during the crisis period. The di¤erences between crisis and
non-crisis period remain statistically signicant as before. The results show that SMEs in
the periphery area are more vulnerable during the nancial crisis period. This is consistent
with Darvas (2013). The author argues that SMEs have a higher vulnerability during the
turmoil period since they su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry and higher
costs of borrowing.
Table 2.17 reports the results for SMEs and non-SMEs at the periphery and non-
periphery countries during and outside of the crisis periods. Empirical ndings show that
the response of employment to interest burden is detectable only for SMEs during the
crisis in the periphery countries. This is in line with the argument of Artola and Genre
(2011). According to the authors SMEs, especially those in the periphery economies have
more serious problems of accessing nance than non-periphery rms.
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Table 2.16: Baseline and crisis models for SMEs and non-SMEs
SMEs Non-SMEs
Baseline Crisis Baseline Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
n
it 1 0.973*** 0.970*** 0.974*** 0.966***
(89.84) (91.01) (19.82) (18.69)
IB
it 1 -0.241*** 0.057
(-3.29) (1.11)
IB
it 1Crisist -0.231*** 0.011
(-3.96) (0.10)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist) -0.058** 0.064
(-2.13) (0.97)
w
it
-1.449*** -1.054*** -0.153 -0.126
(-9.87) (-8.55) (-1.49) (-0.40)

it
0.797*** 0.489*** 0.370** 0.398**
(7.73) (3.40) (2.20) (2.38)
w
it 1 -0.168*** -0.107*** -0.153 -0.182
(-3.04) (-3.30) (-1.49) (-1.61)
k
it
0.027*** 0.013** 0.006 -0.014
(3.50) (2.53) (-0.22) (-0.47)
Observations 376,959 376,959 22,989 22,989
Firms 88,872 88,872 8,060 8,060
Sargan (p-value) 0.412 0.035 0.711 0.673
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.125 0.040 0.298 0.352
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.001 0.685
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 15 in column 1, 11 in column 2, 16 in column 3 and 16 in column 4. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.
SMEs are rms that have less than 250 employees and a total revenue equal or less than e50 million. See Table A.2 in the
Appendix A for the denition of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 2.17: Periphery, non-periphery, SMEs and non-SMEs
SMEs Non-SMEs
(1) (2)
n
it 1 0.995*** 0.954***
(61.67) (21.95)
IB
it 1CrisistPeripheryi -0.176** 0.329
(-2.52) (1.13)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)Peripheryi -0.047 0.165
(-1.06) (1.14)
IB
it 1Crisist(1-Peripheryi) 0.329 0.083
(1.14) (0.70)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)(1-Peripheryi) 0.143 0.026
(1.00) (0.39)
w
it
-0.961*** -0.245
(-3.78) (-0.80)

it
0.910*** 0.343**
(4.93) (2.35)
w
it 1 -0.112** -0.127
(-2.34) (-1.26)
k
it
-0.011 0.013
(1.36) (0.55)
Observations 376,959 22,989
Firms 88,872 8,060
Sargan (p-value) 0.659 0.164
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.021 0.631
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis periph. vs. non-crisis periph. 0.014 0.590
IB crisis non-periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.339 0.695
IB non-crisis periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.271 0.339
IB crisis periph. vs. crisis non-periph. 0.085 0.267
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity , with degrees of freedom for the sargan test
equal to 11 in column 1, 18 in column 2. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. SMEs are rms that have less than
250 employees and a total revenue equal or less than e50 million. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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2.7.9 Alternative cut-o¤ value
As a nal robustness check for Chapter 2 a di¤erent cut-o¤ value for the sample of con-
strained and unconstrained rms is considered. In the main empirical results, the 50th
percentile is used as a cut-o¤ to dene nancially constrained and unconstrained rms.
To ensure that the results are not driven from the way the sample is divided, in Chapter
2 it is considered an alternative benchmark level of 75%. The models from Table 2.8 and
Table 2.9 are re-estimated for this new cut-o¤ point. Results are shown in Table 2.18 and
Table 2.19.
Table 2.18: Alternative classication scheme for nancial constraints
Constrained= Constrained=
BankDep Size
(1) (2)
n
it 1 0.983*** 0.962***
(0.012) (55.33)
IB
it 1CrisistConstrainedit -0.165*** -0.165***
(-2.94) (-3.07)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)Constrainedit 0.005 -0.085**
(0.06) (-2.24)
IB
it 1Crisist(1-Constrainedit) 0.232 0.030
(1.27) (0.37)
IB
it 1(1-Crisist)(1-Constrainedit) 0.300 0.031
(1.61) (0.79)
w
it
-1.035*** -1.008***
(-6.98) (-8.00)

it
0.675*** 0.576***
(5.33) (4.66)
w
it 1 -0.057 -0.119***
(-1.20) (-4.40)
k
it
0.015 0.009*
(1.55) (1.79)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.017 0.003
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m4 (p-value) 0.233 0.114
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis Dummy vs. non-crisis Dummy 0.023 0.027
IB crisis 1-Dummy vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.320 0.989
IB non-crisis Dummy vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.131 0.050
IB crisis Dummy vs. crisis 1-Dummy 0.024 0.012
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged four times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 8 in column 1, 18 in column 2. m1 (m4) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The variable Constrainedit indicates in turn
Bank dependence and small rms. Classication is based on BankDep (Size) at the top (bottom) 75% of the distribution of
all rms operating in the same industry at a given year. See Table A.2 in the Appendix A for the denition of the variables.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Comparing the results in Table 2.18 with those of Table 2.8, it seems that nancially
constrained rms show the same sensitivity to the nancial crisis while unconstrained
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rms remain largely una¤ected. Finally, from Table 2.19 it is clear that the di¤erential
e¤ect of interest burden on employment continues to be statistically signicant only for
constrained rms in the periphery during the crisis. Therefore, the ndings are robust to
the selection of di¤erent cut-o¤ values.
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2.8 Concluding remarks
The literature on nancial constraints and rmsbehaviour has mainly considered the
impact of nancial pressure for rms in the U.K., Spain and China. This chapter goes one
step further and investigates how debt-servicing costs measured as interest burden a¤ect
rmsbehaviour during the recent nancial crisis in the euro area.
The empirical ndings introduce four main implications. Firstly, it is clear that interest
burden a¤ects rms employment decisions. The debt-servicing costs variable exerts a
negative inuence on employment. These results are as expected. In other words, since
the majority of rms in the sample are unquoted, they rely on external sources to nance
debt. Unquoted rms are more likely to su¤er from asymmetric information and therefore
face problems of nancing constraints. Results are in line with previous studies (Nickell
and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Chen and Guariglia, 2009). Secondly,
the ndings also demonstrate that the impact of interest burden on rmsworkforce is
higher during the 2007-2009 crisis compared to the tranquil period. This is also consistent
with the idea that during periods of nancial pressure employment behaviour is associated
with changes in rmsnancial conditions (Görg and Spaliara, 2014; Guariglia et al., 2015).
Thirdlt, when di¤erentiating rms according to the euro area region, the results show
that interest burden has no e¤ect on the non-periphery rms. Conversely the debt-
servicing cost ratio has a negative and signicant impact on periphery rms. The em-
pirical ndings suggest that rms in the periphery economies are more vulnerable to tight
monetary policies. The result may be explained by the higher dependence on external
sources of nance. During an economic downturn, external nance is more costly, a¤ect-
ing rmsnancial position. These changes a¤ect rmslabour decisions and their level
of employment. Previous empirical evidence shows that debt-servicing costs a¤ect rms
behaviour (Spaliara, 2009; Guariglia et al., 2015). Furthermore, results also demonstrate
that for periphery rms during the recession period, the e¤ect of interest burden on the
level of employment is intensied.
Finally, the inuence of nancial constraints on the response to interest burden is only
signicant during the crisis period. In fact, the impact of nancial pressure on employment
is only detectable for rms which are classied as nancially constrained and operating
in the periphery economies. On the other hand, rms which belong to the non-periphery
countries show no statistically signicant response during periods of crisis and non-crisis.
The main empirical ndings are also robust to a set of di¤erent criteria. Overall the
results suggest that nancial pressure in the form of interest burden plays a key role on
the level of employment for euro area rms, especially for nancially constrained ones in
the periphery region.
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3 Chapter 3: Cash holdings of private and public
rms in the euro area
3.1 Introduction
A relevant aspect of rmsnancial management is the decision-making in cash holdings.
One of the advantages of holding cash is that rms can increase their liquidity (Pelly
and Krämer-Eis, 2011). Firms which su¤er from more from capital market imperfections
should hold more cash since hoarding cash helps rms to increase their ability to under-
take investment opportunities (Arslan et al., 2006). Thus, understanding cash holdings
decisions is an important element on the analysis of rmsbehaviour.
Small rms sector are often considered to be an important engine for the development
of the eurozone. For example, in 2007, SMEs generated 58% of the value added and 52%
of the total sales in the euro area business economy (Audretsch et al., 2009). Within
the SMEs sector, 92% of the rms were micro rms. This clearly shows the key part
small rms play in the economy. Nevertheless, the literature on cash holdings has mainly
analysed the determinants and implications of holding cash for rms which are listed in
stock market (Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 2004). Only recently, a limit number
of studies explore the determinants of cash holdings for large public and private rms
(Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013; Farre-Mensa, 2014). Surprisingly, the literature
is relatively silent regarding the behaviour of small rms.
Based on the above, Chapter 3 tests the cash holdings behaviour of privately held and
publicly traded rms in euro area over the period 2003-2011. This chapter focuses on
ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). The reason to do so relates to the recent studies which
nd that public rms hold more cash than their private counterparts in the U.S. and Eu-
rope due to agency motives (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). This goes against
the earlier literature on cash holdings which denote that rms with greater information
asymmetry alleviate costly external nance by retaining higher levels of cash (Opler et al.,
1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Therefore, private rms which in theory have more di¢ -
culties in accessing capital markets, should hold more cash than their public counterparts.
The value added of this chapter is threefold. This chapter makes the rst contribution
by selecting a large panel of small euro area rms to test whether private rms hold higher
cash levels than their public counterparts. While previous studies have used rms which
are large, the majority of the rms in this chapter are relatively small when comparing
with previous studies.42 In fact, 90% of the rms in Chapter 3 are not quoted in the stock
42Note that Akguc and Choi (2013), Gao et al. (2013) and Farre-Mensa (2014) have used a sample of
rms from Capital IQ database. This database only reports information on private and public rms with
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market. Investigating the role of capital market imperfections focusing on cash reserves
of small rms rather than of large ones is important since it allows me to contribute to
the literature on nancial constraints and cash holdings (Almeida et al., 2004). Small and
unquoted rms face higher levels of information asymmetry comparing with their larger
counterparts. As a result the former should hold more cash as a precaution against the
possibility of cash ows shortfall in the future.(Keynes, 1936; Baumol, 1952; Miller and
Orr, 1966) Firms with greater information asymmetry alleviate costly external nance by
retaining higher levels of cash.
Secondly, this chapter tests the impact of nancial pressure (in the form of the credit
risk) on rmscash holdings decisions. This is based on one of the most known areas of
research in corporate nance, i.e., the literature on nancial constraints and rmsreal
activities. It is well established that both information assymetry and agency costs upon
lending are not evenly distributed across rms. As a consequency, rms are more or less
likely to su¤er from nancially constraints on their access to external market. A limited
number of studies have only linked cash holdings with the cash ow sensitivity of cash
as a measure for nancial constraints (Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; Pál and
Ferrando, 2010). Recently, Acharya et al. (2012) argue that in the presence of nancial
constraints, rms which su¤er from higher levels of nancial pressure (i.e. rms with lower
expected cash ows and lower credit worthiness) decide to uphold higher levels of cash
reserves as a bu¤er against possible cash ow shortfall in the future. Drawing on the these
new insights from the literature on cash holdings and nancial constraints (Acharya et al.,
2012), this chapter aims at advancing our understanding on the role of nancial pressure
by exploring whether the relative di¤erence of cash holdings between public and private
rms is a¤ected by their level of credit risk.
Finally, it is investigated the extent to which public and private rms follow a target
cash level. In particular, it is tested whether there is a di¤erence in the speed of adjustment
to target cash levels of private and public rms. The reason to do so is that in an
imperfect capital market, the existence of adjustment costs prevents actual cash holdings
from adjusting to their target levels instantly (Gao et al., 2013). The argument is simple
to follow. If rms which su¤er from higher (lower) nancial frictions and have a better
(worse) access to external markets, as it is argued in the literature on nancial constraints,
then these rms should adjust their actual cash positions towards their target cash levels
quicker (slower). Hence, in Chapter 3 the argument is that private rms (which su¤er
from higher levels of nancial frictions) are able to adjust to their target cash levels slower
than their public counterparts. Previous studies explore the speed of adjustment of cash
holdings on large publicly traded and private rms using a partial adjustment model
a minimum annual revenue of approximately 5 million euros. Amadeus, which is the database used in
this chapter includes information on rms with less than 2 million euros.
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(Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). This chapter uses a dynamic adjustment model
to analyse the cash holding behaviour of euro area public and private rms.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Sub-section 3.2 reviews the theories
and empirical literature. Sub-section 3.3 summarises the research design while sub-section
3.4 denotes the model specication. Sub-section 3.5 provides the empirical methodology
whereas sub-section 3.6 describes the data which is used. Finally, sub-section 3.7 and
sub-section 3.8 provide the empirical results and concluding remarks, respectively.
3.2 Literature review
In a world of perfect markets, holding cash neither creates or destroys value. There is
no information asymmetry, transaction costs and taxes. In an imperfect market setting
transactions costs and taxes are constraints which rms face. There is no liquid premium
and rms have an incentive to hold a substantial portion of their assets in the form of
cash and liquidity securities (Denis, 2011).
The availability of external funding, especially the availability and cost of external
nance is quite important for rms, especially for SMEs. These conditions may a¤ect
rmscorporate behaviour, i.e. rmsinvestment and the amount of cash reserves. Cash
holdings have been studied extensively in the nancial literature. Chapter 3 reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on cash holdings decisions.
3.2.1 Theoretical and empirical background
Prior literature has tested the determinants of cash holdings based on di¤erent theories
and motives. The former is employed to explain the volume of rmscash reserves. The
latter is used under the idea that in a imperfect market setting rms have several motives
to hold cash.
Prior research has tested the determinants of cash holdings in light of three main
theoretical models: the trade-o¤ theory, the pecking order theory and the cash ow theory.
The trade-o¤ model is based on the assumption that rmshave an optimal level of cash.
To do so, rms weight the marginal benets and marginal costs of holding cash (Miller
and Orr, 1966). According to Ferreira and Vilela (2004) holding cash has several benets
for the rms. First, it acts as a safety reserve, minimizing the likelihood of nancial
distress. Cash helps dealing with unexpected losses, creates a bu¤er that allows managing
the operating cycle, and allows rms to deal more e¢ ciently with external fund-raising
constraints. Second, having readily available cash minimizes the likelihood of having to
forgo new Net Present Value (NPV) projects when access to new debt or equity is di¢ cult.
Holding cash has also a higher opportunity cost, which is a direct consequence of the low
return one can earn on liquid assets.
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The pecking order theory of Myers (1984) refers that rms do not have an optimal debt
level. Under an imperfect capital market setting, the presence of information asymmetry
leads rms to prefer internal nance to external sources. External nance is costly due
to transaction costs, tax issues, costs of nancial distress as well as costs associated with
problems of information asymmetry (Allen and Santomero, 1997).
This theory proposes that rms only resort to external nance when internal cash
ows are not su¢ cient to meet the nancial demands of new positive NPV. Under this
theory assumptions, equity is considered to be the most expensive source to obtain nance.
According to Benito and Whitley (2003) new equity issues are associated with various
costs, i.e. registration fees, taxes, selling and administrative expenses. Therefore, rst
rms employ their accumulated cash reserves to nance new projects. Only if it is needed
they issue debt and then equity.
The free-cash ow theory of Jensen (1986) indicates that there is agency conicts
between managers and shareholders. Managers have an incentive to build up cash to
increase the amount of assets under their control (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). This allows
them to gain discretionary power over rmsinvestment decisions.
This theory is based on the agency cost assumption which is developed by Jensen
and Meckling (1976). Agency costs arise when there is a separation between ownership
and control, i.e. managers and shareholders have di¤erent views regarding the costs and
benets of holdings the cash. Thus, this theory assumes that the availability of free cash
ow allows managers to invest in negative NPV projects rather than paying dividends to
shareholders (Stulz, 1999). Jensen (1986) denes free cash ow as the cash ow which is
left after the rms have invested in all available positive NPV projects. Therefore, the
aim of the rms is to increase their size investing in all type of projects.
Furthermore, the literature shows that these main theories that are discussed above
may be derived from four main motives of cash holdings: the transaction cost motive, the
precautionary cost motive, the agency motive and the tax motive.
The transaction cost motive corresponds to the cost that rms face when converting
non-nancial assets in cash and the uses of cash for payments. Thus, holding liquid assets
avoids the transaction costs of selling illiquid assets and avoids the need for external funds
(Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966) Under the precautionary motive, rms hold cash as
a precaution against possible adverse shocks in the future, especially if external nancial
cost is costly or unavailable for rms (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2002).
The agency motive to hold cash is based on the assumption of Jensen and Meckling
(1976). The conicts of interest between managers and shareholders exert an impact on
cash holdings decisions. Entrenched managers choose to hoard cash than to increase pay-
outs to shareholders in a period when investment prospects are low for the rms (Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Finally, the tax motive is based on the assumption that multina-
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tional rms benet from allocating foreign assets to cash if they are faced with heavy tax
expense by repatriating foreign earnings and if they cannot nd more protable investment
opportunities abroad (Foley et al., 2007).
3.2.2 Determinants of listed rms cash holdings
The initial empirical literature has mainly focused on the determinants of cash reserves
for listed rms. Firmscash holdings decisions are rst studied by Kim et al. (1998). The
authors consider an optimal cash reserves model and tests the trade-o¤ between the low
return earned on liquid assets and the benet of minimising costly external nance.
The authors use a panel of 915 industrial U.S. rms between 1975-1994. Two proxies
for the cost of external nance are implemented. Size is used as a proxy for the cost
of external nance since smaller rms are more likely to face higher costs of borrowing
(Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). The variable growth opportunities is also taken into account.
A cross-sectional regressions is implemented. It uses the time-series averages for each rms
variable.
Results indicate that rms have an optimal amount of liquidity. Firms which present
higher costs of external nance in the form of growth opportunities and size tend to hold
higher cash reserves. Cash varies inversely with leverage, probability of bankruptcy, and
operating performance.
Following the work of Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999) create the most known
model of cash holdingsdecisions. The authors rst test whether rms have target cash
levels. To do so, the authors use a sample of 1,048 U.S. publicly traded rms during the
1971-1994. Opler et al. (1999) associate rmsactual cash with their target cash reserves.
Firm specic characteristics are employed as determinants of cash decisions of a rm (i.e.
size, leverage, dividends, nancial distress costs and market to book ratio). An adjustment
partial model similar to the one in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is used.43 Opler et al.
(1999) ndings support only for the precautionary motive to hold cash and the trade-o¤
theory. Firms in the sample follow a target cash level.
Secondly, to account for the pecking order assumptions, Opler et al. (1999) consider
that changes in cash reserves are given by the ow of funds of decit. The ow of funds of
decit is calculated as cash dividends plus capital expenditures, the change in net working
capital less cash, plus the current portion of long term debt due minus the operating cash
ow. The same partial adjustment model is used. Empirical ndings suggest that the ow
of funds decit explain changes in cash reserves. This is consistent with the pecking order
theory.
In addition, the authors regress cash holdings on rms specic characteristics (i.e.
43 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use a target adjustment model which shows that changes in the
debt ratio are explained by deviations of the current ratio from the target.
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size, leverage, dividends, nancial distress costs and market to book ratio). The aim is
to measure the level of rmsliquidity. Di¤erent methodologies are implemented. Opler
et al. (1999) use a cross sectional regression, a xed e¤ect regression and the method of
Fama and MacBeth (1973).44
Firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier cash ows and with smaller size hold
higher levels of cash when comparing with larger ones. The authors refer that rms hold
cash to save transaction costs when raising funds, avoiding liquidating assets to make
payments. Opler et al. (1999) conclude that transaction costs and costs associated with
asymmetric information are important factors in the trade-o¤theory assumptions. Finally,
the model of cash holdings is re-estimated omitting some of the rm-specic characteris-
tics (i.e. capital expenditures, dividends and leverage). According to the authors, using
these specic variables simultaneously can lead to inconsistent estimates. However, results
remain robust to the previous ndings.
3.2.3 Corporate governance
A second set of the literature refers that the nancial structure of the countries and its
legal system have an e¤ect on rms corporate governance structure and consequently
its cash holdingsdecisions. For example, Dittmar et al. (2003) investigate the role of
shareholders protection in a multi-country setting. More specically, the authors test
whether in countries with less developed capital markets, rms may have a limit access
the external nance due to the higher transaction costs of raising funds (Ferreira and
Vilela, 2004).
A sample of 11,000 listed rms are used from 45 di¤erent countries for the year of 1998.
Firmscash holdings are regressed on a set of rm-specic characteristics (i.e. market to
book, size, net working capital, cash ow, R&D), common law, private bank credit to
GDP, external capital held by minority shareholders and the shareholders right index.
The latter is rst developed by La Porta et al. (1997) and it is a measure of corporate
governance.45 A pooled OLS regression is employed.
Results provide evidence of an inuence of shareholders protection on rms cash
reserves decisions. In countries with lower shareholders protection, rms retain more
44Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach is an alternative method to estimate the regression coe¢ cients
and standard errors when the residuals are not independent. In other words, it is a two-stage approach.
It is a method which uses a time series regression to estimate betas and a cross-sectional regression to
test the hypothesis derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
45La Porta et al. (1997) investigate the impact of a country legal system in protecting corporate share-
holders rights on a sample of 49 countries. They refer that commercial legal codes of most countries are
based in four main traditions: English common law, French or Roman civil law, German civil law and
Scandinavian law. La Porta et al. (1997) employ three di¤erent index, i.e. anti-director rights index
(shareholders protection), creditor rights index (creditor protection) and rule of law index (based on the
country risk rating). The results suggest that common law countries provide the most protection to in-
vestors. On the other hand, shareholders and creditors su¤er from the weakest level of protection when
rms are located in countries which are rooted in Roman law.
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than twice the amount of cash when comparing to rms in those countries with higher
shareholder protection.
Guney et al. (2003) extend the work by Dittmar et al. (2003). The authors explore
how legal and institutional characteristics a¤ect rmscash holdings policies. Guney et al.
(2003) assume that higher credit protection and stronger rule of law should increases
the probability of nancial distress of rms leading rms to accumulate more cash. As
a result, their main aim is to test whether target cash levels are di¤erent for rms in
di¤erent countries. A sample of 3,989 publicly traded rms from France, Germany, Japan
and U.K. over the period of 1983 to 2000 is employed.
The authors use the same model as Dittmar et al. (2003) but include the a law index,
an ownership concentration index and the degree of creditor protection. These indicators
account for legal and institutional characteristics. A GMM estimator is used.
Results demonstrate that higher levels of shareholders rights are associated with lower
levels of cash reserves. According to the authors, results demonstrate that rms which
operate in countries with higher shareholders protection should have a better access to
capital markets. Good law enforcement and strong creditor rights are related to higher
cash reserves.
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) investigate a sample of listed rms for 12 European countries
(i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Contrary to the previous studies (Kim et al., 1998;
Opler et al., 1999) the authors explore rms cash holdings in countries with di¤erent
corporate governance and nancial structure. Using a sample of 400 listed rms for the
period 1987-2009, the authors employ the methodology in Fama and MacBeth (1973) and
pooled time-series regressions. The results show a positive relation between rmscash
holdings and investment opportunities. Liquid assets, size, leverage and bank debt are
negatively related with cash holdings.
Furthermore, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) explore the empirical determinants of cash
holdings for a sample of U.K. rms. More specically, it is investigated whether managerial
ownership has an impact on rmscash holdings decisions. According to the authors, the
U.K. corporate sector lacks of e¢ cient monitoring and external market discipline. This
means that managers have an incentive to increase cash to pursue their own interest which
may include higher cash reserves. The authors test if rmscorporate governance factors
have an e¤ect on cash reserves and serve as incentive for managers to hold cash.
A sample of 839 listed U.K. rms for the period of 1984 to 1999 is employed. The
authors construct cash holdings as a function of rm-specic characteristics (i.e. cash
ow, liquidity, variability, leverage, bank debt, market-to-book, size, dividends) and a
set of corporate governance proxies (i.e. rmsboard structure, existence and identity
of control shareholders, discrepancy between largest shareholderscontrol rights and cash
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ow rights). To avoid biased estimates, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) expand the target-
adjustment model by Opler et al. (1999) and include unobservable xed e¤ects, xed
e¤ects and rm-specic factors. A rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is employed.
Empirical ndings show a non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and
cash reserves. Firms with families as controllers have a tendency to hold more cash
comparing with those which controllers are nancial institutions. The results show a
positive relation between cash ow, growth opportunities and cash reserves. Liquidity has
a negative impact on the level of cash holdings, whereas higher cash holdings are related
with lower levels of bank debt.
3.2.4 Financial constraints
Another set of the literature has considered that rms su¤er from nancial frictions from
the market to save cash out of cash ow. This is based on the theoretical model which
is rst dened by Almeida et al. (2004). According to the authors, the discrepancy in
the response of cash reserves to operating cash ow (i.e. the cash ow sensitivity of cash)
among nancially constrained and unconstrained rms is explained by the imperfections
of the nancial markets.
Almeida et al. (2004) develop a empirical model of the cash ow sensitivity of cash to
explain the link between nancial constraints and cash reserves. The cash ow sensitivity
of cash is dened as the change in cash due to changes in cash ow and should be higher
for nancially constrained rms. Almeida et al. (2004) argue that nancially constrained
rms have a tendency to hold higher levels of cash as a bu¤er to balance the protability
of current and future investments. Unconstrained rms should not display a systematic
propensity to hoard cash. These rms face less di¢ culties in accessing the markets and
have a lower propensity to hold cash.
To empirically test their hypothesis, the authors employ a sample of 29,954 rm-year
observations from U.S. listed rms over the 1971 to 2000 period. The model captures the
e¤ect of cash ow in the change in cash holdings and includes a set of control variables
(i.e. Tobins Q, size, expenditures, acquisitions, net working capital and change in short
term debt). Firms are classied as constrained/unconstrained based on several criteria.
The payout ratio, size, bonds, commercial paper rating, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
index are used as a classication scheme. An OLS and IV estimations are used.
Results indicate that constrained rms have a positive sensitivity of cash to cash ow.
However, there is no statistically signicant e¤ect for unconstrained rms. According to
the Almeida et al. (2004) the macroeconomic conditions explain the results. Under a tight
credit market, nancially constrained rms hold higher levels of cash. They conclude
that the precautionary motive for holding cash exists especially for nancially constrained
rms.
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Han and Qiu (2007) expand the model of Almeida et al. (2004) and investigate whether
rmscash holdings change in the presence of cash ow volatility. In their model, Han
and Qiu (2007) assume that rmschoice to invest over two periods cannot hedge future
cash ow risk directly in the market. To hedge for future cash shortage, rmsrely on
their cash holdings. The model explores optimal investment and corporate cash holdings
in a setting which allows to capture the precautionary motive of holdings cash.
A sample of publicly trade U.S. rms using quarterly data from 1997-2002 is employed.
The sample of rms is also divided apriori into constrained and unconstrained. The
following proxies are implemented: dividend payout, size, bond ratings and commercial
paper ratings. A rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is used.
Results show that the impact of cash ow volatility on cash holdings depends on
whether a rm is considered to be constrained. Firms which are classied as nancially
constrained increase their level of cash holdings in response to a raise in the cash ow
volatility. Unconstrained rms show no systematic relation between cash holdings and
cash ow volatility. The results demonstrate that nancial constraints have an impact on
the relation between cash ow volatility, cash reserves and investment.
Lin (2007) examines the impact of operating cash ow in rm cash policies in Taiwan.
The author extends the model of Almeida et al. (2004) and includes debt and equity is-
suances. The author argues that operating cash ow is a relevant determinant of corporate
debt/equity policies. This is due to the fact that new debt/equity are hold as cash before
they are spent.
A sample of publicly traded rms in Taiwan are used from 1990 to 2004. Changes
in cash holdings is a function of operating cash ow, sum of net debt/equity issuances,
changes in the interest rate and other control variables (i.e. change in net working capital,
market-to-book ratio, size, R&D). The author considers that external nance and changes
in cash reserves are jointly determined which means that net debt/equity issuances and
innovations in changes in cash reserves may be correlated. To account for this the author
uses a xed e¤ects two least square (FE-2SLS) and a xed e¤ects three least square (FE-
3SLS).46
Contrary to previous studies Lin (2007) uses a new method to dene nancially con-
strained/ unconstrained rms, i.e. the investment-dividend correlation method of Moyen
(2004). According to the author there is a correlation between investment and dividends.
This investment-dividend correlation is positive (negative) for nancially constrained (un-
constrained) rms.
Lin (2007) classies the sample of rms based on the above methodology and on com-
mon measures from the literature of nancial constraints (i.e. age, bank debt to total debt
46According to Greene (2012), while the FE-2SLS control for possible endogeneity of the regressors
and unobserved heterogeneity it does not take into account the simultaneity problem among regressors.
Contrary to the FE-2SLS, the FE-3SLS approach is considered to be asymptotically e¢ cient.
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ratio, issuance of public debt). Results show that only both constrained/unconstrained
rms have a positive cash ow sensitivity of cash. This e¤ect is stronger to nancially
constrained rms. Firms with access to the bond market hold more cash out of cash ow
than rms which do not issued any public debt.
Recently, Pál and Ferrando (2010) challenge the work by Almeida et al. (2004). They
refer that the model of Almeida et al. (2004) is not able to test the degree of nancial
constraints rms face. To account for this issue, they identify a priori groups of rms
which experience di¤erent nancial conditions. They rst identify those rms with the
better nancial conditions. Then, the authors determine whether the liquidity demand
test is able to di¤erentiate these rms from the rest of the sample.
Using a sample of 2,190 listed and unlisted euro area rms during the 1994-2003 period,
it is tested whether small and unlisted rms are more a¤ected by worse nancial condi-
tions when comparing to their large counterparts. The authors use the empirical model
by Almeida et al. (2004). They divide the sample of rms a priori using asset size, num-
ber of employees and quotation. An OLS regression is employed controlling unobserved
individual heterogeneity by rms.
Secondly, Pál and Ferrando (2010) employ a new a priori classication scheme for
rms. They rank them in three di¤erent groups: absolutely constrained, constrained in
the relative sense and unconstrained rms. Pál and Ferrando (2010) follow the work by
Vermeulen (2002). They dene absolutely constrained rms as those which cannot obtain
new debt and nancing through external sources. Constrained rms are those which access
to capital market is costly whereas unconstrained rms are those with no di¢ culties in
obtaining external nance.
In other words, the authors explore whether the presence of nancing constraints is
based on the relation of the nancial variables (i.e. asset size, number of employees and
quotation) within three di¤erent scenarios. A dynamic model of cash is also developed and
includes all types of debt (i.e. trade credit, short and long term debt). A two-step system
GMM estimator is applied. Results show that nd absolutely constrained and constrained
Euro area rms invest at a lower rate, grow slower and hold higher levels of cash which
increases during periods of nancial turmoil. On the other hand, unconstrained rms save
more cash with an increasing long-term debt.
3.2.5 Macroeconomic uncertainty
Prior research has mainly considered the e¤ect of nancial constraints on rmscash deci-
sions. However, these studies have not focused exactly on the inuence of macroeconomic
uncertainty on rmsdemand for liquid assets. Baum et al. (2006) are the rst to link
macroeconomic uncertainty with rmscash decisions. The authors argue that rms dene
their level of cash holdings based on the level of macroeconomic uncertainty they face.
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Baum et al. (2006) employ a sample of 4,125 non-nancial U.S. rms between the period
of 1970 and 2000. The cross-sectional distribution of rmscash to total assets ratios is
a function of several measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. The following proxies are
used: overall macroeconomic activity (i.e. a monthly measure of real GDP), monthly index
of industrial production variable, uncertainty related to nominal magnitudes variable (i.e.
a monthly rate of consumer price ination) and the nancial market uncertainty variable
(i.e. monthly returns on the Standard and Poors 500 share index). The authors use an
IV estimator where the macroeconomic volatility proxies are weighted averages of lagged
e¤ects.
Baum et al. (2006) classify the sample of rms based on two di¤erent criteria. First,
they dene high-growth/low-growth rms based on their growth in real total assets. High-
growth (low-growth) rms are dened as those above (below) the 75th (25th) percentile
of the annual distribution of growth in real total assets. Second, Baum et al. (2006) dis-
tinguish between nancially constrained and unconstrained rms based on the level of
dividends. Financially constrained (unconstrained) rms are those which their dividend
payout ratio is below (above) the 25th percentile or corresponds to those rms not paying
dividends. Empirical ndings suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty a¤ects negatively
rmscash reserves. High-growth, constrained and capital intensive rms are quite sensi-
tive to macroeconomic conditions.
Baum et al. (2010) explore the e¤ect of leverage on rmscapital investment behaviour
under capital market uncertainty. The authors employ a sample of 7,769 rm-year obser-
vations from U.S. manufacturing rms during the 1988-2005 period. The authors use a
standard investment model which uses as explanatory variables the lag of the dependent
variable, cash ow, leverage and the lagged value of intrinsic uncertainty. A system-GMM
estimator is employed. Results show that the impact of leverage on capital investment
depends on the e¤ect of uncertainty. To be specic, leverage exerts a stimulative role in
investment at lower levels of uncertainty. However, from the moment market uncertainty
crosses a certain threshold, leverage decreases rmsinvestment.
Chen and Mahajan (2010) also test the impact of macroeconomic conditions on cash
holdings on a sample of non-nancial rms from 45 countries from 1994 to 2005. The au-
thors use cash holdings as a function of macroeconomic measures (i.e. GDP growth,ination,
short term rate, the government decit/surplus as a fraction of GDP) and control vari-
ables (i.e. prots, net working capital, capital expenditures, leverage, dividend payout). A
xed e¤ect model and a rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is employed. Their work suggests
that GDP growth, ination, short term rate and government decit have a statistically
signicant e¤ect on corporate liquidity. In other words, rms hold more cash when the
economy is in an expansion phase and decrease their level of cash reserves when ination
is high.
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Baum et al. (2011) explore how the structure of the nancial system and level of
development have an impact on rmsneed to save cash out of cash ows. To be specic,
the authors test whether small (large) rms or rms with low (high) payout ratios, which
in theory su¤er from higher (lower) levels of nancial constraints, show a higher (lower)
sensitivity of cash to cash ow when the impact of the nancial system is considered.
As Almeida et al. (2004), the authors consider that a rm is nancially constrained
if it builds up its stock of cash out of cash ow. To explore the abovementioned issue,
they extend the model of Almeida et al. (2004) and include country level attributes of
nancial markets. Specically, change in cash holdings is used as a function of cash ow,
structure of the nancial system, an interaction term between the former and the latter
and a set of control variables (i.e. lead investment, size, payout, change in net working
capital, change in short debt). Financial structure is calculated based on two proxies.
Following Levine (2002), the rst indicator is the activity of stock markets relative to
banks. The second indicator proxies for the relative size of the stock markets. Using a
sample of 5,500 manufacturing rms from 1989 through 2006 for 35 countries, the authors
employ an IV-GMM estimator. Empirical ndings suggest that rms in a market based
economy have a higher sensitivity of cash holdings to their cash ows.
Baum et al. (2012) investigate the impact of uncertainty and corporate governance on
rmsdemand for liquidity. To do so, the authors extend the model of Baum et al. (2008)
by including indicators for corporate governance and an interaction of an uncertainty mea-
sure and corporate governance index.47 Baum et al. (2012) use a GARCH model to proxy
for macroeconomic uncertainty. They consider a volatility measure which is obtained from
the CPI index as a proxy for the macro-level uncertainty that rms may face. To capture
rm-level uncertainty the authors compute a standard deviation of the rms excess re-
turns over the market return. Firmsreturn is obtained by using monthly equities prices.
Firm-specic variables for U.S. rms are obtained annually for the 1990-2007 period. To
calculate the quality of corporate governance the authors construct an Annual Governance
Index (Gindex) following the work of Gompers et al. (2003). The specication model is
as follows: rmsliquidity is a function of the lag cash holdings, capital investment, the
value of sales in the next period, the last periods values of the index of leading indica-
tors, the treasury bill rate, the previous cash ow shock and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Results show that rmscash holdings depend on the quality of governance and the level
of uncertainty they face.
In addition, Song and Lee (2012) examine the e¤ect of the Asian nancial crisis on
47According to Baum et al. (2012), Baum et al. (2008) develop a two-period cash bu¤er-stock model.
In the model, the manager of the rm is able to vary the optimal level of liquid assets in response to
macroeconomic and/or rm-level uncertainty.
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rmscash holdings. They study cash reserves of rms before and after the Asian crisis.
The authors use a sample of Asia rms for the following countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The total sample
corresponds to 5,059 Asian rms over the period of 1990-2006. Their aim is to investigate
the increase of rms cash reserves after the Asian Crisis.
They follow the model of Opler et al. (1999) and estimate a system of cash holdings
and investment models to determine the impact of investment on cash holdings and the
e¤ect of cash reserves on investment. The authors employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
procedure and then re-estimate the modied model of Opler et al. (1999) for the pre-crisis
period. Empirical results indicate that macroeconomic conditions have an impact on rms
cash policies. Cash holdings increase in all sample countries except Indonesia.
In a similar study, Baum et al. (2013) test the role of future xed capital and R&D
investment expenditures on rmscash reserves while considering the role of market imper-
fections. To do so, the authors use a sample of 32,000 manufacturing rm-year observations
for the U.S., U.K. and Germany for the period between 1989 and 2007. A system-GMM
estimator is employed. First, the authors model change in cash holdings as a function of a
change of the following variables: lagged cash reserves, cash ow, R&D, xed investment,
short term debt and net working capital. Secondly, they interact the explanatory vari-
ables with a dummy variable. The aim is to capture the categorisations of the rms which
are more/less likely to be nancial constraints (i.e. this is based on small/large nexus;
higher/lower dividend payout nexus). Empirical ndings suggest that rms increase their
level of cash holdings more in a scenario when future R&D expenditures increase than in
a situation where future xed capital investment raises. This result is more prominent for
rms which face nancial constraints (i.e. small/ low dividend payout rms).
Recently, Baum and Chakraborty (2016) explore the impact of rm-specic and macro-
economic uncertainty on shareholdersvaluation of rmscash holdings decisions. To ex-
plore this issue, the authors test whether the marginal e¤ect of cash holdings on excess
stock returns is sensitive to uncertainty. The authors extend the model of excess stock
returns of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and include two proxies of uncertainty: econ-
omy uncertainty and rm-specic uncertainty.48 These two proxies are interacted with
scaled measures of change in cash holdings. Macroeconomic uncertainty is measured us-
ing the CPI and an index of leading indicators as in Baum et al. (2012). Three di¤erent
rm-specic uncertainty measures are used: stock price volatility, volatility of sales and
volatility of the number of employees. A sample of 210,632 rm-year observations over
the 1971-2006 period is used. Results show that the type of uncertainty a¤ects di¤er-
48Faulkender and Wang (2006) regress excess stock returns on the unexpected change in cash holdings,
scaled by the prior periods market value of the rm and a set of control variables.
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ently the shareholdersvaluation of rmscash holdings. Specically, higher rm-specic
(macroeconomic) uncertainty increases (decreases) the value of cash.
3.2.6 Small rms
Recently, the literature has focused on the determinants of cash holdings for small rms.
These studies rely on the argument that nancial frictions are higher for smaller rms
then their larger counterparts (Faulkender, 2002). The former su¤er from higher levels of
information asymmetry and higher transaction costs.
For instance, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2008) explore the determinants of
cash reserves of Spanish SMEs. Specically, they test whether changes in the rmscash
ratios follow a partial adjustment model. Using a sample of 860 Spanish SMEs for the
period between 1997 and 2001, the authors use a 2-stage GMM estimator.
Results show that cash holdings of Spanish SMEs follow a partial adjustment model.
The target level of rmscash holdings is higher if rms have more growth opportunities
and larger cash ows. Conversely, rmscash reserves are lower if rmshave access to
bank debt or other substitutes for cash. SMEsSpanish rms tend to achieve an optimal
cash level more quickly than large rms studied by Guney et al. (2003). This can be
explained by the relatively higher cost for small rms of being o¤ target, since SMEs
su¤er more severe information asymmetries than nancial constraints and have a greater
likelihood of su¤ering nancial distress.
Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) examine cash reservesdeterminants of private Italian
rms during the 1996-2005 period. They use three di¤erent measures of cash holdings, i.e.
pure cash, cash equivalents and total cash. The authors dene pure cash as the ratio of
cash, cheques and bank deposits to total assets. Cash equivalents are measured as other
short term marketable securities divided by total assets while total cash as in dened as
in Opler et al. (1999). In addition, the authors use the common explanatory variables of
the literature on cash holdings as controls (i.e. size, cash ow volatility, e¤ective tax rate,
growth opportunities and nancing decit).49 The authors follow the target-adjustment
model by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and use a GMM estimator. Smaller rms which are
younger, riskier and reasonably more nancially constrained hold more cash compared with
big rms. Results are consistent with the trade-o¤ theory. On the other hand, Bigelli and
Sánchez-Vidal (2012) also nd evidence which support the pecking order theory. Firms
retain cash in the presence of longer cash conversion cycles and when they report nancial
surpluses or lower e¤ective tax rates. Private rms which pay dividends tend to have more
49The nancing decit is based on the model by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In their model, the
authors test the relation between nancial decit and variations in debt. The authors refer that rms
nancial behaviour is based on the di¤erence between rmsinvestment needs and the internal resources
which is generated. The di¤erence is known as the nancial decit. If this di¤erence is positive, rms will
seek more debt and the opposite occurs if it is negative.
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cash reserves.
Finally, Pastor and Gama (2012) study cash holdingsdecisions for a sample of Por-
tuguese SMEs for the period 2001 to 2007. They use a linear regression of cash holdings on
exogenous variables which are based on the work by García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano
(2008). Results are consistent with the previous studies. The authors nd that size,
growth opportunities, relation with banks, cash ow uncertainty, debt structure, liquidity
and leverage signicantly a¤ect SMEslevel of cash holdings.
3.2.7 Public and private rms
A new strand of the literature tests the di¤erences between public and private rmscash
holdings. Gao et al. (2013) are the rst to test cash holdingsdi¤erences among public
and private rms. Specically, they test whether public rms hold less cash then their
private counterparts. This is based on the assumption that public rms have lower cost
of accessing external capital and therefore, the precautionary motive should be lower for
public rms. However, Gao et al. (2013) argue that public rms can have lower cash
reserves than their private counterparts. This is based on the idea that public rms
su¤er from higher agency costs. Private rms have less shareholders and are managed by
normally owners with greater control.
To test the above-mentioned hypothesis, each private rm in the sample is matched
with a public rm in the same industry and closest in size. A matching with replacement
procedure is used. In the end, their nal sample include 7,879 unique public rms, 2,624
matched public rms, 3,604 private rms for the period 1995-2011.
Following the previous literature (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007),
the authors use cash holdings as a function of a set of rm-specic characteristics (i.e.
size, cash ow, cash ow volatility, sales growth, leverage, public debt,net working capital,
capital expenditures, acquisition, R&D, dividend, age, dividends, number of segments) and
a dummy variable public which assumes the value of 1 for public rms, and 0 otherwise.
Empirical ndings suggest that public rms hold more cash than their private coun-
terparts which is in line with the agency cost motive. Furthermore, Gao et al. (2013)
investigate the speed of adjustment of rms to their target cash levels and how rms react
to excess cash. Gao et al. (2013) employ a partial adjustment model. They conclude that
public rms adjust their cash holdings much faster towards their target levels than do
private rms when holdings less cash. Finally, they also test whether the speed of public
rms adjustment is a¤ected by corporate governance using the insider ownership and the
E-index.50 Results indicate that well-governed public rms are slower in adjusting down
to target cash levels comparing with governed public rms.
In a similar setting, Farre-Mensa (2014) explores the cash di¤erences between U.S.
50Note that E-index corresponds to the entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009).
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public and private rms. The author employs a sample of 66,092 rm-year observations for
private rms and 26,751 rm-year observations for public rms from 2002 to 2011. Farre-
Mensa (2014) follow the cash model of Bates et al. (2009) and uses an OLS regression.
Results show that the cash-to-assets ratio of public rms is higher than their private
counterparts and that the cash di¤erence between public and private rms is decreasing
with size.
Similar to Gao et al. (2013) the author applies a matching procedure (i.e. calliper-
based nearest-neighbour with replacement) to account for di¤erences in size and industry
distribution of public and private rms. Results are robust to their previous ndings.
Public rms hold more cash than private rms. Farre-Mensa (2014) concludes that the
precautionary motive leads public rms with worse access to external nance to accumulate
more cash than those with better access. Results demonstrate that the di¤erences in cash
between public and private rms is larger in industries with riskier cash ows.
Finally, Hall et al. (2014) explore the behaviour of public and private rms in a cash
holding setting. The authors study cash reserves for public and private rms from 20
emerging markets. Firstly, they test whether private rms hold more cash than private
rms. Secondly, the authors explore whether rms specic-characteristics and the national
level of institutions have a di¤erent impact among private and public rms.
The sample consists of 18,167 rms from 18 Central and Eastern European countries
from 2001 to 2010. Hall et al. (2014) use a cash holding model based on previous literature
(Kim et al., 1998). They employ a pooled OLS regression in order to include the listing
status of the rms (i.e. private rms versus public rms) and transition indicators (i.e.
transition to capitalism and markets development).
The empirical evidence demonstrates that public rms hold less cash than their private
counterparts. Firms which are located in more developed countries with better institutions
tend to choose a more conservative policy increasing their cash reserves.
In addition, the authors employ three distinguish xed e¤ects models to examine if
rm and country-specic determinants have a di¤erent e¤ect on private and public rms.
Firstly, they test the existence of a U-shaped form between short term debt and cash
holdings for both type of rms. They conrm that the relation is U-shaped for both public
and private rms. Finally, they employ two models which take into account the following
independent variables: maturity, return on assets, size, unemployment working capital and
bankruptcy prediction variable (i.e. Z-Score). Evidence shows that the determinants of
cash holdings are similar to both private and public rms independently of the stage in the
transition to capitalism. Overall the authors nd evidence in line with the precautionary
motive to hold cash.
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3.2.8 Credit risk
Some studies have also focused on the role of credit risk on rmscash reserves. The crucial
assumption in this strand of the literature is that cash is positively related with credit
risk. This is based on the work of Acharya et al. (2012). Contrary to previous studies,
the authors suggest that cash holdings should be obtained endogeneously as part of an
optimization process. They argue that an increase in cash reserves should be interpreted
as a negative signal by the markets since the rms should be increasing their cash levels
for a precautionary motive. In this scenario, there should be a positive relation between
cash and rmscredit risk and default probability.
To test the assumption that cash holdings are positively related to credit spreads and
default risk, the authors employ monthly credit spreads combined with quarterly balance
sheet data for U.S. listed rms from 1996 to 2010. This sample includes 9,932 rm-quarter
observations for 2,247 bond issuers at risk of default and 341,954 rm-year observations
for 24,825 rms.
As a preliminary analysis, the authors summarise cash holdings by rmscredit risk
(i.e. coverage ratio and credit ratings). They nd that there exists an U-shaped relation
between rmscash and credit risk. Safer rms have higher cash reserves and low debt
levels. According to the authors, their higher levels of liquidity and low debt levels make
agencies to rate them at higher categories. For these rms, the risk of default is unlikely to
explicate these rms higher cash levels. Conversely, riskier rms (i.e. those that are rate
at low categories) are also characterised by higher cash holdings due to leveraged rms
precautionary motive to hold cash. To conrm these preliminary ndings, the authors use
an OLS regression of bond spreads and an IV regression of credit spreads.
Empirical ndings show that the relation between credit spreads and liquidity is posi-
tive. Riskier rms have more cash and higher credit spreads (or credit risk). Liquidity is
also positively related to the probability of default. Overall, the results conrm that cash
reserves are driven by the precautionary motive to hold.
Palazzo (2012) investigates the link between rmsprecautionary motive to hold cash
and rmsrisk premia. The author tests whether changes in cash holdings can be explained
by rmsexpected return. The author extends the model of Kim et al. (1998) and includes
a source of aggregate risk. Specically, Palazzo (2012) considers that investors are not
risk-neutral (i.e. shareholders value future cash ows). The author assumes that riskier
rms are those with a higher correlation between cash ow and the aggregate risk. These
rms have a higher probability of using costly external funds to fund their growth option
exercises and obtain higher savings.
Contrary to previous studies on cash holdings which employ cash ow volatility as a
measure of rm risk, Palazzo (2012) considers an accounting based measure for expected
98
equity returns.51 Using a sample of U.S. public rms for the sample period between 1975
and 2009, the author uses pooled OLS, xed e¤ects and Fama and MacBeth regressions.
The empirical evidence provides evidence of a positive relation between changes in cash
holdings and expected equity returns. Results are in line with the precautionary motive
to hold cash.
3.2.9 Recent nancial crisis
Finally, empirical studies on cash holdings study the importance of the recent turmoil
period on rmscash decisions. For example, Pinkowitz et al. (2012) investigate whether
U.S. rmscash reserves are abnormally high after the crisis. Based on Bates et al. (2009),
the authors estimate a model of normal cash holdings. The model tests how abnormal cash
holdings evolve across countries and di¤erent types of rms. According to the authors,
all the models which explain rmscash holdings are prior to the 2000s. Thus, Pinkowitz
et al. (2012) compare the evolution of U.S. rmscash reserves to the evolution of rms
in other countries estimating how much cash rms would have each year from 2000 until
2010.
The results show that U.S. rms hold more cash than foreign rms. When comparing
the U.S. cash reserves with those of U.K. and Japan. In addition, they estimate the model
comparing actual cash holdings in the 2000s to the cash holdings predicted by the model,
i.e. the abnormal cash reserves.52 The results indicate that only U.S. rms experience an
increase in cash holdings from the late 1990s to before the crisis. The increase of cash
after the crisis is higher for more protable rms.
Akguc and Choi (2013) test the impact of the recent crisis in a sample of listed and
unlisted rms in Europe. They use a sample of 76,587 rms from 33 European countries
during 2002-2011. Firstly, they employ a similar model as in Opler et al. (1999) and
Bates et al. (2009). The aim is to verify whether private rms hold less cash than public
rms. Results indicate that public rms hold on average more cash than private rms in
Europe. As Opler et al. (1999), the authors re-estimate a reduce form regression to avoid
inconsistent estimates. Results conrm that public rms still hold more cash comparing
with private rms.
Akguc and Choi (2013) also follow the work by Ferreira and Vilela (2004). They employ
a country level investor protection index and a ownership concentration index based on
the work of La Porta et al. (1997). Results indicate that countries with better shareholder
51Palazzo (2012) follows the method which is used by Gebhardt and Swaminathan (2001) and modied
by Tang et al. (2013). The methodology is based on a residual income model. It permits to " evaluate an
implied rate of return (the proxy for expected equity returns) which equates the stock price of a rm to
the present discounted value of future dividends".
52It should be noted that abnormal cash holdings are dened as actual cash holdings minus predicted
cash holdings. In other words, abnormal cash holdings are cash reserves relative to what rms would hold
if they held cash as in the base period.
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protection hold less cash. This result is consistent with Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for a
sample of listed European rms and with the free cash ow theory.
In addition, the authors employ a dynamic target adjustment model. They follow
the work of Dittmar and Duchin (2011). They investigate if and how rms manage cash
holdings toward a target cash ratio using publicly traded rms for the period between
1965 and 2006. They nd that rms adjust their cash holdings back to a predicted target
level but the adjustment speed is relatively slow.
Both public and private rms adjust to target cash levels. Empirical ndings suggest
that there is no statistically di¤erence between public and private rms. Finally, the
authors test whether cash holdings are sensitive to operational cash ow (Almeida et al.,
2004). They employ the model dened by Almeida et al. (2004) to test for cash ow
sensitivity of cash. Results demonstrate that cash ow is signicant showing that cash
reserves are sensitive to both public and private rms. Cash ow sensitivity is higher for
public rms.
Stone and Gup (2015) study whether rms increase their cash reserves during recession
periods. They use the National Bureau of Economic Analysis (NBER) recession dates and
announcement dates of recessions. They test ve di¤erent recessions periods. Recession
dates and announcement dates are also included. The aim is to investigate how rms
cash reserves react during recessionary periods. The authors also employ a random e¤ect
double-censored Tobit model similar to Loudermilk (2012).53 They use three di¤erent
datasets (i.e. non-missing observations dataset, a mature rms dataset and a growth rms
dataset). Stone and Gup (2015) conclude that rms tend to respond to announcement
of recessions and increase their cash reserves. The authors conclude that these ndings
are not consistent with the precautionary motive to hold cash. Firms do not hold large
amount of cash in their balance sheets. They only hold large amounts of cash once they
know the economy is in a recession.
3.3 Research design
The following sub-sections dene the theoretical framework and variables denition which
are implemented in this chapter.
3.3.1 Theoretical framework
Chapter 3 follows the empirical model of cash holdings which is dened in Gao et al. (2013).
The model which is a static linear model considers that cash reserves adjust immediately
53According to the authors, this model allows one to bound predicted values between zero and one while
also controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, the dependent variable presents a value between 0
and 1.
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to changes in the explanatory variables. The model assumes that cash holdings can be
taken as a function of several rm-specic characteristics X , of rm i at time t and a
disturbance error term. The static linear model takes the following general form:
Cashit= 0+
kX
k=1
1;kXit+"it (3.1)
Where, rms are represented by subscript i = 1; :::; N , t represents time by t = 1; 2; :::T .
Cashit is the ratio of cash holdings, Xit is the vector of the explanatory variables. "it is
the error term which is composed by ve components: i as a rm-specic e¤ect, t which
is a time-specic e¤ect, j is an industry-specic e¤ect, k is an country-specic e¤ect
and lastly "it is an idiosyncratic component. It is also assumed that i are unobservable
but have a signicant e¤ect on cash reserves and that t varies through time but is the
same for all rms in a given year. It captures the economic factors like prices which are
outside the control of rms.
It should be noted, however, that in equation (3.1) there is no adjustment process.
In reality, though, markets are imperfect and transaction and adjustment costs exist.
Following previous literature (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012),
this chapter also takes into account this issue. The adjustment process involves a lag
in adjusting to changes in the target cash structure (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). In this
scenario, cash reserves do not instantly adjust to changes in the explanatory variables. It
is assumed that rms pursue a target level when making their cash reservesdecisions.
The level of cash which is achieved at time t is also explained by the decisions which are
taken at time t  1. The model is determined as follows:
Cashit= 0+
kX
k=1
1;kXit+"it (3.2)
Where, rms are represented by subscript i = 1; :::; N , t represents time by t = 1; 2; :::T .
i. Cash

it is the optimal cash ratio, Xit is the vector of the explanatory variables. "it
is the error term. In this scenario, rms adjust their cash holdings to be closer to their
target cash ratio. This leads to a partial adjustment cash level. The equation takes the
following format:
Cashit Cashit 1= (Cashit Cashit 1) (3.3)
Where Cashit is the actual cash ratio. The coe¢ cient  measures the rate of adjustment
to the target cash holdings and it is expected to lie between 0 and 1. If  = 1, rms adjust
their cash levels to the optimal level immediately. In a scenario of  = 0, rmscost of
adjustments are so high that they are not able to modify their investment in liquid assets
(García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2008). A higher value of  indicates a fast adjustment
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from the actual to the target level of cash. The reduced form of the cash holdingsequation
is obtained by replacing equation 3.2 into equation 3.3. The nal model is dened below:
Cashit= 1+0Cashit 1+
kX
k=1
kXit+"it (3.4)
where, 1 = 0 ; 0 = (1 ); k = 1;k ; "it is the error term. Since the adjustment
speed is determined by 1  0, a higher value of 0 indicates a lower adjustment speed.
3.3.2 Variables denition
Following the literature (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013), the dependent variable
cash holdings is dened as the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. The main
variable of interest in this chapter is the private dummy. It assumes the value of 1 if
rms are private and , 0 otherwise. It is expected that private rms hold higher levels of
cash than their public counterparts. The former su¤er from higher levels of information
asymmetry and have a more restricted access to external markets (Akguc and Choi, 2013).
Please refer to Chapter 2, sub-section 2.6.2 for details on the construction of this variable.
A set of control variables are also included in the regression model based on the pre-
vious literature (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2014). They are as
follows: cash ow, leverage, net working capital, capital expenditures, rmssize, cash
ow volatility, sales growth and rmsage. The denition of these variables are provided
in the next paragraphs.
The variable cash ow is measure based on the cash ow of the rms. The majority of
the previous studies nd a positive relation with cash reserves (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan
and Ozkan, 2004; Gao et al., 2013). This is consistent with the idea behind the pecking
order theory. Firmsprefer to obtain nance through internal sources before accessing
external markets. In other words, if operating cash ows exceed investment needs, rms
repay debt and/or accumulate cash (Opler et al., 1999).
The variable leverage is calculated as rmstotal debt. Previous studies show a negative
relation between leverage and cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Akguc and Choi, 2013).
Brav (2009) provides evidence that Private rms are highly leveraged and have a higher
proportion of short-term debt to total debt when comparing with their public counterparts.
This negative relation is explained under the pecking order theory. When investment
exceeds retained earnings debt grows, and therefore, cash reserves decrease (Pastor and
Gama, 2012).
Net working capital is obtained as the di¤erence between current assets and current
liabilities excluding cash. This variable is a proxy for cashsubstitute (Opler et al., 1999).
Previous studies nd a negative relation with cash holdings (Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli
and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012). In addition, Chapter 3 follows the work of Erel et al. (2015)
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to dene capital expenditures since Amadeus database does not provide information on
this variable. Thus, capital expenditures variable is measured as the change in xed assets
plus depreciation. Kim et al. (1998) and Dittmar et al. (2003) refer that cash balances
are the outcome of investment decisions (i.e. capital expenditures) which are made by the
rm. Investment improves collateral and borrowing capacity leading to a reduction of the
costs associated with external markets. As a result, a negative relation between cash and
capital expenditures is expected.
Moreover, rmssize is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Previous studies nd
that the variable size has a negative e¤ect on rmscash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Gao
et al., 2013) which is in line with the trade-o¤ theory. Since there are economies of scale
in cash management, larger rms are expected to be able to obtain nance easier. Thus,
the trade-o¤ theory may predict lower cash reserves for private rms.
Cash ow volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of industry-median-adjusted
yearly cash ow over the previous three years. It is included to control for the rmsrisk.
Previous studies nd a positive relation with cash reserves (Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli and
Sánchez-Vidal, 2012). Firms which are in industries associated with a large increase in
the idiosyncratic risk hoard more cash.
The variable sales growth is calculated as the change in total sales. It accounts for
the growth opportunities of the rms. Previous empirical studies nd a positive relation
between cash and rmsgrowth opportunities (Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Gao et al.,
2013). According to Myers (1984), rms which are largely determined by their growth
opportunities su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry. This indicates that
these rms are also characterised by higher external nancing costs. Finally, rmsage
is calculated as the di¤erence between the present year and rmsdate of incorporation.
The relation between cash and age should be a negative one. Younger rms tend to have
weaker associations with corporate stakeholders (Almazan et al., 2009).
Finally, with the exception of size, cash ow volatility and sales growth all variables
are divided by total assets. All Euro variables are also adjusted using the CPI at the 2005
price level.
3.4 Model specication
The empirical models which are used in this chapter are dened in the next sub-sections.
3.4.1 Baseline
The main aim of this chapter is to test whether private rms hold more cash than their
public counterparts. To do so, Chapter 3 follows the recent literature on private and public
rmscash holdings (Gao et al., 2013). It employs the following baseline model:
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Ln(cash
it
)=+ 1Privatet+2Cflowit+3Levit + 4Nwcit + 5Capexit+6Ln(Size)it+
+7Cfvit+8Sgrowthit+9Ln(Age)it+"it (3.5)
where i = 1; 2; ::; N indexes rms and t = 1; 2; :::; T indexes years. Ln(cash
it
) is the log
cash ratio of rms. Privatet is the main variable of interest and it accounts for the per-
centage of cash holdings for private rms when comparing with their public counterparts.
It is based on a dummy variable equal to 1 for private rms, and 0 otherwise. Cflow
it
indicates the cash ow to total assets ratio. Lev
it
indicates total debt scaled by total
assets. Nwc
it
is measured as the di¤erence between current assets and current liabilities
excluding cash scaled by total assets. Capex
it
is dened as the change in xed assets plus
depreciation divided by total assets. Ln(Sizeit) corresponds to the natural logarithm of
total assets while Cfv
it
denotes the cash ow volatility which is measured as the standard
deviation of industry-adjusted yearly cash ow over the previous three years. Sgrowth
it
corresponds to the growth rate. Lev
it
indicates total debt scaled by total assets. Finally,
Ln(Age)
it
corresponds to the natural logarithm of rmsage which is calculated as the
di¤erence between the present year and rmsdate of incorporation.54
The error term "
it
includes a rm-specic time-invariant component, including all time-
invariant rm characteristics likely to have an impact on the cash holdings variable and it
also accounts for the time-invariant component of the measurement error a¤ecting any of
the regression variables: a time specic component accounting for possible business cycle
e¤ects and an idiosyncratic component. As in Chapter 2, to account for the rm-specic
time-invariant component of the error term, the equation is estimated in rst-di¤erences.
Time-specic component is considered as well by including time dummies (in addition to
the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all specications (Brown et al.,
2009). Country dummies are also used to control for institutional di¤erences between
countries.
If the coe¢ cient (1) on the variable Privatet is positive and statistically signicant
that means that private rms hold more cash than their public counterparts. More im-
portantly, it indicates that the precautionary demand motive drives the results and not
the agency-based explanation as in Akguc and Choi (2013) and Gao et al. (2013). In
other words, the argument is that due to higher levels of nancial constraints and infor-
mation asymmetry, private rms hoard more cash as a precaution against future cash ow
shortfalls.
54See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denition of the variables in the data-set.
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3.4.2 The e¤ect of nancial pressure
Next, it is considered the extent to which nancial pressure exerts an e¤ect on the di¤erence
of cash holdings for private and public rms. To explore this hypothesis, equation (3.5) is
re-estimated for three di¤erent levels of nancial pressure. Financial pressure is measured
as the coverage ratio following previous literature (Görg and Spaliara, 2014). It measures
rmslevel of credit worthiness. The higher the credit worthiness the better is the balance
sheet of the rms (Görg and Spaliara, 2014). Three di¤erent categories of nancial pressure
are implemented: higher (1st decile), medium (5th decile) and lower (10th decile).
It is anticipated that the coe¢ cient on the private variable (1) to remain positive and
statistically signicant across the three levels of nancial pressure. More importantly, it is
expected that there is a U-shaped relation between the cash holdingsdi¤erences of private
and public rms. This is based on the rationale of Acharya et al. (2012) for listed rms.
According to the author, safer rms have higher cash reserves and low levels of debt. Their
risk of default most probably does not explain their higher cash holdings levels. However,
riskier rms also present higher cash holdings. This pattern is obtained due to leveraged
rms precautionary motive to hold cash. In Chapter 3 it is hypothesised that at higher
levels of nancial pressure, access to external market is more restricted to all the rms.
This means that private and public rms should hoard more cash as a precaution against
possible decrease of cash ow in the future. However, it is also possible that safer rms to
hold higher levels of cash. Firms which su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry
always prefer internal over external nance holding more cash as a bu¤er.
3.4.3 Speed of adjustment
Finally, it is investigated the speed of adjustment of private and public rmscash levels.
It is tested whether private rms adjust slower to their target cash levels than their public
counterparts. The reason to explore this hypothesis is based on the assumption that capital
market imperfections may prevent rms from quickly adapt to new circumstances (Ozkan
and Ozkan, 2004). This means that private rms which face more nancial frictions and
have lower access to external nance should adjust their cash reserves slower than their
public counterparts (Akguc and Choi, 2013).
To explore this issue, the variable Privatet is interacted with the lagged of the depen-
dent variable (cash
it 1). Equation (3.5) is augmented with a lagged variable of the log of
cash (cash
it 1) and an interaction term (cashit 1Privatet).
Previous studies on private and public rms cash holdings decisions use a partial
target-adjustment model (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). They consider only
the di¤erence between actual cash holdings and target cash holdings of public and private
rms. Contrary to their analysis, the model which is implemented includes unobservable
xed and time e¤ects as well as the rm-specic characteristics. By accounting for these
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e¤ects, it is ensured that the target cash model which is estimated does not provide biased
estimates (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). The model takes the following form:
Ln(cash
it
)=+ 1Privatet+2PrivatetCashit 1+3Cashit 1+
+4Cflowit+5Levit+6Nwcit+7Capexit+8Ln(Size)it+
+9Cfvit+10Sgrowthit+11Ln(Age)it+"it (3.6)
The coe¢ cient of interaction term (2) captures the di¤erence in the speed of adjust-
ment between public and private rms. 3 can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the
adjustment speed. Firmsability to reach their target cash level is obtained by (1   3).
If 3 = 0, the speed of adjustment equals 1. Firms adjust instantaneously towards the
optimal cash target level. Conversely, a low speed of adjustment (3 = 1) indicates that
the cash level modication is extremely costly for the rms (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).
It is expected that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term (2) to be positive which
denotes that private rms adjust slower to their target cash levels. This is consistent with
the idea that private rms su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry and have a
higher cost of external nance (Gao et al., 2013).
3.4.4 Robustness check: Dynamic models
As a rst robustness check it is considered a dynamic cash model. The aim is to explore
whether the hypothesis which are dened subsection 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are robust to the
addition of the lagged dependent variable. The motivation to do so, is that in a dynamic
model is is possible to explore whether the current behaviour of rms depends on their
past behaviour. Similar to the model which is dened for the speed of adjustment in sub-
section 3.4.3, the dependent variable Ln(cash
it
) is regressed on the past cash Ln(cash
it 1)
and a set of control variables. The equation takes the following form:
Ln(cash
it
)=+ 1Privatet + 2Cashit 1+3Cflowit+4Levit+5Nwcit+6Capexit+
+7Ln(Size)it + 8Cfvit+9Sgrowthit+10Ln(Age)it+"it (3.7)
The coe¢ cient in the lagged cash holdings variable (2) corresponds to the adjustment
speed. It should be interpreted as 1  2: A low speed of adjustment indicates that cash
level is very costly for rms (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). If 2 is positive and statistically
signicant that means that rms cannot adjust immediately towards their target cash level
following changes in rm-specic determinants. It is expected that private rms continue
to hold more cash than public rms. Finally, the cash holdingsdi¤erent of private and
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public rms should remain U-shaped based on their level of nancial pressure.
3.4.5 Robustness check: Alternative measure of nancial pressure
So far nancial pressure is dened based on the credit risk measured as in Acharya et al.
(2012). To ensure robustness of the empirical ndings, it is also considered an alternative
measure of nancial pressure. In particular, Chapter 3 employs the change in the borrow-
ing ratio as in Chapter 2. Following Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) it is used the product
of the debt capital ratio three years lagged and the contemporaneous change in the bond
yield.
Equation 3.5 is re-estimated with a new measure of nancial pressure. Similar to
section 3.4.2, rms are also split into deciles of the new nancial pressure variable. It is
anticipated that the cash holdingsdi¤erence between private and public rms remains
unchanged to the new measure of nancial pressure.
3.4.6 Robustness check: Jointly determined coe¢ cients
Further, Chapter 3 employs a robustness check which is based on the work of Opler
et al. (1999). According to the author, rm-specic variables such as leverage and capital
expenditures can be jointly determined with cash reserves. This means that the baseline
regression which is dened in sub-section 3.4.1 can lead to inconsistent estimates. To
account for this issue, equation (3.5) is re-formulated without these jointly determined
variables. The new equation is dened as follows:
Ln(cash
it
)=+ 1Privatet+2Cflowit+3Nwcit+4Ln(Size)it+
+5Cfvit+6Sgrowthit+7Ln(Age)it+"it (3.8)
Once more, if the coe¢ cient on the variable Privatet (1) is positive and statistically
signicant, that means that private rms hold more cash than their public counterparts.
3.4.7 Robustness check: Cash ow sensitivity of cash
To check for the robustness of the main ndings, it is also considered if rmshave a
di¤erent propensity to save cash out of cash ows. In particular, it is tested whether
private rms have a higher cash ow sensitivity of cash than their public counterparts.
To test this assumption, equation (3.5) is re-formulated as in Almeida et al. (2004). The
following specication is estimated:
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cash
it
=+ 1Privatet+2PrivatetCflowit+3Cflowit+4Nwcit+
+5Capexit+6Ln(Size)it + 7Sgrowthit+8STdebtit+"it (3.9)
Where, cashit represents the change in log of cash and equivalents to total assets.
NWCit denotes the change in net working capital while STdebt is change in the ratio
of short-term debt to total assets.
This is based on the argument of Almeida et al. (2004). Firms which face a higher
degree of information asymmetry are less likely to access external capital markets, and
therefore, have a tendency to save higher levels of their operating cash ow as cash.
Almeida et al. (2004), classify these rms as nancially constraints. For the author rms
which su¤er from higher levels of nancial constraints have a positive cash ow sensitivity
of cash. Thus, based on the assumption of sub-section 3.4.1, it is anticipated that private
rms save more cash out of cash ow than their public counterparts (i.e. a higher cash
ow sensitivity of cash).
3.4.8 Robustness check: The nancial crisis
This sub-section takes into account the e¤ect of the global nancial crisis on private and
public rmscash holdings. The aim is to explore whether private rms hold more cash
than their public counterparts during the crisis. To account for this scenario, equation (3.5)
is augmented with a nancial crisis dummy (Crisist) and an interaction term between the
crisis and the private variable (Privatet). The crisis dummy assumes the value of 1 for
the period between 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise. The equation is as follows:
Ln(cash
it
)=+ 1Privatet+2PrivatetCrisist+3Crisist+4Cflowit+5Levit + 6Nwcit+
+ 7Capexit++ 8Ln(Size)it+9Cfvit+10Sgrowthit+11Ln(Age)it+"it (3.10)
This hypothesis is based on the nancial-accelerator theory. It refers that rmshave
higher costs of external nance in a period of uncertainty. For example, Duchin et al.
(2010) demonstrate the recent nancial crisis exerted a negative impact on the supply of
external nance for non-nancial rms.
It is anticipated that private rms hold more cash than their public counterparts during
the turmoil period. In an uncertainty period, the former may increase their cash balances
in response to more di¢ cult access to external nance. Finally, the nancial crisis dummy
should have a positive e¤ect on cash holding of rms. They should build up more cash
reserves during and/or right after the turmoil period (Akguc and Choi, 2013).
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3.4.9 Robustness check: Alternative cut-o¤ point
As a nal robustness check, the sample of rms is split according to their size. Previous
studies have explored cash holdings of large private and public rms and nd that the
latter hold more cash than the former (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). In this
sub-section it is argued that the di¤erences in the results between this chapter and the
previous studies is the size of the rms in the sample.
To ensure that the results are driven by the size of the rms in the sample, in this
sub-section rms are divided into large and small using a dummy variable Dummyit as a
sorting device. Once more this variable assumes the value of 1 if rmsreal total assets
belong to the bottom 75% distribution of rms operating to the same industry as rm i
and year t, and 0 otherwise. In other words, large (small) rms are dened as those in the
top (bottom) 75% of the size distribution.
To explore this issue, equation (3.5) is re-estimated only for large rms. If private
rms at the top size of the distribution hold less cash than their public counterparts that
means that the relative size of rms in the sample drives the empirical ndings.
3.5 Model estimation
Unlike Akguc and Choi (2013) which use a xed e¤ect methodology to explore the cash
holdings of public and private rms in Europe, this chapter employs a system GMM. The
main drawback of the xed e¤ect estimator is that it assumes that the regressors are strictly
exogenous with respect to the error term. Firm-specic variables (cash ow or leverage
for example) are likely to be inuenced by cash holdings. More importantly, cash holdings
and rm-specic characteristics may also be a¤ected by unobservable shocks (Ozkan and
Ozkan, 2004). This means that rm-specic variables may su¤er from endogeneity issues.
In this chapter, the model of cash holdings considers all regressors as endogeneous with
the exception of the variable private and log of age which are treated as exogenous. The
Sargan and m(n) test are implemented to test whether the instruments are valid and the
specication models are also correctly specied. In Chapter 3, two (and deeper) lags of
the regressors are used as instruments. It is also presented the m2 and m3 tests for second
and third order serial correlation of the di¤erenced residuals in the tables.
3.6 Data
This section is divided in 3 parts. The rst describes the main sources for the database
which is used to test the di¤erences in cash holdings of public and private rms. The
construction of the data and the description statistics are shown in the last sections.
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3.6.1 Data collection
The dataset which is employed in this chapter is obtained from Amadeus database as in
Chapter 2. Once more, rm-level data is provided over the period 2003-2011. Information
corresponds to a nine year period and it comprises the following ten euro area countries:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. It should be noted that due to the lack of information on public and private
rms in Finland and Ireland these countries are dropped from the dataset.
Similar to Chapter 2, only rms with unconsolidated accounts are considered. The
vast majority of the rms in the dataset are also not trade in the stock market (i.e.
approximately 90.0%). Chapter 3 also follows the work of Blundell and Bond (1998) and
takes into account all manufacturing rms following the 2-digital NACE rev. classication.
Finally, the CPI is collected from the Eurostat as it is explained in Chapter 2. Private
and public rms are dened as in the sub-section 2.6.2.
3.6.2 Sample selection process
Consistent with Chapter 2, negative sales and assets are dropped from the initial sample.
To control for the potential inuence of outliers, observations in the 1% tails for each of
the regression variables are dropped.
The nal panel which is unbalanced covers 120,796 rms (Corresponding to 829,178
observations) which belong to the manufacturing sector. In particular, the panel includes
2,693 rms from Austria (corresponding to 14,277 observations), 3,078 rms from Bel-
gium (corresponding to 23,696 observations), 19,185 rms from France (corresponding
to 144,812 observations), 28,405 rms from Germany (corresponding to 154,367 observa-
tions), 1,582 from Greece (corresponding to 12,289 observations), 40,790 rms from Italy
(corresponding to 300,085 observations), 123 rms from Luxembourg (corresponding to
769 observations), 5,223 rms from Netherlands (corresponding to 37,352 observations),
4,646 rms from Portugal (corresponding to 33,882 observations) and 15,071 rms from
Spain (corresponding to 107,649 observations).55
3.6.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics (i.e., number of observations, mean, standard
deviation, 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile) for the rm-specic variables which
are used in the analysis for Chapter 3 for the sample period (2003-2011). Table 3.2
describes the abovementioned statistics across private and public rms. The P-values of
a test for the equality of means is also provided in Table 3.2.
55In Appendix B, see B.2, B.3, B.4 and B.5 for the number of rms per country, number of observations
per country, the number of observations per year and the total structure of the panel, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the all sample
Total sample
Obs. Mean St. dev 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash (cash holdings) 806,782 0.102 0.123 0.020 0.048 0.150
Cow (cash ow) 538,729 0.070 0.073 0.002 0.050 0.109
Lev (leverage) 562,604 0.261 0.162 0.065 0.170 0.334
Nwc (net working capital) 794,665 0.129 0.224 0.016 0.119 0.268
Capex (capital expenditures) 582,719 0.053 0.069 0.009 0.029 0.071
Size (log of size) 674,217 7.952 1.190 5.361 6.301 7.122
Cfv (cash ow volatility) 292,616 0.043 0.028 0.022 0.037 0.057
Sgrowth (sales growth) 576,047 0.370 0.701 -0.113 0.259 0.713
Age 816,450 28.337 20.521 16.000 24.000 35.000
Notes: This table presents the number of observations, sample means, standard deviations, the 25th percentile, the median
and the 75th percentile for the all sample (column 1 to 6), respectively. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denition
of the variables.
Row 1 of Table 3.1 indicates that the average total cash holdings is approximately
10.2% which is similar to previous studies on Italian and Spanish SMEs (García-Teruel
and Martínez-Solano, 2008; Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012). As it can be seen, the
distribution for the cash holding ratio seems to be strongly positively skewed and rms at
the 75th of the distribution hold an average cash holdings of 0.150. In terms of cash ow,
the distribution remains rather skewed, with rms at the 75th percentile presenting an
average cash ow level which is large than of the median rm. The leverage in the sample
has a mean and a median of 0.170 and 0.065, and the 75th percentile and a 25th percentile
of 0.334 and 0.065, respectively. A similar pattern is observed for the net working capital
and capital expenditures ratios. The gures in Table 3.1 also show that during the 2003-
2011 period, rms have a mean (median) size of 7.950 (6.301). These results are similar to
those which are presented by Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) for small rms. Table 3.1
also shows the industry cash ow risk across percentiles. It is clear that during the 2003-
2011 period, cash ow volatility is higher for rms at the 75th percentile of the distribution
then at the 25th and 50th percentiles. It is important to mention that the sample size
is further reduced when the variable cash ow volatility is considered. In chapter 2 the
variable cash ow volatility measures the industry cash ow risk and it is calculated as
the standard deviation of industry average cash ow to assets ratio for the previous three
years. In other words, it means that 3 out of the 9 years are lost to calculate this variable.
Finally, the level of sales growth for rms at the 25th percentile is negative whereas at
the median is positive. Firms at the 75th percentile of the distribution see their earnings
increasing ve decimal points more than at the median of the distribution. Finally, the
average rm is 28 years old and 75% of the rms in the distribution are approximately 35
years old.
Table 3.2. shows that the majority of the observations in the sample belong to the
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private rms.56 When comparing private and public rms (Table 3.2), it is clear that
the former hold substantially more cash than the latter. In fact, across the di¤erent
percentiles distribution of cash, private rms hoard more than their public counterparts.
This is consistent with the notion of the precautionary motive. Firms which su¤er from
higher levels of information asymmetry and have a restricted access to capital markets
should hoard more cash as a precaution. These ndings contradict the recent studies
on private and public rmscash reserves (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013) but
are in line with those which focus on small rms (Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Hall
et al., 2014). However, the di¤erence between sub-samples is not statistically signicant
(column 4). A similar pattern is observed when considering cash ow. The mean of
cash ow for private rms is higher than for their public counterparts. More important,
for private (public) rms at the 25th percentile of distribution, the cash ow is negative
(closer to zero). In other words, these may indicate that private rms at the low end of
the distribution are not able to hold cash inows from their operations and may need to
raise external nance more. Private rms are on average smaller and highly leveraged
when compared with public rms. Looking at the percentiles of the distribution of both
variables, the statistics indicate that the leverage (size) for rms at the 25th percentile
of the distribution is positive and below the median for both private and public rms
although the latter present lower levels than the former. This seems to be consistent with
the argument that private rms depend more on internal debt and/or equity whilst public
rms obtain nance through the public equity market (Brav, 2009).
Moving to the net working capital, it seems that this variable takes the average value
of 10.0% for private rms while it equals 13.0% for public rms. Firms at the low end of
the distribution hold a lower proportion of net working capital, with private rms showing
a net working capital closer to zero at the 25th and 50th percentile. The literature of cash
holdings denotes that net working capital is a substitute for cash (Opler et al., 1999). In
fact, these results are consistent with the assumption of Gao et al. (2013). The authors
refer that a higher value of net working capital for public rms should be explained by a
decrease in cash reserves for public rms.
Another important di¤erence which is documented in Table 3.2 is that public rms have
higher cash ow volatility (i.e. Chapter 2 measure of risk) than private rms. However,
when considering the percentiles distribution of this variable for private and public rms,
the statistics show that private rms experience highest cash ow variability at the median
and 75th percentile when comparing with public rms at the 50th and 75th percentile.
Hence, the statistics suggest that private rms at the top of the distribution have a higher
variability of cash ow. It should be taken into account once more that to calculate this
56This is in line with the expectations since the data which is implemented includes mainly unquoted
rms (approximately 90%).
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variable I have required a minimum of 3 years which decreases the sample size of this
variable for both private and public rms.
In terms of sales growth both private and public rms have similar patterns. The
average sales growth is higher for the former than for the latter. The median growth on
sales is below the average but also negative at lower levels of sales growth (25th percentile)
for both type of rms. Private rms are younger when comparing with public rms across
the di¤erent percentiles of the distribution. Overall, private rms are on average highly
leveraged, smaller and younger when comparing with their public counterparts.
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As a further story for the preliminary analysis, Figure 3.1 shows the average cash
holdings for the sample period between 2003 and 2011. Figure 3.2 describes the average
cash holdings by public and private rms for the overall sample period. Figure 3.3 denotes
the average cash holdings for public and private rms according to their level of nancial
pressure.
The most noticeable feature of Figure 3.1 is that since 2003 the overall cash ratio for
euro area rms has uctuated increasing again in 2008 in the context of the nancial crisis.
This is a period characterised by a high uncertainty for rms. In line with this argument,
Forster et al. (2011) refer that during the nancial crisis rms sold other assets to raise
cash since their net borrowing decreased.
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Figure 3.1: Average cash holdings for the sample of rms in the euro area.
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Figure 3.2 shows that private rms have constantly kept higher cash levels than their
public counterparts. The average cash holdings for both type of rms converges at the end
of 2011. In fact, private rmscash holdings have decreased since 2009 and public rms
have raised their cash level since 2010. Two factors may explain this behaviour during
the crisis period. First, in the euro area since 2009 there has been a tightening of the
business credit standards together with a decrease of the availability of external nancing.
This may enable public rms to increase their level of cash reserves as a precautionary
measure. Ferrando and Mulier (2013) argue that rms which normally hold lower cash
reserves attempt to raise it during crisis periods. Secondly, private rms may face a
deterioration of their nancial situation during the crisis which explains their decrease in
cash levels at the end of the sample period.
Figure 3.2: Average cash holdings for the sample of private and public rms in the euro
area.
Finally, Figure 3.3 shows the average cash holdings of public and private rms by deciles
of nancial pressure, i.e. coverage ratio. Coverage ratio measures rmscredit worthiness.
The higher the coverage ratio, the better is the rmsbalance sheet of the rms(Spaliara,
2009). The gure shows a right hand side of a U-shaped relation between cash holdings
and credit risk. Figure 3.3 indicates that for higher levels of nancial pressure private
rms hold more cash than their public counterparts. Once more the way the sample of
rms behave may be an indicator that the precautionary motive leads private rms to
hold more cash than their public counterparts.
To sum up, the descriptive statistics show that there is an important heterogeneity in
cash holdings for public and private rms. The following sub-section shows the econometric
analysis on the links between these variables.
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Figure 3.3: Average cash holdings for the sample of private and public rms in the euro
area across deciles of nancial pressure.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Cash holdings of private and public rms
This section explores whether private rms hold higher levels of cash than their public
counterparts. While previous evidence explores this issue for relatively large rms (Akguc
and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013; Farre-Mensa, 2014), this chapter takes one step forward
and explores cash reserves for a sample of relatively small and unquoted rms. Table 3.3
shows the estimates for equation (3.5).
To begin with the coe¢ cient on the variable Privatet is positive and statistically
signicant which conrms the summary statistics from Table 3.1. In other words, private
rms hold more cash than their public counterparts when controlling for rm-specic
characteristics. It is also clear the economic e¤ect of this variable. Private rms hold
approximately 35.8% more cash than their public counterparts.57 This result can be
explained under the precautionary motive. Private rms have a higher need to hold more
cash than their public counterparts to counter the impact of nancial frictions. The former
su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry than the latter and as a result they
hoard more cash (Akguc and Choi, 2013). This is inconsistent with the previous literature
which shows that public rms hold more cash than their private counterparts (Akguc and
Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013).
Turning to the coe¢ cients of the control variables, it is clear that they have the ex-
pected sign. For instance, Capex
it
and Lev
it
have a negative and signicant e¤ect whereas
Sgrowth
it
and Cfv
it
present a positive relation with the cash variable. The negative sign
on the coe¢ cient of Nwc
it
demonstrates that working capital is a substitute for cash.
Overall, rms with greater cash ow, cash ow volatility and sales growth hoard more
57Following Gao et al. (2013) the percentage of cash holdings is calculated as follows: exp(0.306)=1.358;
(1.358-1)*100=35.8%
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Table 3.3: Public and private rmscash holdings
Baseline
(1)
Privatet 0.306**
(2.09)
Cow
it
0.312***
(3.11)
Lev
it
-2.996***
(-4.27)
Nwc
it
-1.824***
(-4.03)
Capex
it
-0.358***
(-2.99)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.150*
(-1.72)
Cfv
it
0.850***
(3.25)
Sgrowth
it
1.627***
(3.39)
Ln(Age
it
) -0.144*
(-1.80)
Observations 329,706
Firms 72,008
Sargan (p-value) 0.158
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.090
All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication. Instru-
ments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 18. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
cash. Larger and highly leveraged rms hold less cash. These ndings are in line with
previous empirical literature (Gao et al., 2013; Akguc and Choi, 2013).
The diagnostic tests demonstrate that neither the Sargan test (J statistic) nor the m3
indicate any problems with the choice of instruments or the general specication of the
model.
3.7.2 The impact of nancial pressure
In this section it is explored the e¤ect of nancial pressure (measured as the coverage
ratio) on the relative cash holdings di¤erences among private and public rms.
Table 3.4 shows the results for the private rm dummy across three di¤erent levels
of nancial pressure. Empirical ndings suggest that the di¤erence between private and
public rmscash holdings is of a U-shaped pattern. At higher (lower) level of nancial
pressure private rms hold 64.70% (70.02%) more cash as a percentage of assets than their
public counterparts.58 This result suggest that the di¤erence in cash holdings between
58In column 1, this is calculated as follows: exp(0.532)=1.702; (1.702-1)*100=70.02. In column 3, the
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Table 3.4: Cash holdings and nancial pressure
Financial pressure
Low Med. High
(1) (2) (3)
Privatet 0.532** 0.270*** 0.499**
(2.43) (2.71) (2.32)
Cow
it
0.414*** 0.342*** 0.157
(2.72) (3.56) (0.68)
Lev
it
-4.733*** -3.941*** -6.255**
(-4.45) (-2.68) (-2.51)
Nwc
it
0.785 -4.205*** -4.748***
(1.16) (-3.57) (-6.11)
Capex
it
-1.702 -0.182 -7.947*
(-0.99) (-0.10) (-1.72)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.758 -0.053* 1.719
(-0.96) (0.02) (0.88)
Cfv
it
0.049 0.195** 0.617***
(0.10) (2.54) (2.69)
Sgrowth
it
0.834 0.808*** 1.818**
(1.63) (5.96) (2.00)
Ln(Age
it
) -0.339*** -0.359 -0.076
(-2.79) (-1.00) (-0.68)
Observations 29,004 27,540 21,855
Firms 18,302 19,496 11,138
Sargan (p-value) 0.430 0.454 0.020
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.040 0.345 0.094
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Firms are split according to each decile of the nancial pressure (coverage
ratio). Low indicates the the 10th decile. Med denotes the 5th decile . High corresponds to the the 1th decile. Country,
industry and time dummies are included in the specication. Instruments include all regressors (except Private
it
and
ln(Age
it
)) lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the
null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 27 in column 1, 31 in column 2 and 26
in column 3. m1 (m2) is a test for rst (second) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
private and public rms is smaller (higher) at higher (lower) levels of nancial pressure.
This is a novel and signicant result which extends the argument of Acharya et al. (2012).
The smaller gap between private and public rms at higher levels of nancial pressure
(column 3) can be attributed to the precautionary motive. At higher levels of nancial
pressure rms hoard cash as a precaution.
Similarly, private rms hold even more cash than their public counterparts at lower level
of nancial pressure (column 1). This di¤erence may be explained under the assumption
that rms which are faced with more nancial frictions always prefer internal to external
funds for nancing. Private rms are normally characterised as those with a more costly
access to external nance. Thus, it is likely that the way these rms obtain nance explain
their cash levels.
Finally, rm-specic variables continue to be important in explaining cash decisions.
coe¢ cient is calculated as: exp(0.499)=1.647; (1.647-1)*100=64.70.
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For instance, it is clear that cash ow volatility is higher in the higher level of nan-
cial pressure category. The Sargan and m2 tests do not indicate any problems with the
specication of the model and the choice of the instruments.
3.7.3 Target cash levels
Next, it is explored whether rmsstatus has a di¤erential e¤ect on the speed of adjustment
of rms to their target cash levels. Empirical ndings for equation (3.6) are provided in
Table 3.5.
Results show that private rms continue to hold more cash than public rms. They
show that private rms hold approximately 27.1% more than private counterparts.59 The
coe¢ cient on the Cash
it 1 variable is positive and statistically signicant. It indicates
that rms try to achieve their optimal cash level. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term
(Private
i
*Cash
it 1) is also positive and statistically signicant. This suggests that private
(public) rms adjust slower (quicker) to their target cash levels. This nding is in line
with the idea that private rms have higher transaction costs as well as a restricted access
to capital markets than their public counterparts. As a result, the former adjust their
actual cash positions towards their target cash levels slower than the latter (Gao et al.,
2013).60
Consistent with the results of the baseline model in sub-section 3.7.1, the control
variables are also statistically signicant and present the expected signs. Finally, the
Sargan test is statistically signicant and the m3 does not indicate problems with the
instruments.
59In column 2, this is calculated as follows: exp(0.243)=1.271; (1.271-1)*100=27.1%
60In Chapter 3 it is also employed a partial adjustment model to estimate the speed of adjustment
of cash holdings of private and public rms following the literature on cash holdings (Akguc and Choi,
2013; Gao et al., 2013). Results are robust to the empirical ndings provided in Table 3.4. Please see
sub-section B.6 in Appendix B for details.
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Table 3.5: Cash holdings and target cash levels
(1)
Privatet 0.243**
(2.97)
Cash
it 1 0.612***
(5.41)
Privatet*Cashit 1 0.275**
(2.05)
Cow
it
0.254***
(2.70)
Lev
it
-2.485***
(-3.47)
Nwc
it
-2.962***
(-5.39)
Capex
it
-3.008***
(-2.01)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.086***
(-2.59)
Cfv
it
0.651**
(2.53)
Sgrowth
it
1.539***
(4.78)
Ln(Age
it
) -0.900***
(-3.26)
Observations 327,688
Firms 71,761
Sargan (p-value) 0.030
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.300
All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication. Instru-
ments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 32. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.7.4 Dynamic specication
Until now a static model has been used which means that adjustment costs have not been
considered. Since markets are imperfect and adjustment and/or transaction costs exist,
a dynamic estimation is implemented. Results for equation (3.7) and equation (3.8) are
presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.
Starting with Table 365, it is observed that private rms continue to hold more cash
than their public counterparts. All control variables retain their signicance.
The coe¢ cient of the lagged cash variable (Cash
it 1) indicates a speed of adjustment
of 0.116.61 This implies that rms follow a target cash level while maintaining a low
adjustment speed. This adjustment may be explained by the existence of transaction
and other adjustment costs. Finally, results in Table 3.7 show that the di¤erence in cash
61As it is noted in sub-section 3.4.4, the adjustment speed is calculated as 1-. In this case 1-
0.884=0.116.
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holdings of private and public rms are of a U-shaped when considering the e¤ect of
nancial pressure.
Table 3.6: Cash holdings of public and private rms: Dynamic specication
Baseline
Privatet 0.191*
(1.94)
Cash
it 1 0.884***
(28.43)
Cow
it
0.172***
(2.44)
Lev
it
0.126
(0.25)
Nwc
it
-0.175
(-0.75)
Capex
it
-4.735**
(-2.33)
Ln(Size
it
) 0.978
(0.61)
Cfv
it
-0.086
(-0.45)
Sgrowth
it
0.703*
(1.84)
Ln(Age
it
) -0.055
(-0.91)
Observations 327,688
Firms 71,761
Sargan (p-value) 0.085
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.117
All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication. Instru-
ments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 21. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (fourth) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Cash holdings and nancial pressure: Dynamic specication
Financial pressure
Low Med. High
(3) (2) (1)
Privatet 0.394*** 0.205* 0.375**
(4.31) (1.87) (2.37)
Cash
it 1 0.582*** 0.557*** 0.617***
(6.99) (6.45) (9.68)
Cow
it
0.303** 0.019 0.244**
(2.93) (0.16) (2.55)
Lev
it
-1.518 -0.450 -1.973**
(-1.24) (-0.26) (-2.20)
Nwc
it
0.378 -1.415** 0.640
(0.39) (-2.29) (1.29)
Capex
it
-1.829 -2.419 -4.818**
(-1.10) (-0.78) (-2.52)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.157 -0.965 -0.210
(-0.18) (-0.71) (-0.34)
Cfv
it
7.039 0.352** -0.325
(0.93) (2.45) (-0.80)
Sgrowth
it
0.821** 0.220 0.245
(2.07) (1.07) (0.56)
Ln(Age
it
) 0.031 -0.044 0.062
(0.08) (-0.69) (0.41)
Observations 25,756 28,805 21,777
Firms 17,233 18,174 11,097
Sargan (p-value) 0.101 0.747 0.935
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.022 0.136 0.012
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator.The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Firms are split according to each decile of the nancial pressure (coverage ratio).
Low indicates the the 10th decile. Med denotes the 5th decile . High corresponds to the the 1th decile. Country, industry
and time dummies are included in the specication. Instruments include all regressors (except Privatetand ln(Ageit)) lagged
three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 34 in column 1, 38 in column 2 and 38 in column 3. m1 (m2) is
a test for rst (second) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under
the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.7.5 Alternative denition of nancial pressure
In the main empirical results, nancial pressure is dened using the coverage ratio. To
ensure the robustness of the results, Chapter 3 also includes an alternative measure of
nancial pressure, i.e. the debt-capital ratio. Results are presented in Table 3.8.
Empirical ndings are robust to the results of Table 3.4. Private rms hold more cash
than their public counterparts. The U-shaped relation between the di¤erential in cash
holdings of public and private rms persists. Firms which su¤er from higher levels (3
column) and lower levels (column 1) of nancial pressure hold also higher levels of cash
reserves.
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Table 3.8: Alternative measure of nancial pressure
Financial pressure
Low Med. High
(1) (2) (3)
Privatet 0.516*** 0.167** 0.399***
(2.91) (6.50) (3.00)
Cow
it
0.476*** 0.170** 0.390*
(3.79) (2.53) (4.03)
Lev
it
0.898 -0.635 -5.987***
(0.56) (-0.74) (-9.44)
Nwc
it
-0.028 1.616*** -1.275
(-0.02) (1.99) (-1.40)
Capex
it
2.576 -1.633 -2.485
(1.13) (-0.87) (-1.19)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.269** -0.211* -0.152
(-2.16) (-1.69) (-1.33)
Cfv
it
0.338** 0.234*** 0.164**
(2.47) (3.54) (2.13)
Sgrowth
it
1.229** 0.973*** 0.512
(2.42) (3.88) (1.30)
Ln(Age
it
) -0.219 -0.266 -0.581
(-0.40) (-0.83) (-1.16)
Observations 25,314 32,304 29,057
Firms 17,749 21,514 22,641
Sargan (p-value) 0.147 0.004 0.000
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.720 0.015 0.052
Notes: This table shows the impact of nancial pressure on public and private rms cash holdings. In this case, nancial
pressure is dened as the debt-capital ratio. Firms are split according to each decile of the debt-capital ratio, i.e. from
the 1th decile (lower nancial pressure) to the 10th decile (higher nancial pressure). Debt-capital ratio is the product
of debt-capital ratio three years lagged and the contemporaneous change in the 10-year bond yield. Specications are
estimated using a system GMM estimator.The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to
heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except Privatet
and ln(Age
it
)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under
the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 18 in column 1, 22 in column 2 and
26 in column 3. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.7.6 Jointly determined variables
The baseline regression model which is obtained in sub-section 3.7.1 employs as control
variables rm-specic characteristics which are normally implemented in the cash litera-
ture. However, Opler et al. (1999) refer that variables such as leverage and capital ex-
penditures may be determined jointly with cash reserves. This means that the coe¢ cients
which are presented for the baseline model can be inconsistent.
To account for this issue, equation (3.5) is re-estimated without the aforementioned
variables. Table 3.9 provides the empirical ndings.
Results are robust to the previous empirical ndings when considering the exclusion
of the jointly determined variables. In other words, private rms continue to hold more
cash than their public counterparts.
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All control variables have the expected signs and are statistically signicant. Overall,
the empirical ndings continue to suggest that private rms retain more cash holdings
comparing with public rms due to a precautionary demand for cash.
Table 3.9: Omission of jointly determined variables
Baseline
(1)
Privatet 0.638***
(4.07)
Cow
it
0.505***
(4.35)
Nwc
it
-2.163***
(-5.42)
Ln(Size
it
) 0.612
(0.51)
Cfv
it
0.642***
(2.62)
Sgrowth
it
1.598***
(3.93)
Ln(Age
it
) 0.124
(1.35)
Observations 381,106
Firms 77,077
Sargan (p-value) 0.060
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.006
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication.
Instruments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-
identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan
test equal to 12. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
3.7.7 Cash ow sensitivity of cash
Chapter 3 also takes into account the argument of Almeida et al. (2004) according to who
the cash ow sensitivity of cash is greater for nancially constrained rms than for their
unconstrained counterparts. Table 3.10 provides the empirical ndings for equation 3.9.
The coe¢ cient on the cash ow variable is positive and statistically signicant. It
denotes that private and public rms have a cash ow sensitivity of cash. When considering
the interaction term (Privatet*Cowit), it is clear that the coe¢ cient also captures the
indirect e¤ect of cash ow on cash holdings. In fact, it provides evidence that private
rms save more cash out of cash ow than their public counterparts.
The aforementioned ndings contradict the recent studies on U.S. and European private
and public rms(Farre-Mensa, 2014; Gao et al., 2013). However, they are in line with the
argument of Almeida et al. (2004). Cash ow sensitivity of cash is positive for nancially
constrained rms. These rms have a more restricted access to external markets and su¤er
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from higher levels of information asymmetry. Hence, in Table 3.10 the empirical ndings
suggest that private rms may su¤er from higher levels of nancial constraints than their
public counterparts (Akguc and Choi, 2013).
Table 3.10: Cash ow sensitivity of cash
(1)
Privatet 0.528*
(1.79)
Privatet*Cowit 0.047**
(2.19)
Cow
it
0.008***
(3.79)
Nwc
it
-0.405***
(-9.96)
Capex
it
-0.033
(-0.31)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.900***
(-7.51)
Sgrowth
it
0.254***
(10.41)
STdebt
it
-0.360***
(-10.96)
Observations 329,706
Firms 73,551
Sargan (p-value) 0.016
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.582
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication. Instru-
ments include all regressors (except Privatet) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions,
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 18. m1
(m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1)
under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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3.7.8 Private rmscash holdings during the crisis
This sub-section takes into account the e¤ect of the crisis in the cash holdingsdi¤erences
among private and public rms. Table 3.11 presents the results for equation 3.10.
Table 3.11: The impact of the nancial crisis
Privatet 0.173***
(4.84)
Privatet*Crisist 0.321***
(2.13)
Crisist 0.440***
(7.86)
Cow
ti
0.283***
(2.67)
Lev
ti
-0.115
(-1.36)
Nwc
ti
-1.841***
(-4.16)
Capex
ti
-0.159
(-0.08)
Ln(Size
it
) -0.246
(-0.16)
Cfv
ti
0.974***
(3.71)
Sgrowth
ti
1.824***
(4.85)
Ln(Age
ti
) 0.126
(1.40)
Observations 329,706
Firms 72,008
Sargan (p-value) 0.095
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.008
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all
regressors (except Privatet , Privatet*Crisist , Crisistand ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-
identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan
test equal to 19. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The coe¢ cient on the variable Privatet is positive and statistically signicant. That
means that private rms hold more cash than their public counterparts, especially dur-
ing the nancial crisis. This contradits Akguc and Choi (2013). They provide evidence
that public rms hoard more cash than their public counterparts during the crisis in Eu-
rope. However, the empirical ndings are in line with other recent evidence by Campello
et al. (2010). The authors show that in Europe and Asia rms which su¤er from credit
constraints decrease their investment levels and increase their cash holdings than their
unconstrained counterparts, especially during the turmoil period. More importantly, the
results are consistent with the idea that an increase in cash reserves is related to a pre-
cautionary motive against unexpected credit supply shock (Almeida et al., 2004). Finally,
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the nancial crisis (Crisist) exerts a positive e¤ect on the cash level of the rms.
3.7.9 Private and public rmscut-o¤ point
As a nal robustness check, the sample of rms is split according to their size. The
motivation to do so is to ensure that the results are driven by the large share of small
rms in the sample. A 75th percentile is used as a cut-o¤ point to distinguish between
large and small rms. In fact, large rms are classied as those whose total assets are
above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the assets of all the rms in a particular
country, year and industry, and 0 otherwise. Equation (3.5) is re-estimated only for rms
above the 75th percentile. Empirical ndings are shown in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Cash holdings for the largest rms in the sample
Privatet -0.345***
(-5.23)
Cow
it
-0.143
(-1.56)
Lev
it
-4.822***
(-6.52)
Nwc
it
-1.162**
(-1.70)
Capex
it
-1.124
(-0.96)
Ln(Size
it
) 0.535
(0.32)
Cfv
it
-0.702
(-1.04)
Sgrowth
it
-1.046***
(-3.47)
Ln(Age
it
) -1.504***
(-4.59)
Observations 115,322
Firms 28,939
Sargan (p-value) 0.014
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.379
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. High size rms correspond to the upper 25 percentile of rmssize. Country,
industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit )) lagged two
times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity,
with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 12. m1 (m2) is a test for rst (second) order serial correlation in the
rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the
Appendix B for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Results provide evidence that only large private rms hold less cash than their pub-
lic counterparts. This indicates that for large private rms the agency motive is more
pronounced than the precautionary one. More importantly, the negative and statistically
signicant coe¢ cient on the private variable implies that all the previous results are driven
by the very small size of the rms which are used in Chapter 3.
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3.8 Concluding remarks
Recently, private and public rmscash holdings have been subject of attention (Akguc
and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). The few empirical studies which test cash reserves
among private and public rms show that public rms hold more cash than their private
counterparts. However, in these studies private rms are able to issue debt. In other words,
both private and public rms are relatively large rms. Having this caveat in mind, this
chapter o¤ers new insights on the behaviour of public and private rms. It investigates
the cash holdingsdi¤erences of private and public rms for a sample in which the vast
majority are relatively small.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, private rms hold more cash than
their public counterparts. These results reconcile with the main literature of cash holdings
decisions (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 2009). The precau-
tionary motive to hold cash is more pronounced than the agency cost motive. Private
rms have less access to external nance and therefore are expected to have a stronger
precautionary motive to nancial frictions (Gao et al., 2013). Results contradict the recent
diverging studies on cash holdings for private and public rms (Akguc and Choi, 2013;
Gao et al., 2013).
Secondly, when di¤erentiating rms according to three di¤erent levels of nancial pres-
sure (i.e. lower, medium and higher levels), it is clear that private rms still hold more
cash than their public counterparts. The di¤erence between private and public rms cash
reserves decreases the higher is the level of nancial pressure of the rms. There is also a
U-shaped relation between rmscash holdings and nancial pressure. This is consistent
with the work by Acharya et al. (2012).
Thirdly, the results suggest that both private and public rms adjust to their target
cash levels and that private rms are slower in adjusting to their targets. Finally, the re-
sults are robust to a set of distinct criteria. When the dynamic component is implemented,
results show that private rms still hold more cash.62 Private rms also have a higher cash
ow sensitivity of cash than their public counterparts. During the crisis the former also
hoard higher cash levels than the latter emphasising the role of the precautionary motive.
Overall, the results suggest that in the euro area small private rms hold more cash than
public counterparts.
62Empirical ndings are also robust when considering an adjustment cash model based on the literature
on cash holdings (Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). Empirical ndings are provided in Appendix
B, sub-section B.6.
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4 Chapter 4: Trade credit and inventories: Evidence
from a panel of euro area rms
4.1 Introduction
Trade credit is considered to be one of most important sources of short-term nancing.
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), trade credit is behind bank lending
the most important source of external nance, especially for SMEs. Trade credit is dened
as an agreement between the buyer and the supplier. The buyer of goods and/or services
is not required to pay immediately since the seller o¤ers credit terms to the buyer.
The literature suggests that trade credit should be considered from a demand and a
supply point of view (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Both sides should contribute to the nal
impact of trade credit on the rmsbalance sheets. A rm can be seen as a supplier and
its accounts receivables are a proxy for how much the rm is willing to lend (Petersen and
Rajan, 1997). However, a rm is also a customer and its accounts payables correspond to
the borrowing from suppliers (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013).
In the euro area, trade credit is associated with the economic cycle. For instance,
Ferrando and Mulier (2013) provide evidence that between 2000 and 2005, trade credit
declined due to an easier access to bank nancing. The situation is reversed during the
crisis period. More importantly, recent evidence suggests trade creditors play an important
role on SMEs nancing. The former act as an alternative important source of short-term
nancing to the latter and this role is magnied during the turmoil period (Casey and
OToole, 2014; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016).
The main focus of the empirical literature on trade credit is on whether trade credit
and bank loans act as complements or substitutes of one another depending on the phase
of the business cycle. Other studies have focused on the relation between trade credit and
inventories and argue that suppliers are only willing to provide credit to their buyers as a
way of shifting their inventory stocks to their buyers (Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia and
Mateut, 2016). This approach is based on the inventory management motive of Bougheas
et al. (2009). According to the authors, rms have an advantage to extend trade credit
to their nancially constrained customers. Since producers face an uncertain demand for
their products, they prefer to obtain sales rather than to accumulate costly inventories of
nish goods. The literature on trade credit and inventories is surprisingly limited. The
only studies which explore this link are based on a sample of U.K. and Chinese rms
(Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). What is less explored, however, is
the role of nancial constraints and the characteristics of the goods transacted on trade
credit.
The present chapter seeks to ll this gap by connecting the literatures on trade credit,
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nancial constraints and nancial development. More specically, the aim is to provide for
the rst time an empirical analysis on the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit
(i.e. extended and taken) by testing whether rm-specic dimensions and di¤erent chan-
nels are important in explaining the trade credit process. Hence, Chapter 4 uses a sample
of twelve euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) for the period between 2003
and 2011. The chapter makes three main contributions to the literature of trade credit
and inventories. First, it determines whether the trade-o¤ between stock of inventories
and trade credit (i.e. extended and taken) depends on the characteristics of the goods
which are sold and rmsaccess to external nance. The former is based on the diver-
sion value hypothesis of Giannetti et al. (2011) according to which rms which produce
di¤erentiated goods have a closer buyer-seller relation when comparing with the one in
the standardized industries. The latter is based on the well known literature on nan-
cial constraints which refers that rms with a restriced access to credit su¤er from higher
levels of nancial constraints. The motivation to explore the role of nancial constraints
on inventory management motive stems from the fact that changes in the costs of storing
goods (especially higher costs) can force rms to sell their products on credit to reduce
their storage costs and facilitate external funding. These e¤ects should be stronger for
nancially constrained rms since they su¤er from higher levels of information assymetry
and are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections.
Second, Chapter 4 contribution is related to the recent nancial crisis. In this chapter
the e¤ect of stock of inventories on trade credit is di¤erentiated over a crisis and a non-crisis
period. To this end, it is hypothesised that during the turmoil period, rms should have a
higher incentive to sell their stock on credit as a way to improve their sales and decrease
their costs of holding stock. This is based on the nancial accelerator theory according
to which deteriorations in the economic conditions increase rmscosts of nance, and
therefore, weakens rmsbalance sheet positions (Bernanke et al., 1996). Recent literature
only explores whether trade credit acts as a substitute and/or complement to bank lending
during the crisis and do not take into account the role of inventories on trade credit (Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Kabir and Zubair, 2015; Carbó-Valverde et al.,
2016). This is an important contribution since it may help us understand the channels
through which the nancial crisis led rms to extend and take trade credit.
The nal contribution of this chapter is to determine for the rst time whether nancial
development has an indirect role on rmswillingness to o¤er and receive trade credit. To
be specic, the aim is to test the extend to which the development of the banking system
a¤ects rmsdecisions to extend and take trade credit. It is well established that the euro
area is characterised by a more bank-based system. The banks have a more inuential role
than markets in channelling funds from investors to non-nancial corporations (Boot and
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Thakor, 2008; Bijlsma and Zwart, 2013). Thus, Chapter 4 contributes to the literature
on trade credit by investigating whether nancial development is an important channel
in the inventory management process. This approach complements the existing empirical
literature which focuses on the direct e¤ect of bank development on trade credit (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Fisman and Love, 2003; Cassia and Vismara, 2009; Deloof
and La Rocca, 2015).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Sub-section 4.2 reviews the theories
and empirical literature. Sub-section 4.3 summarises the research design whereas sub-
section 4.4 provides the model specication. Sub-section 4.5 and sub-section 4.6 denote
the estimation method and the data which is used. Finally, sub-section 4.7 and sub-section
4.8 show the results and nal conclusions of the chapter.
4.2 Literature review
Trade credit is an agreement in which the suppliers o¤er credit terms that allow the cus-
tomers of a business to delay payment of goods and services. Usually, transactions of trade
credit involve short-term delay of payment (30 to 60 days) of purchases of intermediate
goods and services (Cuñat, 2007).
Under the assumption of perfect markets trade credit does not exist. Firms sell their
goods and services for cash rather than use trade credit (Lewellen et al., 1980). All credit
terms that are acceptable to both the seller and the buyer are the present value equivalent
of cash terms (Emery, 1984). However, capital markets are imperfect and research on
trade credit has focused on several nancial market imperfections to explain the use of
trade credit by the rms (Lewellen et al., 1980).
Many theories have been put forward to explain the existence of trade credit. The
following sub-sections describe the main theoretical and empirical studies on trade credit.
4.2.1 Theoretical and empirical background
The literature provides di¤erent theories to describe the use of trade credit. They are
based on advantages that suppliers (customers) have to provide (receive) trade credit
from a commercial, an operational and a nancial point of view. In the next paragraphs
it is described the most prominent theories.
 Information asymmetry
Trade credit can alleviate the information asymmetry between banks and rms (Biais
and Gollier, 1997). Suppliers have private information about their customers at
lower costs than banks due to the business between the two parties. This means
that suppliers are able to choose creditworthy rms for trade credit alleviating an
information asymmetry which would prevent the nancing of positive NPV projects.
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 Price discrimination
Suppliers which extend trade credit can also use it as a mechanism for price discrim-
ination. This is known as the price discrimination theory of trade credit. If the rm
decides to extend the period of credit supplied or raise a discount for an "on time
payment", this leads to a price reduction (Brennan et al., 1988). In other words,
rms can sell the same product but at di¤erent prices to di¤erent customers.
 Product quality
For the supplier, trade credit can serve as a guarantee of product quality (Emery,
1984). The supplier is willing to provide trade credit allowing the customer su¢ cient
time to test the product (Long et al., 1993). Under this scenario, trade credit is seen
as a guarantee of product quality. According to Mian and Smith (1992) monitoring
of credit quality is possible if a manufacturer sales representative visits the borrower
regularly.
 Bankruptcy and comparative liquidity advantage
It is on the interest of suppliers to provide trade credit to their customers. Since trade
credit is based on a long-term relation and it is likely to involve sunk costs, trade
creditors have an incentive to keep their customers in business (Wilner, 2000; Cuñat,
2007). However, suppliers provide trade credit only if there is a higher probability
of reselling the product being sold. In a scenario of default, the seller is able to seize
and resell the products (Mian and Smith, 1992; Frank and Maksimovic, 1998).
 Opportunistic behaviour
The amount of credit which the rm needs depends on its nancial wealth. Less
wealthier rms need higher levels of nancing and they prefer to resort to trade
credit since they are more constrained on bank loans. The advantage of trade credit
is that it increases e¢ ciency. Opportunistic borrowers prefer to buy inputs on credit.
It may be more protable for them to invest in their own projects than to divert due
to the lower liquidity of inputs relative to cash (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).
 Inventory transaction costs
The theoretical literature also considers the inventory transactions costs as a motive
to o¤er trade credit. The main assumption is that suppliers o¤er trade credit to
their buyers as an incentive to the latter to hold higher stock of inventories. In other
words, there is a shift from the sellers to the buyers (Emery, 1987; Bougheas et al.,
2009; Daripa and Nilsen, 2011).63
63It should be noted that the theories which are dened in Bougheas et al. (2009) and Daripa and
Nilsen (2011) are di¤erent. The former study is based on a storage cost model in which the supplier
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 Transaction motive
According to this motive the use of trade credit also reduces the transaction costs
of paying bills (Ferris, 1981). Both the seller and the buyer are able to separate the
payment cycle from the delivery schedule. This process allows the rms to optimise
their inventories and cash ows.
To sum up, the above-mentioned theories denote the importance of trade credit from
the supplier and buyer points of view. The majority of the empirical evidence on trade
credit focuses on these theories and provide evidence from a demand and a supply view
of trade credit.
Core empirical studies focus on two main issues. They examine the link between trade
credit and rm-specic characteristics and the use of trade credit relative to bank loans
during and/or outside periods of tight monetary policy. In the next sub-sections, it is
described the main relevant papers.
4.2.2 Trade credit and bank credit: The redistribution role of trade credit
A key strand of the literature explores the link between trade credit and bank lending.
Meltzer (1960) is the rst to theoretically propose a relation between trade credit and
bank loans. According to the author, there is a redistribution view of trade credit. Firms
which receive nancing from banks can redistribute these funds through trade credit (in
the form of accounts receivables) to their nancially constrained customers. For Meltzer
(1960), trade credit can be seen as a channel to redistribute bank credit from creditworthy
suppliers to less creditworthy customers. For the redistribution view to take place, rms
(i.e. the lenders) need to be able to raise external nance to distribute credit to less
privileged rms (Love et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, there is another set of the literature which considers that trade credit
and bank lending are complements. This is based on the theoretical model of Biais and
Gollier (1997). Firms which receive trade credit can use it as a way to improve their
credit standing. The complementary view of trade credit occurs if the sellers have enough
expected future cash ow as a guarantee of collateral. The next paragraphs describe the
main empirical studies which give emphasis to the redistribution and complementary views
of trade credit.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) are the rst to empirical test the assumptions of Meltzer
(1960). The authors explore the determinants of trade credit based on the suppliers
and customerstrade credit allocation. They dene accounts receivables as a proxy for
faces a stochastic demand. The supplier has the need to extend trade credit only to meet their nancial
obligations. In the latter model, it is the downstream customer who faces a stochastic demand. The buyer
has to decide whether to hold inventories to meet their sales or to order inputs when the nal demand
materialises (Mateut et al., 2015).
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trade credit extend. Firmsaccounts payables are dened as trade credit taken which
corresponds to the rmsborrowing from their suppliers.
The authors use a sample of U.S. SMEs from the National Survey of Small Business Fi-
nance (NSSBF) during the period 1988-1989. A simultaneous equation model is employed
to estimate the demand and supply of trade credit.
To test the determinants of accounts receivables, Petersen and Rajan (1997) regress
rms trade credit extended on their size and age. In their model the uptake of trade
credit depends on rmslevel of creditworthiness (i.e. size and protability), factors that
allow the suppliers a great advantage in nancing the rms (i.e. better information about
the rms than nancial institutions, better control and better ability to liquidate goods)
and demand for funding (i.e. the amount of accounts payable is determined by suppliers
demand for credit).
Results show that rms which are smaller and without long-term relations with banks
extend less trade credit to their customers. These rms take more trade credit from their
suppliers. The authors interpret the results as an evidence that trade credit falls below
bank credit. Trade credit is used as a source of nancing of last resort by small and
constrained rms. This is consistent with the redistribution view of trade credit of Meltzer
(1960).
Ono (2001) investigates which factors determine trade credit and tests whether trade
credit can act as a complement to bank loans. Aggregate quarterly data is used for a
sample of Japanese manufacturing rms between 1979 and 1996. The sample of rms is
split into 4 groups based on the size of capital stock. Firms are divided in the following
categories: 10-49 million; 50-99 million; 100-999 million; 1000 and above. A two-stage
least square (2SLS) is implemented. In the model, trade credit (i.e. trade payables to
trade receivables) is regressed on rm specic characteristics (i.e. cash ow) and credit
terms o¤ered by the banks. This allows to test the relation between credit terms o¤ered
by the banks and trade credit.
Results demonstrate that both trade credit receivable and payable are inuenced by
rm-specic characteristics and transactional activities. For small rms increase in cash
ow allow them to reduce trade payables. Cash ow has no impact on the trade payables
of large rms. Interestingly, the author nds that the ratio of trade payables to trade
receivables increase when banks ease their lending attitude. This means that trade credit
can act as a complement to bank loans.
Nilsen (2002) investigates the receipt of trade credit (i.e. accounts payables to sales) for
U.S. rms. The author regresses trade credit taken on a set of rm-specic characteristics
(i.e. inventories and cash reserves) and a set of macroeconomic variables (i.e. GDP,
price level and the spread between the Fed funds and long-term treasury bond rates as
an indicator of monetary policy). Following the work of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
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the sample of rms is split into large and small based on rmsassets.64 Nilsen (2002)
employs a sample of U.S. rms for the period 1972-1982 and a Vector Auto Regressive
(VAR) model. To investigate trade credit of small and large rms, a system of equations
is implemented.
Results show that small and large rms use higher levels of trade credit during a period
of contractionary monetary policy which supports the redistribution view of trade credit.
However, large rms increase their level of trade credit more than small rms. For Nilsen
(2002) this is a puzzling nding. Large rms are expected to be more established and to
su¤er from lower levels of information asymmetry than smaller rms.
To explain the aforementioned results the author divides the sample of large rms
using a direct indicator of market access. This indicator is based on bond ratings and it is
rst introduced in Whited (1992).65 Empirical ndings suggest that only non-rated rms
increase trade credit. Rated rms use more loans. Overall, the author concludes that only
small and large rms without bond ratings increase their reliance on trade credit during
monetary contractions.
4.2.3 Trade credit, bank credit and nancial crises: Conicting view
A second set of the literature relates trade credit with tight monetary policy. Meltzer
(1960) also argues that the use of trade credit can weaken the traditional credit channel
hypothesis. Monetary policy is distributed to the real economy through its e¤ect on
bank loans and rmsbalance sheet variables (Choi and Kim, 2005). Under this scenario,
banks are expected to be more restricted in lending money to their nancially constrained
customers. As a result, rms should resort to other sources of nance such as trade credit.
This is known as the substitution e¤ect.
Empirical studies nd a conicting evidence regarding the relation between bank loans
and trade credit during nancial crises. For instance, Choi and Kim (2005) explore the
impact of macro-nancial shocks on trade credit from both sides of trade credit (extended
and taken). The net position of these variables determines whether a rm is a customer
or a supplier. The authors argue that during a period of tight monetary policy, stronger
rms most likely increase their accounts receivables and decrease accounts payables. If
markers are constrained, larger rms may not be able to provide liquidity to smaller rms.
Two di¤erent quarterly panel data sets are used for the period between 1975 to 1997.
Data is collected for S&P 500 U.S. listed rms and a comparison group of 689 non-S&P
500 U.S. rms. Both accounts payables and receivables are regressed separately in two
di¤erent equations. Specically, the authors dene that trade credit depends on macro-
64As it is mentioned in sub-section 2.2 of Chapter 2, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) refer that small rms
behave di¤erently than their larger counterparts over the business cycle. During periods of monetary
contraction the credit ows to small rms decrease when comparing with large rms.
65Please refer to sub-section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2 for more details on this indicator.
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economic variables and rm-specic characteristics (i.e. cost change, rm size, inventory
stock, retained earnings for accounts payables and sales change, size, inventory stock, re-
tained earnings, short term debt for accounts receivables). Regarding the macroeconomic
variables the authors employ two di¤erent measures of market interest rate (i.e. 3-month
treasury bill rate and the change in the FED funds rate) and macro-nancial shocks (i.e.
the change in the FED funds rate and a dummy for the dates corresponding to the pe-
riod in which the Fed policy happen to be disinationary). The methodology which is
implemented is the OLS method.
Empirical ndings demonstrate that accounts receivables and accounts payables rela-
tive to their assets increase with a tighter monetary policy. This supports the idea that
trade credit is a substitute for bank lending.
Love et al. (2007) investigate the impact of a nancial crisis on rmstrade credit.
Trade credit is proxied by 3 di¤erent measures. Firstly, rms are considered as borrowers
and the ratio of accounts payables to sales is used as a form of non-bank debt (i.e. trade
credit taken). Secondly, the ratio of accounts receivables to sales is employed (trade credit
extended). The authors have also implemented the net trade credit (i.e. the di¤erence
between receivables and payables to total sales).
Love et al. (2007) argue that the ratio of receivables should indicate the percentage
of sales that it is acquired on credit. Trade credit has a shorter maturity and should be
interpreted as the percentage of goods sold on credit and the time it takes for credit to be
repaid. Therefore, the authors multiply the ratios of credit extended and received by 360.
All the ratios are interpreted in terms of number of days.
Love et al. (2007) use a sample of 890 large publicly trade rms from Indonesia, South
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and the devaluation of the 1994 peso on
Mexican rms. A xed e¤ect estimation is used. To test the behaviour of rms during and
after the crisis, trade credit is regressed on a set of control variables (i.e. cash ow, cash
balances and the lagged of sales growth) and the depreciation of the exchange rate. The
set of the control variables are interacted with two di¤erent dummy variables to account
for the impact of the crisis and post-crisis years, respectively.
Results demonstrate that trade credit extended increases immediately after the crisis.
However, it decreases sharply in the post crisis period. This is inconsistent with the
redistribution view of Meltzer (1960), according to who trade credit extended should
increase during periods of monetary contraction. Love et al. (2007) argue that the results
provide evidence that the redistribution view of trade credit shuts down if all sources of
external nancing dry up, especially during a nancial crisis. The monetary contraction
which has an impact on nancial lenders also has an e¤ect on non-nancial lenders of trade
credit. Regarding accounts payables, ndings show that they do not decline signicantly
during the crisis when comparing with the pre-crisis period. After the peak of the crisis,
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the ratio of accounts payables increases.
Love et al. (2007) also account for the important dimension of rm heterogeneity during
the crisis period. The model is extended and includes a set of rmsvulnerability measures
(i.e. short-term debt to assets, short-term debt foreign currency, cash ow and cash stock
to assets). The assumption of the author is that more vulnerable rms have a higher
probability of being a¤ected by the crisis. They are more likely to cut the extension
of trade credit to their customers and increase their use of credit from suppliers. To
explore whether rm-level heterogeneity a¤ects rmsresponse to trade credit di¤erently
during the crisis, an interaction of pre-crisis nancing variables with crisis and post crisis
dummies is implemented. Results show that before the crisis rms with a higher level of
vulnerability extend more trade credit. After the crisis, there is a sharp decline on this
provision.
Finally, the authors investigate the impact of bank credit growth on trade credit before,
during and after the crisis. Trade credit is regressed on the same set of control variables
and an interaction between a crisis dummy and the private credit to GDP ratio, which
measures the overall credit growth in the banking sector. There is a positive relation
between bank credit growth and trade credit extended during the crisis. After the crisis,
there is a sharp decline of the provision of trade credit especially for countries which have
experienced a higher contraction in bank credit.
Love and Zaidi (2010) extend the work of Love et al. (2007) for a sample of SMEs
during the Asian crisis. In particular, the authors test the heterogeneous response of
nancially constrained rms to alternative sources of nance during and after the crisis.
Data is provided for Thailand, Korea, Philippines and Indonesia from a survey of 3,160
manufacturing rms between November 1998 and February 1999. All rms are surveyed
about the impact of the crisis, prospects of recovery and sources of nance prior and after
the crisis. The survey includes detailed information on trade credit terms, i.e. the length
of accounts payables, accounts receivables and early payments discounts. Financially
constrained rms are classied based on two measures. Firmsapplication for a bank loan
and a subjective perception. The former measure classies rms as constrained if there is
a rejection for a loan before and after the crisis. The latter is based on a survey response
regarding the restriction of rms to bank loans during the crisis. An OLS estimation is
used.
Results demonstrate that the use of trade credit declines after the crisis. Financially
constrained rms extend less trade credit to their customers and use less trade credit after
the turmoil period. The length of time to repay the credit to the supplier is shorter for
nancially constrained rms. These rms also buy a smaller amount of inputs on credit
and pay a higher cost for trade credit. Love and Zaidi (2010), conclude that the existence
of the substitution e¤ect is not clear. During the crisis nancially constrained rms are
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not able to obtain bank loans and cannot meet the excess demand for funds with trade
credit.
4.2.4 Trade credit and inventories
Empirical research relates trade credit also with suppliersstock of inventories. This is
based on the inventory transaction cost motive which is dened in sub-section 4.2.1. The
most prominent empirical study in this area is the one of Bougheas et al. (2009). The
authors build on a theoretical two-period stochastic demand model of rmsbehaviour.
The rationale behind the model is that rms produce products for sale. In the rst period
the rm chooses its level of production in an environment where the nal demand for
its product is uncertain. In the second period if demand is uncertain, the rm can hold
stock of inventories which are not sold but at a cost. Hence, the rm has an incentive
to sell on credit its products to reduce inventories and increase its sales. In other words,
producers which face uncertain demand for their products, are motivated to extend credit
to their nancially constrained customers. The incentive to provide credit is only limited
by the need to obtain liquidity to meet its own nancial obligations. This is known as
the inventory management motive. Since its potential buyers are nancially constrained,
the rm faces a trade-o¤ by extending trade credit to its customers and avoiding holding
costly stocks of inventories. As a result, Bougheas et al. (2009) predicts a negative relation
between the volume of trade credit extended and stock of inventories as rms attempt to
minimize the inventory storage costs.
Bougheas et al. (2009) empirically test whether trade debit (i.e. trade credit extended)
and trade credit (i.e. trade credit taken) are inuenced by changes in the cost of inven-
tories, protability, risk, liquidity and a proxy for the access to bank credit. A sample of
U.K. rms is used for the period between 1993 and 2003 and the system GMM estimator
is implemented. Results demonstrate that inventories have a negative and statistically
signicant e¤ect only on accounts receivables. The stock of inventories variable has an
insignicant impact on rmstrade credit taken.
The authors also consider the impact of rm-level heterogeneity on the trade-o¤ be-
tween trade credit and inventories. They examine the role of inventories on the account
receivables and payables of larger and small rms. In the model, size is interacted with
rmsstocks. Firms which are characterised as large provide and receive more trade credit
from their business partners. The authors conclude that the bigger the size of the rm
the smaller is the role of inventories on rmsdecisions to extend credit.
Giannetti et al. (2011) link the use of trade credit (i.e. extended and taken) to the
characteristics of the transacted good. The authors follow the diversion vulnerability
theory of Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). This theory assumes that suppliers of credit have
an advantage comparing to the banks in nancing their customers. Goods which are
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reacquired are worth more to suppliers than to banks. Thus, trade credit decreases the
risk of moral hazard. The buyer is more likely to repay the supplier rather than the bank.
Giannetti et al. (2011) explore whether the trade credit a rm extends depends on the
nature of the product which is transacted. According to the author, providers of trade
credit have an advantage relative to banks in nancing their customers since repossessed
goods are worth more to suppliers than to the banks. This advantage is stronger for
rms in the di¤erentiated sector than for rms in the standardised industries. Firms in
the former industries produce more specic products and the seller-buyer relation is also
closer than in the latter industries (Guariglia and Mateut, 2016).
To account for this hypothesis, rms are divided based on their product character-
istics. Following the work of Rauch (1999), rms are split based on standardized and
di¤erentiated products. A sample of U.S. SMEs from the NSSBF survey is used during
the period between 1999-2001. The sample is matched with the industry-specic infor-
mation, i.e. based on a product classication (i.e. di¤erentiated and standardized goods).
Two proxies for trade credit are implemented. The ratio of receivables to sales and the
percentage of purchases on account by a rm. An OLS methodology is used. Results show
that rms which produce di¤erentiated products are willing to extend more trade credit
to their customers. Firms which buy di¤erentiated products present more purchases on
account.
Furthermore, Mateut et al. (2015) explore the relation between trade credit and the
type of inventory a rm hold. The authors assumption is that the composition of invento-
ries a¤ects rmstrade credit (i.e. extended and taken). Firstly, they explore the inventory
management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009) and account for the diversion hypothesis in
Giannetti et al. (2011).
A sample of French rms for the period between 2000 and 2007 is used and the models
are estimated with the HausmanTaylor (HT) estimator. The HT estimator combines the
consistency and e¢ ciency of a xed e¤ects model with a random-e¤ect estimator. In other
words, the regressors are correlated with the individual e¤ects and includes time-invariant
controls (Hausman and Taylor, 1981; Baltagi et al., 2003).
To explore the inventory management motive and the diversion hypothesis, Mateut
et al. (2015) dene trade credit extended as a function of sector specic e¤ects (i.e. di¤er-
entiated, services, retail and wholesale), a set of control variables (i.e. bank loans, prots,
liquidity, size, age and a measure of likelihood of failure) and the proportion of raw mate-
rials in total inventories which is the main variable of interest. Results demonstrate that
rms with higher inventories in raw material extend more trade credit. Provision of trade
credit is also higher for producers of di¤erentiated goods.
In addition, trade credit taken is considered as a function of the same control variables,
lag of inventories, sector specic e¤ects (i.e. di¤erentiated and services) and the share of
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processed inventories in total inventories. Empirical ndings demonstrate that rms which
buy more di¤erentiated inputs have higher levels of trade credit taken.
Finally, Guariglia et al. (2015) test di¤erences in trade credit extension across po-
litically a¢ liated and non-a¢ liated rms.66 The authors extend the work of Bougheas
et al. (2009) and include in their model a measure of short-term nancing. This measure
accounts for rmslevel of nancial constraints. Following the work of Giannetti et al.
(2011), the authors also separate the sample of rms based on di¤erentiated and stan-
dardized products. Firms are also classied in 4 di¤erent categories. They are as follows:
state-owned, private, foreign and collective. A sample of 65,706 Chinese rms is used over
the period 2000-2007 and a rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is employed.
Empirical ndings suggest that independently of the ownership type there is a positive
relation between short-term liabilities and trade credit (i.e. accounts receivables). Firms
use short-term nancing to fund their accounts receivables and to allocate long-term lia-
bilities to long-term investments. The trade credit extension is higher for rms operating
in di¤erentiated sectors than for those rms with standardized goods.
4.2.5 Trade credit and nancial development
Another set of the literature on trade credit focuses on the role of nancial development.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) are the rst to link trade credit with nancial
development. The authors investigate whether the use of trade credit between rms is a
substitute or a complement for borrowing from the nancial intermediaries. Specically,
they test whether the use of trade credit is linked to the development of the banking
system of a country and its legal infrastructure.
To account for nancial development, the authors dene three di¤erent measures. They
consider the overall development of the banking system (i.e. the ratio of private bank
credit to GDP), bank e¢ ciency (i.e. the extent of public ownership of a countrys banking
system) and an indicator of concentration. The latter indicator measures the assets of
the three largest banks in the nancial system. Based on the work of De Silanes et al.
(1998) they employ di¤erent proxies for the e¢ ciency of the legal system (law and order,
creditorsrights, legal origin).
The authors use a sample of publicly trade rms in 40 countries for the period between
1989 and 1996. Trade credit is dened as receivables turnover (i.e. sales to accounts
receivables ratio) and payables turnover (i.e. costs of goods sold to accounts payables
ratio). Trade credit is tested as a function of the aforementioned nancial development
proxies and rm-specic characteristics (i.e. size, return on assets, net sales, ination,
66Political a¢ liated rms are those not owned by the government. These rms are controlled by or
subordinated to the government.
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GDP per capita and GDP growth rate). A pooled OLS methodology is implemented.
Empirical ndings suggest that rms which are located in a large banking system obtain
more credit from their suppliers and lend more to their customers. If a countrys legal
system is e¢ cient rms rely less on trade credit. These rms have a small advantage on
providing trade credit to their buyers. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) conclude
that there is a complementary e¤ect between rmstrade credit and the development of
the banking system, especially in countries which legal system is not e¢ cient.
Fisman and Love (2003) investigate the relation between trade credit and nancial
development at a industry level. They argue that rms with easier access to trade credit
should face less di¢ culties in countries where the quality of nancial intermediation is low.
The authors refer that nancial market development should matter disproportionately
more for rms which do not have access to trade credit nancing.
The main aim is to test whether industries that are more dependent on trade credit are
relatively better o¤ in countries with lower development of nancial institutions. To do so,
the authors use data at an industry level from 1970 to 1998 from a panel of 37 industries
and 44 countries. Industry growth is a function of an interaction between a measure of
nancial development of a country and trade credit taken (i.e. accounts payables to total
assets ratio). An OLS estimation is implemented.
Results show that industries which are more dependent on trade credit nancing grow
quicker in countries with less developed nancial intermediaries. Firms in countries with
less developed nancial markets substitute credit which is provided by their suppliers to
nance their growth.
Ge and Qiu (2007) study how rms in a country with poorly developed nancial in-
stitutions fund their growth opportunities. They test the di¤erence in the level of trade
credit between state and non-state owned rms in China. According to the authors, China
is the largest developed country with a poor developed nancial system. State (non-state)
rms have a lower (higher) access to bank loans.
Using rm-level data on 442 state owned and 358 non-state owned rms from 1994 to
1999, the authors use four di¤erent measures of trade credit. They are as follows: the trade
credit extended (i.e. accounts receivables to total assets or sales ratio); the trade credit
taken (i.e. accounts payables to total assets or sales ratio); net trade credit (i.e. accounts
payables minus accounts receivables to total assets or total sales). Ge and Qiu (2007)
link trade credit to rmsownership and a set of control variables (i.e. size, age, capital
to labour ratio, cash ow, sales growth, xed investment to total investment, industry,
location). The model is estimated using random e¤ects. Results show that non-state
rms use more trade credit than state rms.
Finally, Cassia and Vismara (2009) link rmstrade credit with the local development
of the banking system. Their aim is to test whether di¤erent degrees of trade credit (i.e.
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extended, taken and net trade credit) are a¤ected by the characteristics of the local banking
system. To do so, the authors use 6 di¤erent measures of local banking development.67
A sample of 24,479 euro-area rms is used over the period of 2002-2006. Trade credit
extended (taken) is a function of trade credit taken (extended), local banking development
indicators, ination and a set of rm-specic variables variables (i.e. size, leverage and
sales to total assets). Net trade credit is regressed on the same variables with the exception
of trade credit extended and taken. An OLS estimation is implemented.
Results show that independently of the proxies which are used, the direct impact
of nancial development on trade credit is negative and statistically signicant. This
indicates that rms which belong to a more developed banking system rely less on trade
credit. According to the authors the empirical ndings show that there is a substitution
e¤ect. Trade credit is considered as an alternative to bank credit.
4.2.6 Trade credit and rmsperformance
Subsequent studies relate rmsvalue and its performance with trade credit. The under-
lying assumption behind these studies is that trade credit mitigates rmsperformance,
i.e. rms support their protability through credit sales.
To begin with, Martínez-Sola et al. (2013) study the impact of trade credit on the
value of Spanish SMEs. They argue that investing in trade credit in the form of accounts
receivables is important for the sellersbalance sheets. To do so, rms weight the benets
and costs of extending trade credit. Martínez-Sola et al. (2013) argue that at lower levels
of accounts receivables, rms have nancial and commercial benets.68 Conversely, at
higher levels of accounts receivables rms obtain credit risk, opportunity and nancial
costs.69
A sample of Spanish listed rms is used from 2001 to 2007 and a rst-di¤erence GMM
estimation is employed. Firm value is dened as Tobins Q and it depends on trade credit
(i.e. accounts receivables), trade credit squared and rm-specic characteristics (i.e. rms
growth, size and leverage).
Results show that there is a positive relation between rm value and trade credit at
lower level of accounts receivables. A negative relation between rm value and trade credit
is found at higher level of receivables.
67The following indicators are considered by Cassia and Vismara (2009): Counters-the number of
counters which are opened in the province where each individual rm is located; Counters to the population
ratio-number of bank counters to the number of inhabitants; private bank to GDP ratio; private bank
credit; number of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) in the province where each rm is located; ratio of
number of ATMs over population.
68These nancial and operational benets are related to the supplier theories of trade credit. These
benets are as follows: reduction of transaction costs, mitigating customers nancial frictions, stimulation
of sales, reduction in information asymmetry between buyer and seller, price discrimination.
69Trade credit is costly and involves an opportunity cost. On the other hand, providing trade credit
also involves bearing the credit risk due to the exposure to payment default.
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Empirical ndings show that there is a positive relation between suppliers nancing and
SMEsvalue. Firms with better access to alternative nancing have lower value of supplier
nancing. Conversely, rms with a worst access to external nance have a greater supplier
nancing value. This is in line with the redistribution view of trade credit. The credit
which is provided by suppliers is more relevant for SMEs with less borrowing capacity and
which produce lower levels of cash ow.
Ferrando and Mulier (2013) explore whether rms resort to trade credit to manage
their growth. For the authors, it is the combination of both aspects of trade credit (i.e.
receivables and payables) that a¤ect rmsperformance. The rm can be considered a
lender but also as a customer. The combination of both aspects of trade credit permits to
optimise rmsperformance.
The authors follow the work of Coluzzi et al. (2015) and implement a dynamic growth
model. The aim is to estimate the impact of trade credit on rmsperformance. Coluzzi
et al. (2015) use a model of rmsgrowth, i.e. a version of the Law of Proportionate
E¤ect (LPE) to determine the impact of nancial obstacles on rms performance.70
A sample of 600,000 euro area rms from 8 euro-area countries between 1993 and 2009
is used.71 For each country, the authors regress rms performance (measured as the growth
of value added) on a set of rm-specic characteristics (i.e. bank loans, sales growth and
age) and on the trade credit channel. The latter is calculated as the sum of accounts
payables with accounts receivables. A rst-di¤erence GMM estimator is employed.
Results show that there is a positive relation between trade credit and rmsperfor-
mance for all the countries. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Ferrando and Mulier
(2013) that rms use trade credit to grow.
Furthermore, the authors also test the impact of rm-level heterogeneity on the relation
between rmsperformance and trade credit. They focus on two di¤erent dimensions of
rm-level heterogeneity: size and age. The behaviour of rms with di¤erent size (age) is
explored by interacting trade credit with a size (age) dummy. Empirical ndings suggest
that trade credit is more important for younger and smaller rms
Ferrando and Mulier (2013) also explore whether the development of nancial markets
have an impact on the trade credit relation with rmsperformance. They refer that
euro area countries are considered to have developed nancial markets but these countries
continue to be heterogeneous. To investigate this issue, all the rm-level information is
merged into one single panel. Trade credit is interacted with two di¤erent measures of
nancial market development (i.e. bank loans to GDP and deb securities to GDP). They
70Coluzzi et al. (2015) employ an augment version of the original Law of Proportionate E¤ect deter-
mined by Goddard et al. (2002). The original LPE model refers that rmsgrowth does not depend on the
initial size and past growth rates. However, Coluzzi et al. (2015) indicate that the existence of information
asymmetry makes rms dynamics dependent on rm-specic characteristics (i.e. size and age).
71Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal are the 8 euro area
countries which are used in this study.
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conclude that the use of trade credit is more relevant in years and countries where rms
issue less debt securities and is less important in years/countries where there is a higher
supply of bank loans.
In a similar vein, Martínez-Sola et al. (2015) explore the e¤ect of trade credit in the
form of accounts payables on the value of Spanish SMEs. The authors modify the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) valuation regression to test whether changes in trade credit have an
impact on rmsvalue. Specically, rm value is regressed on accounts payables, a set of
control variables (i.e. total assets, earnings, intangible assets and interest expenses) and
an interaction term between changes in accounts payables and a dummy variable for the
availability of nancial resources (i.e. long-term leverage ratio, short-term bank debt and
nancial costs). The interaction term accounts for the di¤erence in the value of supplier
nancing between groups of rms.72 Using a sample of 7,952 Spanish SMEs rms between
1998 and 2007, the authors employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method and an OLS
estimator.
4.2.7 The recent nancial crisis
Few studies have looked at trade credit during the recent turmoil period. Once more, the
central focus is on the link between trade credit and bank loans. The most prominent
studies are presented in the next sub-sections.
4.2.7.1 Trade credit and access to nance
Recent studies on the impact of the recent credit crunch have provided mixed ndings
on whether trade credit can be considered as a complement or a substitute to bank loans.
For instance, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) test whether U.S. suppliers
with liquidity provision prior to the turmoil period provide trade credit to their liquidity
constrained customers. The authors employ a sample of quarterly data of 2,250 U.S. rms
between the 3rd quarter of 2005 and the 4th quarter of 2010. Information is included on a
matched sample of 9,368 client-supplier quarter-pairs. Information on rmskey customers
is also collected. They manually match it to the original data. The matched sample allows
the authors to control for the demand and the supply factors of trade credit. Following
the work of Duchin et al. (2010), rmsnancial position is measured one year prior to the
crisis. Trade credit is used as a function of rmsliquidity provision (i.e. cash reserves)
and a set of control variables (i.e. size, age, net prot margin, sales growth, total debt,
net worth, TobinsQ, tangible assets and long term ratings measures). A DID approach
is implemented. Results show that liquid rms increase the trade credit extend more than
72Firm value is measured as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus a proxy for
the market value of equity. Since the authors deal with unlisted rms, they substitute the value of equity
with net prot plus depreciation over the average return on equity of the industry.
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less liquid rms. Specically, cash-rich rms provide more credit to their customers during
the rst stage of the crisis (2007-2008).
In addition, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) examine the impact of
the crisis on nancially constrained rms. The authors use the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
index, the Whited and Wu (2006) index and the dividend payout ratio to measure rms
level of nancial constraints. Empirical ndings demonstrate that nancially constrained
rms resort more to trade credit than their unconstrained counterparts during the crisis.
Finally, the impact of liquidity provision on suppliers and clientsperformance is also
examined. According to the authors, liquidity provision is only possible for suppliers of
trade credit. These rms have the possibility to expand their market positions. Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) nd that liquid rms which receive more trade
credit (accounts receivables) have a better performance during and after the crisis. This
is consistent with the redistribution view of trade credit and the substitution e¤ect.
Casey and OToole (2014) investigate the extent to which SMEs with restricted access
to bank loans are more likely to apply for alternative sources of external nance (i.e. trade
credit, informal lending, loans from other rms and state grants). The authors employ
survey data of SMEs from the ECB Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE)
during the 2009 and 2011 period across 11 euro area countries.73
The dependent variable is dened as a binary variable. It corresponds to di¤erent
alternative sources of nance. This variable is regressed on a set of control variables.
They capture the degree of risk, level of creditworthiness, rmsquality, rmsoutlook
perspective and prot growth. A probit model is implemented.
Empirical ndings provide evidence of a positive relation between trade credit and
bank constraints. Credit rationed SMEs have a higher probability of applying and use
trade credit during the crisis. These ndings suggest that there is a substitution e¤ect
between bank lending and other sources of nance and that there is a redistribution e¤ect
from liquidity provider rms.
Next, the authors determine how rms rms age, ownership and country-specic
heterogeneity have an impact on SMEs nancing during the crisis. The sample is divided
into di¤erent levels of nancial constraints, i.e. credit rationed rms and self-rationed
borrowers.74 Casey and OToole (2014) observe that larger and older SMEs with a higher
level of debt and better outlooks are more likely to request trade credit when bank lending
is rejected.
Abdulla et al. (2015) shed light on the role played by private and public rms on trade
credit taken. The authors argue that public (private) rms have easier (harder) access to
73Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and
Portugal are the countries which are used in this study.
74Credit rationed rms are those which apply for loans and are rejected. Self-rationing borrowers are
those which do not apply to allow due to high lending costs.
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external nance and su¤er from lower (higher) levels of information asymmetry. Abdulla
et al. (2015) test whether the level of nancial vulnerability of rms prior to the crisis has
an impact on trade credit taken.
A sample of 27,300 private rms and 3,340 public rms is employed for the period
1995-2012. Trade credit (calculated as accounts payables to total assets) is regressed on a
dummy public, a set of control variables (i.e. age, cash ow, cash holdings, current assets,
sales growth, short term debt and rm size) and an interaction between a crisis dummy
and rmslevel of nancial vulnerability. The latter is measured on short-term debt and
cash ow. A matching procedure is used. Each public rm-year observation is matched
to a private rm-year observation in the same industry, year and closest size.
Empirical ndings demonstrate that public rms rely more on trade credit as a sub-
stitute during the credit crunch. Private rms which are vulnerable prior to the crisis
period have more di¢ culties in obtaining trade credit after the crisis. This is in line with
argument of Love et al. (2007). Large suppliers transfer funds through trade credit to
their less liquid customers. It occurs until the point in which bank loans and trade credit
are not accessible, i.e. when the redistribution view shuts down.
In a similar study, Kabir and Zubair (2015) study the uptake and extension of trade
credit for Dutch SMEs. 368 rms are used for the period between 2003 and 2012. Trade
credit extended (i.e. accounts receivables to total assets) and trade credit taken (i.e. ac-
counts payables to total assets) are a function of bank loans, an interaction term capturing
bank loans during the crisis and a set of control variables (i.e. cash ow, size, liquidity,
rmsgrowth, inventories). A xed e¤ect model is estimated.
The coe¢ cient on the bank loans variable determines whether trade payable has a
substitution/compliment role and trade receivable has a redistribution one. A negative
(positive) coe¢ cient on the bank loan is associated with a substitution (complementary)
e¤ect.
Empirical ndings show that during the nancial crisis, both trade credit extended and
taken decreases. Kabir and Zubair (2015) show that during the crisis there is a positive
relation between bank loans and trade credit. This indicates that there is a complimentary
role of trade credit with bank credit during the crisis.
Muñoz et al. (2015) investigate the use of trade credit and bank loans for a sample
of 1,186 SMEs from 5 European countries (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and U.K)
for the period between 2006 and 2011. Contrary to the previous studies, the authors
use a binary variable as the main dependent variable. It assumes the value of 1 if rms
are not able to substitute bank loans with trade credit, and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable is regressed on lagged rm-specic controls (size, tangible xed assets, return on
assets, investment, cash reserves), a crisis dummy and a lagged credit quality measure
which is dened as the Z-score of Altman (1968). A logit model is implemented. Results
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show that there is a monotonic relation between credit quality and the probability of
substitution. Credit quality has a positive e¤ect on the probability of substitution and
that the probability of substitution decreases during the crisis.
Muñoz et al. (2015) also test the impact of rm-level heterogeneity on the probability
of substitution. The authors consider as a measure of nancial constraints the index of
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and interact it with the credit quality measure.75 The sample
of rms is separated by each quintile of the index. Empirical ndings show that there is
an inverse U-shaped relation between the probability of substitution and the interaction
term. Intermediate nancially constrained rms with high credit have a higher probability
of substitution. For rms with lower levels of nancial constraints the quality of credit is
less relevant for the probability of substitution. The authors conclude that the substitution
e¤ect is not as straightforward as earlier literature suggests (Meltzer, 1960; Petersen and
Rajan, 1997).
Furthermore, di¤erent than the previous empirical studies, Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016),
explore how trade credit a¤ects the investment (i.e. capital expenditures) of Spain SMEs
during the turmoil period. A sample of 40,000 rms over the period 1994-2010 is used.
Contrary to previous studies, the authors employ a disequilibrium model to identify
nancially constrained and unconstrained rms. The model follows the one of Maddala and
Nelson (1974). It is estimated by including three di¤erent equations. They correspond to
the demand, supply and the quantity which is observed as the minimum quantity which
is supplied and demanded. The demand equation is used for bank loans. The supply
regression is implemented for the maximum amount of loans that banks are willing to
lend. The last is a transaction equation which restricts the value of loans as a minimum
equation of desired demand and loan supply. To be more specic, from a demand point
of view, the bank loans variable is regressed on sales, cash ow, loan interest spread and
GDP growth. In the supply side, bank loans are a function of tangible assets, bank market
power, default risk and GDP growth.
Using the aforementioned classications from the disequilibrium model, the authors
then test the sensitivity of investment (in the form of capital expenditures) to the two
key sources of SMEs external nance (i.e. bank loans and trade credit). The empirical
specication follows a panel causality test as in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). This method
rst-di¤erences the data to remove the xed e¤ects and then estimates the models using
instruments. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) suggest to use a time-varying set of instruments
that includes di¤erences and levels.
Empirical ndings suggest that nancially constrained SMEs depend only on trade
credit to nance their capital expenditures. This e¤ect is stronger during the nancial
75See Chapter 2, sub-section 2.2.4 for details on the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of nancial
constraints.
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crisis. Conversely, unconstrained SMEs are only dependent on bank loans.
Finally, McGuinness and Hogan (2016) explore whether unconstrained SMEs extend
trade credit to their nancially constrained counterparts during the recent nancial crisis.
To this end, the authors use a sample of 7,618 Irish SMEs over the period 2003-2011.
In the model, McGuinness and Hogan (2016) regress trade credit (i.e. accounts payables,
accounts receivables and net trade credit) on a set of control variables (i.e. age, sales
growth, cash reserves, size and the level of economic activity) and on the nancial posi-
tion of the rm (i.e. bank loans) calculated one year prior to the crisis. A xed e¤ect
estimator is used. Results show that SMEs with a better nancial position extend higher
levels of trade credit to more vulnerable SMEs after the crisis. This is consistent with the
redistribution view of Meltzer (1960).
4.2.7.2 Trade credit and nancial development
Finally, studies on the link between trade credit and nancial development during the
recent crisis are limited. In fact, Deloof and La Rocca (2015) is the only study which links
the provision of trade credit with local nancial development. The authors test the relation
between local nancial development and trade credit, for a sample of Italian SMEs. In
particular, it is examined whether the development of local banking system has a positive
relation with trade credit extended (i.e. accounts receivables to total assets ratio). Deloof
and La Rocca (2015) follow the work of Alessandrini et al. (2009) and consider the role of
providences on trade credit.76
A sample of 14,662 SMEs during the period between 2003 and 2009 is employed.
Trade credit (i.e. extended, taken and net trade) is tested as a function of economic
indicators (i.e. GDP growth, bank credit standards), province characteristics (i.e. north,
south, social capital, extortion crimes, industrial district density), branch/coop density
and rm-specic characteristics (i.e. size, age, cash ow, sales growth, sales, gross prot
margin, costs of goods sold over total assets, short-term debt over total assets). An OLS
methodology with standard errors clustered at the rm level is used.
Results show that trade credit enforces the positive e¤ect of local banking development
on the availability of external nance for Italian SMEs. SMEs which are located in a more
developed banking system, extend and take more trade credit. Deloof and La Rocca (2015)
argue that trade credit acts as a complement to bank loans in line with Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2002).
Moreover, Deloof and La Rocca (2015) test the e¤ect of banking development on
SMEs during the crisis. The authors interact the proxies of nancial development with
year dummies for 2008 and 2009. Empirical ndings suggest that during 2008 trade credit
76Alessandrini et al. (2009) consider that in providences with a better banking developed system, bor-
rower rms have a better access to bank loans. As a result, these rms have a lower demand for trade
credit taken (i.e. accounts payables to total assets ratio).
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extended and taken has experienced a small declined for rms in a more development
banking system. In 2009 there is no statistically signicant e¤ect. According to the
authors, the results suggest that local bank development reduces the impact of the crisis
on trade credit. However, this only occurs in the start of the turmoil period.
4.3 Research design
The main aim of Chapter 4 is to explore the interaction between trade credit and inven-
tories for optimal control. Next, it is presented the theoretical framework and the main
variables used in Chapter 4.
4.3.1 Theoretical framework
The starting point of the empirical analysis is the trade credit model of Giannetti et al.
(2011). The model which is implemented in Chapter 4 extends the one of Giannetti et al.
(2011) to account for the inventory management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009).77
The model assumes that trade credit extended and trade credit taken can be captured
by the same set of independent variables. These variables correspond to the characteristics
of a rm i at time t and a disturbance error term. The models take the following general
form:
Yit = 0 +
kX
k=1
1;kXit + "it (4.1)
Where, rms are represented by subscript i = 1; :::; N; t represents time by t =
1; 2; :::; T . Yit represents trade credit extended or trade credit taken. Xit is the vector
of the explanatory variables. "it is the error term. Overall, trade credit (extended and
taken) is explained as a function of stock of inventories, prots, liquidity, collateral, size,
bank loans and age. These variables are dened in the next sub-section.
4.3.2 Variables denition
Following the literature (Bougheas et al., 2009), the dependent variable trade credit is
dened from a supply and a demand side. Trade credit extended (or trade debit) is
calculated as the ratio of accounts receivables to total sales. This variable is a proxy for
the suppliers willingness to extend trade credit to all customers. Trade credit taken (or
trade credit) is measured as accounts payables to sales ratio. This variable captures the
supply of trade credit to a given rm from all suppliers (Giannetti et al., 2011).
77Guariglia et al. (2015) also follows Giannetti et al. (2011) and include stock of inventories to test the
impact of stock of inventories on trade credit extended.
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In terms of the explanatory variables, the main variable of interest is the stock of inven-
tories. It is calculated as rmstotal stock of inventories. Previous studies nd a negative
relation between the stock of inventories and trade credit extended (Giannetti et al., 2011;
Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). This is consistent with the inventory management motive
of Bougheas et al. (2009). Producers which face an uncertainty for the demand of their
products prefer to extend trade credit to their nancially constrained customers to increase
their sales instead of accumulating costly inventories. Conversely, Bougheas et al. (2009)
nd that the cost of holding inventories does not have an impact on trade credit taken.
In addition to the stock of inventories variable, Chapter 4 also includes a set of controls.
In particular, it is used rmsprot which is dened as rmsprot (or loss) for the period.
It is calculated as the rmsoperating prot (or loss). Previous studies show a positive
relation with trade credit (extended and received). An increase in protability has a
positive e¤ect on both accounts. Suppliers are more likely to o¤er trade credit since this
situation represents an opportunity for potential future cash sales. Extra prot represents
a channel towards accounts receivables (Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). Firms with a
creditworthiness balance sheet are also more likely to receive credit from their suppliers.
In addition, a liquidity variable is considered. It is determined as rms cash and
equivalents. In line with the previous literature (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Bougheas
et al., 2009), the expectation is that liquidity exerts a negative e¤ect on trade credit.
According to Guariglia et al. (2015), less liquid rms extend trade credit to boost its
credit sales. It is preferable to lend credit rather than not selling rmsproducts.
The variable loans is also implemented as a control. It is calculated as short-term
liabilities. Previous literature nds a positive impact of loans on trade credit extended
and a negative e¤ect on trade credit taken (Bougheas et al., 2009). The availability of
bank loans allows rms as suppliers to extend trade credit, and therefore increase their
volume of sales on credit. Conversely, the negative relation between trade credit taken and
bank loans is associated with a credit rationing. If the access to bank loans is constrained,
rms look for other sources of external nance such as trade credit (Petersen and Rajan,
1997).
Furthermore, collateral is calculated as tangible assets. Following the work of Giannetti
et al. (2011) this chapter calculates collateral as tangible assets in total assets. The variable
collateral is used as a proxy for rmsborrowing capacity. Previous studies nd a negative
relation between rms collateral and the trade credit (Giannetti et al., 2011). Firms
with higher asset tangibility have a higher borrowing capacity and a higher probability of
operating in a less dynamic industry with lower growth potential (Guariglia and Mateut,
2016).
It should be noted that all the variables which are described above are scaled by total
sales with the exception of collateral. Moreover, size corresponds to the logarithm of rms
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real assets. Previous studies suggest that larger rms have the ability to extend and receive
more trade credit and have lower inventory holding costs (Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia
and Mateut, 2016). Thus, a positive relation between size and trade credit (accounts
payables and accounts receivables) is expected. Finally, rmsage is calculated as the
di¤erence between the present year and the rmsdate of incorporation. The literature
is not clear regarding the impact on rms age on trade credit (extended and taken).
Giannetti et al. (2011) nd no e¤ect of age on trade credit extended and a negative e¤ect
on trade credit taken. According to Guariglia et al. (2015), the negative e¤ect may be
explained by the lack of nancial exibility which is a characterist of old rms. However,
younger rms tend to have weaker balance sheets and they should not be able to extend
credit to their customers. All Euro variables are adjusted using the GDP deator at the
2005 price level.78
4.4 Model specication
The empirical models are dened in the next sub-sections.
4.4.1 Baseline
The baseline specication extends the model of Giannetti et al. (2011) to account for
the inventory management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009). The aim is to test whether
rms substitute holding costly inventories with higher accounts receivables and accounts
payables. The equations which are estimated take the following form:
TDit= i+1Stockit+2Profitit+3Liqit+
+4Loansit+5Collit + 6Sizeit+7Ageit + it (4.2)
TCit= i+1Stockit+2Profitit+3Liqit+
+4Loansit+5Collit + 6Sizeit+7Ageit + it (4.3)
Where, i is the idiosyncratic error component, i = 1,2,. . . , N indexes rms and t
= 1,2,. . . , T indexes years. TDit and TCit correspond to the dependent variable Trade
debit (trade credit extended) and trade credit (trade credit taken), respectively. Stock
it
is
the total stock of inventories and accounts for the incentives rms face to increase sales.
Profit
it
represents rmsprots (or loss) for the period while Liq
it
denotes rmsgross
78See Table C1 in the Appendix for the summarised data items.
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liquid assets. These two variables capture the nancial condition of the rms. Loans
it
represents short-term liabilities of the rms and it controls for alternative sources of -
nance which may enable rms to extend trade credit while continuing production. Coll
it
represents tangible assets in total assets and captures rmsborrowing capacity. Size
it
is
the logarithm of rmstotal assets which controls for size e¤ects whereas Age
it
represents
the log of rmsage. All these variables are scaled by total sales with the exception of
rmscollateral and size.
The error term it comprises a rm-specic time-invariant component, encompassing
all time-invariant rm characteristics likely to inuence trade credit and the time-invariant
component of the measurement error a¤ecting any of the regression variables. As in Chap-
ter 2, to control for rm-specic time-invariant component of the error term the equation
is estimated in rst-di¤erences. Time specic component is controlled by including time
dummies (in addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all speci-
cation. Country dummies are also included to control for institutional di¤erences between
countries
A negative coe¢ cient (1) on the variable Stockit in equation (4.2) denotes the in-
ventory management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009). Firms prefer to sell their stock
on credit to their customers rather than accumulate costly stock of inventories. In other
words, the expectation is a trade-o¤ between stock of inventories and trade credit ex-
tended. Consistent with the work of Bougheas et al. (2009) it is anticipated that the
variable Stock
it
exerts an insignicant e¤ect on trade credit taken.
4.4.2 Firmsproduct characteristics
Next, it is examined whether the inventory management motive is related with rms
product characteristics. This is based on the work of Giannetti et al. (2011) who follow
the classication of Rauch (1999).79 A dummy variable Diff i is used. It takes the value
of 1 if rms are in the di¤erentiated sector, and 0 otherwise. To test whether the inventory
management motive di¤ers across rmsproducing di¤erentiated and standardised prod-
ucts, the variable stock of inventories (Stock
it
) is interacted with Diff i and (1 Diff i)
terms. Equation (4.2) and equation (4.3) are re-formulated as follows:
TDit=i+1Stockit Diff i+2Stockit  (1 Diff i) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.4)
79See Table C2 in the Appendix C for the assigning of the US 2003 SIC codes for the two sectors.
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TCit=i+1StockitDiffit + 2Stockit  (1 Diff i) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.5)
This test is motivated by the diversion value hypothesis in Giannetti et al. (2011).
Suppliers of trade credit have an advantage relative to banks in nancing their customers
since repossessed goods are worth more to suppliers rather than to banks. This advantage
is stronger for rms in the di¤erentiated industries than for those in the standardised
sector. Firms in the former industries produce more specic products and the seller-buyer
relation is closer than in the latter (Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). Hence, it is expected that
the trade-o¤between inventories and trade credit extended to be negative and signicantly
higher for rms in the di¤erentiated sector than for those in the standardised one (j1j >
j2j). Finally, trade credit taken should remain una¤ected as in Bougheas et al. (2009).
4.4.3 The di¤erentiated e¤ect of rm size
In addition, Chapter 4 also explores whether the trade-o¤ between stock of inventories
and trade credit is di¤erent across all type of rms. To do so, rms size is used as
a sorting device. This is based on the nancial constraints literature (Guariglia, 2008;
Spaliara, 2009). Small rms are normally associated with a higher degree of information
asymmetry and are more vulnerable to capital markets imperfections. This means that
they are more likely to be nancially constraints. Therefore, small rms should have higher
costs of storing goods and should sell more on credit when their stock of inventories are
high (Bougheas et al., 2009).
Using the same criteria as in Chapter 2, sub-section 2.4.4, a dummy variable Smallit is
employed. It takes the value of 1, if rmsreal assets are in the bottom 50% distribution
of rms. Equation (4.2) and equation (4.3) are re-estimated as follows:
TDit=i+1Stockit  Smallit+2Stockit  (1  Smallit) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.6)
TCit=i+1StockitSmallit + 2Stockit  (1  Smallit) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.7)
Both specications capture the e¤ect of rms size on the inverse relation between
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stock of inventories and trade credit (extended and taken). It is expected that changes in
inventories exert a higher impact on trade credit extended for smaller rms than for their
larger counterparts (j1j > j2j). This means that smaller rms are more likely to have
higher costs of storing goods. If so, they sell more of their stock on credit to increase their
sales and meet their nancial obligations. Once more it is anticipated that the trade-o¤
between inventories and trade credit taken remains statistically insignicant.
4.4.4 Trade credit, rm size and product characteristics
It is also investigated the extent to which the inventory management motive di¤ers across
small and large rms, controlling for the characteristics of the goods which are traded. To
explore this hypothesis, equation (4.4) and equation (4.5) are augmented with interaction
terms of the Diff i dummy. The equations take the following form:
TDit=i+1Stockit  SmallitDiff i+2Stockit  Smallit  (1 Diffi)+
+ 3Stockit(1  Smallit) Diff i+4Stockit(1  Smallit) Diff i+3Profitit
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.8)
TCit=i+1Stockit  SmallitDiff i+2Stockit  Smallit  (1 Diffi)+
+ 3Stockit(1  Smallit) Diff i+4Stockit(1  Smallit) Diff i+3Profitit
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.9)
It is expected that smaller rms in the di¤erentiated industries to extend more trade
credit than smaller rms in the standardized sectors. This is based on the argument
that smaller rms are more likely to have higher storing costs of holding stocks than
their larger counterparts (Bougheas et al., 2009) and that rms with larger proportions of
di¤erentiated goods inputs extend more trade credit (Giannetti et al., 2011).
4.4.5 Financial crisis
Until now the trade-o¤ between stock of inventories and trade credit is considered for
the whole sample. To account for the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis, a crisis dummy
(Crisist) is considered. It takes the value of 1 over the period 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise.
The aim is to investigate whether the crisis magnies the inverse relation between the
volume of stock of inventories and the amount sold on credit. Equation (4.2) and Equation
(4.3) are re-estimated with the stock of inventories variable interacted with the Crisist
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and the (1  Crisist) terms. The models take the following form:
TDit=i+1Stockit  Crisist + 2Stockit(1  Crisist) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.10)
TCit=i+1Stockit  Crisist + 2Stockit(1  Crisist) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.11)
This test is motivated by the nancial-accelerator theory according to which periods of
monetary contraction increase the costs of nance, weakening rmsbalance sheet positions
(Bernanke et al., 1996). Previous literature on trade credit also refers that deteriorations
in economic conditions lead to an increase of both accounts payables and receivables of
rms (Choi and Kim, 2005; Love et al., 2007). Thus, in Chapter 4 it is argued that during
this period, producers face a much higher uncertain demand for their products and have
a higher need to obtain liquidity. The magnitude of the inventory management motive is
expected to be higher during the turmoil period than in the non-crisis period (j1j > j2j).
4.4.6 Financial development
Finally, it is considered the e¤ect of nancial development on the inventory management
motive. The aim is to test whether country-level nancial development mitigates the
impact of the inventory management motive. To test this hypothesis, the models in equa-
tion (4.2) and equation (4.3) are augmented with a nancial development term (FDt)
and an interaction term between nancial development and stock of inventories variable
(Stock
it
 FDt). The nancial development term denotes the vector of nancial develop-
ment measures.
To ensure the robustness of the results, three di¤erent indicators of nancial interme-
diary development are used. Following the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009;
Beck et al., 2010a), the overall development of the banking system is rst considered.
It measures the extent to which new rms have opportunities to acquire bank nancing
(Baltagi, 2013). The overall development of the banking system is dened in two ways:
the rst is based on the ratio of private bank credit to GDP, and the second is the ratio
of private bank credit and other institutions to GDP. Finally, the ratio of deposit-money
bank assets to GDP (i.e. bank assets to GDP) is implemented. It measures the overall
size of the banking sector (King and Levine, 1993). The following specication models are
estimated:
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TDit=i+1Stockit+2Stockit  FDt + 3FDt + 4Profitit ++5Liqit+6Loansit+
+7Collit + 8Sizeit+9Ageit + it (4.12)
TCit=i+1Stockit+2Stockit  FDt + 3FDt + 4Profitit++ 5Liqit+6Loansit+
+7Collit + 8Sizeit+9Ageit + it (4.13)
The motivation for this specication stems from two important considerations. First,
it is argued that nancial development helps improve rmsaccess to lower cost of external
nance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This means that a bank-based system is superior in
nancing transactions which would otherwise nance through trade credit (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 2002). Secondly, in the euro area banks have dominated the nancial
markets (Bijlsma and Zwart, 2013). Hence, a large and e¢ cient banking system should
mitigate the need of rms to sell their stock on credit. Firms in a nancial development
system face lower levels of uncertainty since they are able to obtain more credit through
banks.
The estimation results should be interpreted as follows: the coe¢ cient on the stock of
inventories variable (1) refers to the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit when
nancial development is not taken into account. The indirect e¤ect of nancial develop-
ment on the inventory management motive is given by the coe¢ cient on the interaction
variable (2). The overall e¤ect of nancial development is given by 1+2. It is expected
that the inverse relation between inventories and trade credit to would be lower for rms
in a development banking system than for their non-development counterparts.
Finally, the coe¢ cient of the nancial development variable (3) should be positive
and statistically signicant in line with the complementary view of trade credit. The use
of trade credit by rms is higher in countries characterised with a larger banking sector
(Deloof and La Rocca, 2015).
4.4.7 Robustness check: Financial development and product characteristics
In addition, it is explored whether the impact of nancial development on the inventory
management motive is linked with the characteristics of the inputs which are purchased.
To do so, the sample of rms is divided into those producing di¤erentiated and standard-
ized products based on the dummy variable Diff i which is dened in sub-section 4.4.2.
Equation (4.12) and equation (4.13) are re-estimated.
It is expected that the relation between stock of inventories and the amount sold on
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credit to be higher for rms in the di¤erentiated sector than in the standardised industries.
This is once more based on the assumption that rms from sectors producing di¤erentiating
products have a higher advantage in nancing their customers as a repossessed good is
worth more to suppliers than to banks (Giannetti et al., 2011).
4.4.8 Robustness check: SMEs and non-SMEs
Previous studies have shown that trade credit is an important source of external nance
for SMEs (Casey and OToole, 2014; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). However, this literature
is silence on the role of stock of inventories on trade credit. To test for this hypothesis, a
dummy SMEit is interacted with the variable stock of inventories (Stockit).
80 Equation
(4.2) and equation (4.3) are extended as follows:
TDit=i+1Stockit  SMEit+2Stockit  (1  SMEit) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.14)
TCit=i+1StockitSMEit + 2Stockit  (1  SMEit) + 3Profitit+
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.15)
This hypothesis is motivated by the argument that SMEs are considered to su¤er
from higher levels of information asymmetry and higher costs of borrowing than non-
SMEs (Darvas, 2013). It is expected that the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade
credit extended to have a higher impact on SMEs than for non-SMEs. The former are
considered to be more vulnerable to capital market imperfections, and therefore, their
costs of holding inventories should be higher. Once more the relation between trade credit
taken and inventories should not be statistically signicant.
Finally, this section also relates SMEs/non-SMEs to product characteristics. Equation
(4.14) and (4.15) are re-estimated by considering the characteristics of traded products.
The equations are modied as follows:
TDit=i+1Stockit  SMEitDiff i+2Stockit  SMEit  (1 Diffi)+
+ 3Stockit(1  SMEit) Diff i+4Stockit(1  SMEit) Diff i+3Profitit
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.16)
80See sub-section 2.4.10 for details on the denition of variable SMEit.
158
TCit=i+1Stockit  SMEitDiff i+2Stockit  SMEit  (1 Diffi)+
+ 3Stockit(1  SMEit) Diff i+4Stockit(1  SMEit) Diff i+3Profitit
+4Liqit+5Loansit+6Collit + 7Sizeit+8Ageit + it (4.17)
Following the argument in sub-section 4.4.2, it is expected that SMEs in the di¤eren-
tiated sector extend more credit than SMEs in the standardized sector. The interaction
terms should also have no e¤ect on the ratio of accounts payables to sales ratio.
4.4.9 Robustness checks: Alternative cut-o¤ point
In the main specication models the 50th percentile is employed as a cut-o¤point to dene
small and large rms. To ensure that the results are not driven from the way the sample
is split, the 75% percentile is used as an alternative cut-o¤ point. In this case, small rms
are classied as those with total assets below the 75% of the distribution of the assets of
all the rms in that particular industry and year, and 0 otherwise. Equation (4.6) and
equation (4.7) are re-estimated. The expectation is that the empirical ndings remain
robust to the previous splitting criteria.
4.5 Estimation methodology
To control for both endogeneity of the regressors as well as unobserved heterogeneity
problems, this chapter implements the system GMM estimator. In line with the previous
studies (Chen and Guariglia, 2013), all regressors (with the exception of age) are treated as
endogenous. In order to evaluate whether the instruments are valid and the specication
models are correctly specied the Sargan and m(n) test are used. In summary, in this
chapter three (and deeper) lags of the regressors are used as instruments. It is also reported
the m3 test for third order serial correlation of the di¤erenced residuals in tables.
4.6 Data
This section is divided in 3 parts. The rst describes the main sources for the database
which is used to test the relation between trade credit and inventories. Data construction
and the description statistics are provided in last sub-sections.
4.6.1 Data collection
The main dataset which is used is the Amadeus database as in Chapter 2. Firm-level ac-
counting data continues to cover the period between 2003 and 2011. However, in Chapter
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4 information on annual accounting reports comprises the following 12 euro area coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Following the steps of Chapter 2, rms with unconsol-
idated accounts are eliminated ensuring that the majority of the rms in the dataset are
small. In fact, the vast majority (95%) of the rms included in the dataset are not traded
in the stock market. Consistent with the previous chapters, Chapter 4 follows the work
of Blundell and Bond (1998) and considers all manufacturing rms based on a 2-digital
NACE rev. classication.81
To account for the characteristics of the transacted goods, this chapter follows the
work of Giannetti et al. (2011). The author use the product classi¢ cation of Rauch
(1999) to distinguish between standardized goods and di¤erentiated goods. Table C.2 in
the Appendix C provides information on the assignment of U.S. SIC codes to the inputs
characteristics. This information is also taken from Amadeus database.
Data on nancial development is obtained from the World Development Indicators
(WDI, November 2013) as it is described in Beck et al. (2003). Finally, the GDP deator
is collected from the World Bank dataset.
4.6.2 Sample selection process
Following the same criteria as in the previous chapters, negative sales and assets are
dropped. To control for outliers observations are excluded in the 1% tail for each of the
regression variables. Firms with less than 3-years of observations are also dropped from
the sample. The nal panel which is unbalanced covers 136,489 rms (corresponding
to 822,488 observations) which operate in the manufacturing sector. Specically, it in-
cludes 3,499 rms from Austria (corresponding to 18,741 observations), 3,604 rms from
Belgium (corresponding to 24,416), 2,267 rms from Finland (corresponding to 14,398 ob-
servations), 20,874 rms from France (corresponding to 137,176 observations), 33,036 from
Germany (corresponding to 175,977), 1,819 from Greece (corresponding to 11,204 obser-
vations), 755 rms from Ireland (corresponding to 4,847 observations), 41,495 rms from
Italy (corresponding to 250,272 observations), 138 rms from Luxembourg (corresponding
to 758 observations), 5,190 rms from Netherlands (corresponding to 36,947 observations),
5,056 rms from Portugal (corresponding to 32,010 observations), 18,756 rms from Spain
(corresponding to 115,724 observations).82
81See sub-section 2.6.2 for details on the assigning of rms based on the industrial sectors.
82In Appendix C, see C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6 for the number of rms per country, number of observations
per country, the number of observations per year and the total structure of the panel, respectively.
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4.6.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 provides statistics for the sample during the 2003-2011 period. It includes in-
formation on number of observations, means, standard deviations and percentiles (i.e.
25th percentile, 50th percentile and 75th percentile). Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the
aforementioned statistics for rms producing di¤erentiated/standardised products and
crisis/non-crisis periods, respectively. The P-values of a test for the equality of means
is also provided in both tables. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 illustrate the average provision
and receipt of trade credit for the overall sample.
Column 1 of Table 4.1 indicates that the information that it is possible to make the
most use of is on the age and collateral variables. In fact, Chapter 4 provides 911,404
and 901,645 rm-level observations for age and collateral during the 2003-2011 period,
respectively. Conversely, for loans and size the number of observations is smaller than for
any other variables (i.e. 464,483 and 348,823 respectively).
Table 4.1 shows that the average accounts receivable to sales ratio for rms in the
sample is 26.7%. The ratio for a median rm is approximately 24.5%, with substantial
variation across the distribution; a rm at the 25th percentile has an average trade credit
extended of 15.1% comparing with a rm at the 75th percentile which has an average of
34.3%. This is similar to the ratio for a sample of French manufacturing rms (21.2%)
in Mateut et al. (2015) but much higher when comparing with the previous studies on
U.K. and China. (Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia and Mateut, 2016).83 On average, the
trade credit taken for the sample of rms is approximately 17.8% with a median of 15.6%.
These gures are consistent with those from the earlier study of Bougheas et al. (2009).
The main variable of interest in the analysis, stock of inventories, has a mean (median) of
14.0% (10.6%) with a standard deviation of 13.3%. The 25th and 75th percentile of this
variable indicate that there is some variability in the distribution of this variable across
the sample period. Turning to the control variables both prot and liquidity have similar
patterns. The average rm presents a prot (liquidity) level of 3.6% (7.9%) with the 25th
percentile below the median and closer to zero. Loans account for 11.0% (mean) or 6.2%
(median). The fact that the mean is much larger than the median may suggest that there
a small number of rms which have a large number of laons when comparing with other
rms. The size variable suggest that rmssize is skewed to the left. Finally, collateral
(age) is skewed to the right (left).
Table 4.2 indicates that the number of observations in the dataset is higher for rms in
the standardised industry than in the di¤erentiated one. Table 4.2 also shows a striking
di¤erence in the ratio of accounts receivables to sales (TD). Firms producing di¤erentiated
83Bougheas et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Mateut (2016) found an average accounts receivables to
sales ratio of 17.0% and 17.2%. This discrepancy is probably explained by the di¤erent sample period
which is used. These studies employ data for the 1993-2003 period and the 2000-2007 period, respectively.
Chapter 4 uses a sample of rms for the period between 2003 and 2011.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics: Full sample
Full sample
Obs. Mean St. dev 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TD (Trade debit) 644,250 0.267 0.178 0.151 0.245 0.343
TC (Trade credit) 551,830 0.178 0.117 0.094 0.156 0.228
Stock (Inv. stock) 792,464 0.140 0.133 0.052 0.106 0.188
Prot (Prots) 693,310 0.036 0.040 0.006 0.021 0.049
Liq (liquidity) 804,495 0.079 0.106 0.007 0.036 0.106
Loans (loans) 464,483 0.110 0.127 0.017 0.062 0.169
Coll (collateral) 901,645 0.273 0.137 0.073 0.171 0.325
Size (size) 348,823 7.088 1.206 6.955 7.683 8.521
Age (log age) 911,404 3.148 0.602 2.708 3.178 3.526
Notes: This table presents the number of observations, sample means, standard deviations, the 25th percentile, the median
and the 75th percentile for the all sample (column 1 to 6), respectively. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denition
of the variables.
products on average sell more on credit than rms in the standardized sector (i.e. 31.2%
against 18.2%). The ratio for a median rm in the di¤erentiated (standardised) sector is
23.3% (16.2%). However, rms at the 75th percentile of the distribution of trade credit ex-
tended have an average of 35.5% in the di¤erentiated sector and 33.3% in the standardised
industry. Once more it should be taken into account that the number of observations for
rms in the standardised sector are higher than for those in the di¤erentiated one. These
ndings are consistent with Giannetti et al. (2011) and Guariglia and Mateut (2016).
By contrast, trade credit taken (TC ) does not di¤er much across di¤erentiated and
standardized sectors. In e¤ect, the ratio for a median rm in the di¤erentiated (standard-
ised) sector is approximately 22.1% (11.8%), with a small variation across the distribution.
At the 25th percentile a rm in a di¤erentiated (standardised) industry shows an average
trade credit taken of 9.6% (9.5%) whereas a rm at the 75th percentile displays an average
of 23.6% (23.2%). This is an expected result since the uptake of trade credit depends on
the characteristics of the products which are used such as the proportion of di¤erentiated
products versus standardized products (Mateut et al., 2015).
Another important di¤erence which is documented in Table 4.2 is that di¤erentiated
goods manufacturers have higher levels of inventories (relative to sales). In fact, when
considering the percentiles distribution of this variable it is clear that di¤erentiated rms
have experienced highest levels of stock of inventories at the median and 75th percentile
when comparing with rms in the standardised industries at the 50th and 75th percentile.
Hence, the statistics suggest that rms which produce di¤erentiated products at the top
of the distribution have a higher stock of inventories.
Moreover, di¤erentiated goods manufacturers are younger and make a higher use of
bank loans relative to sales with the distribution of the being skewed to the right for both
di¤erentiated and standardised samples. This is in line with previous studies (Giannetti
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et al., 2011). The prot in the sample is higher (lower) for rms in the standardised
(di¤erentiated) industry with a mean and a median of 3.1% (4.6%), and the 25th and
the 75th percentile of 0.7% (0.8%) and 4.9% (5.1%), respectively. A similar pattern is
observed for liquidity and collateral. Finally, rms in the di¤erentiated sector are larger
than those in the standardised one with a small variation across the distribution of rm
size. The di¤erences between sub-samples are statistically signicant in all cases (column
13).
Moving to Table 4.3, it is also clear that when the sample is split into crisis and
non-crisis period that the number of observations is much higher outside of the crisis
period thant during the turmoil. Starting with row 1 and row 2, the statistics show
that the average trade credit extended and trade credit taken is lower during the crisis.
Although the di¤erence in the trade credit extended between the two periods is statistically
signicant, it is not actually large. The ratio for a median rm in the crisis (non-crisis)
period is approximately 23.9% (25.3%), with a small variation across the distribution; a
rm at the 25th percentile in the crisis (non-crisis) has an average trade credit extended
of 14.9% (15.8%) comparing with a rm at the 75th percentile which has an average of
33.8% (35.4%). A similar pattern is observed for the trade credit taken.
Furthermore, the average rm during the crisis has 13.8% of inventories (relative to
sales ) and 13.2% outside of the crisis. Once more the discrepancy between the two sub-
samples is not relatively large. When considering the percentiles distribution across the
two sub-periods, it seems that during the crisis rms present a higher levels of stocks at
the median, 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution of this variable. This results
may indicate that during the crisis rmsreduce their inventory stock levels which may
be related to their need to obtain liquidity. The average loans and prot is higher for the
crisis period than outside. It is also clear that across the di¤erent percentiles distribution
of loans and prots the mean values are always higher during the crisis period. However,
the di¤erence between the means is not statistically signicant for loans and for prot at
1% level.
Turning to the other control variables, it seems that liquidity and collateral have similar
patterns. The average rm presents a higher prot (liquidity) outside of the crisis than
during the turmoil period, with the 25th percentile below the median and closer to zero.
The mean average of size is not di¤erent between crisis and non crisis period and this is
also observed when considering the di¤erent percentiles distribution of the variable size.
Finally, the distribution of the age variable may suggests that age is skewed to the left
since the median age of the rm is higher than the mean and it is younger during the crisis
period.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show that all trade credit ratios exhibit very similar patterns
to the abovementioned descriptive statistics on the trade credit extended and taken. A
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slight increase at the beginning of the crisis followed by a sharp decline in subsequent crisis
years. Both statistics are in line with the gures provided by Ferrando and Mulier (2013).
To sum up, these preliminary results suggest that rmsprovision and receipt of trade
credit may be related to the level of inventories, the characteristics of the goods produced
and the nancial crisis. In the next sub-section, it is provided an empirical analysis on
the relation between these variables.
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Figure 4.1: Average trade receivables to total sales ratio for the sample of rms in the
euro area.
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Figure 4.2: Average trade payables to total sales ratio for the sample of rms in the euro
area.
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4.7 Results
4.7.1 The inventory management motive
To begin with, this section sheds light on the role of inventories on trade credit. Few papers
have considered the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit (Bougheas et al., 2009;
Giannetti et al., 2011; Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). Chapter 4 takes one step further and
tests whether there is an inventory management motive using a comparable multi-country
data on euro-area rms. Table 4.4 presents the estimates for equation (4.2) and (4.3).
Starting with column 1, it is clear that stock of inventories (Stock
it
) has a large, neg-
ative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the trade credit extended (TDit). This relation
is not only statistically signicant but also economically important. The magnitude of
change in trade credit extended is of -0.039 when the variable stock takes its average
value for the overall sample period.84 This can be explained under the assumption of the
inventory management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009). In a scenario where demand is
uncertain and the production exceeds sales rmsthe level of inventories increases. Thus,
they prefer to extend more trade credit to obtain more sales and decrease their level of
inventories. In line with this argument, Bougheas et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Mateut
(2016) nd a negative relation between stock of inventories and the provision of trade
credit for U.K. and China, respectively.
Focusing on the other regressors, I nd that all control variables are statistically signif-
icant (with the exception of age) and have the expected sign. For instance, the coe¢ cient
on the prot variable (Profit
it
) is positive indicating that protable rms are more likely
to extend trade credit to their nancially constrained customers. As more external funding
is available, rms extend trade credit to their buyers as it can be seen by the positive sign
on the bank loans variable (Loans
it
). On the other hand, collateral (Coll
it
) and liquidity
(liq
it
) have a negative and signicant e¤ect on trade credit extended. Firms with a higher
level of asset tangibility are more likely to extend less trade credit since they operate in a
less dynamic industry with a lower growth potential (Hovakimian, 2009).
Results in column 2 suggest that there is no trade-o¤ between inventories and trade
credit taken. The coe¢ cient on the stock of inventories is statistically insignicant. This is
consistent with the previous work of Bougheas et al. (2009). Finally, the diagnostic tests do
not indicate signicant problems with the choice of the instruments and the specication
of the model.
84The magnitude of the change in the accounts receivables to sales ratio is given by the coe¢ cient
associated with the stock variable multiplied by the mean value of stock during the 2003-2011 period.
This is calculated as follows: -0.283*0.140=-0.039.
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Table 4.4: Trade credit extended and taken
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
-0.283*** 0.041
(-3.89) (0.65)
Prot
it
0.426* -0.126
(1.94) (-0.78)
Liq
it
-0.283* -0.053
(-2.06) (-1.42)
Loans
it
0.574*** 0.120
(9.04) (1.00)
Coll
it
-0.369*** 0.009
(-4.78) (0.21)
Size
it
0.021*** -0.001
(3.87) (-0.16)
Age
it
0.003 -0.024***
(0.70) (-5.23)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.020 0.862
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.043 0.437
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of
over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the
sargan test equal to 14 in column 1 and 12 in column 2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the
rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the
Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
4.7.2 The nature of the transacted good
Next, it is investigated whether rms with di¤erent product characteristics exhibit di¤erent
e¤ects of stock of inventories on their trade credit (extended and taken). Table 4.5 presents
the estimates for equation (4.4) and equation (4.5) as well as the test for equality of the
coe¢ cients.
Starting with column 1, it is clear that the strength of the relation between trade credit
extended and the stock of inventories varies with the characteristics of the traded products.
The empirical ndings suggest that the inverse relation between the volume of stocks of
inventories and the amount sold on credit is stronger for rms producing di¤erentiated
goods than for their standardized counterparts. This can be explained under the diversion
theory in Giannetti et al. (2011). Firms in the di¤erentiated sector produce products which
are more specic to the needs of the their customers. Thus, the seller-buyer relation is
closer than in the standardized industries. The P-value for the equality of the coe¢ cients
indicates a statistically signicant di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients. The results also
reinforce the economic importance of the inventory management motive: the magnitude
of the change in trade credit extended when stock of inventories takes its average value
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Table 4.5: Firmsproduct characteristics
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Di¤i -0.407*** -0.849
(-3.66) (-0.98)
Stock
it
*(1-Di¤i) -0.149* -0.006
(-1.66) (-0.02)
Prot
it
0.045 0.213
(0.19) (0.55)
Liq
it
-0.036 0.488*
(-0.30) (1.74)
Loans
it
0.528*** -0.287**
(8.32) (-1.96)
Coll
it
-0.280*** -0.113
(-5.07) (-1.16)
Size
it
0.016*** 0.003
(3.31) (0.41)
Age
it
0.001 -0.014*
(0.23) (-1.89)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.503 0.182
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.064 0.425
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock di¤ vs non-di¤ 0.073 0.455
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation, with
degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 17 in column 1 and 9 in column 2. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the
denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
for di¤erentiated and standardized products is -0.063 and -0.018, respectively.85 This is
consistent with Guariglia and Mateut (2016) for a sample of Chinese rms.
Moving to column 2 of Table 4.5, empirical ndings suggest that independently of the
characteristics of the goods which are transacted, the trade-o¤between stock of inventories
and trade credit taken remains statistically insignicant. Finally, the Sargan test shows
once more that the model is not misspecied and the m3 indicates that the instruments
are valid.
4.7.3 The impact of rmssize
It is tested also whether all type of rms are equally a¤ected by the trade-o¤ between
stock of inventories and the provision/uptake of trade credit. Following previous literature
(Bougheas et al., 2009), the focus is on the e¤ect of rmssize. Empirical ndings for
85In row 1, the magnitude of the change is measured as the coe¢ cient associated with the stock variable
multiplied by the mean value of stock in the di¤erentiated sector (-0.407*0.154=-0.063)
In row 2, the magnitude of the change is obtained by multiplying the coe¢ cient of the stock variable
with the mean value of stock in the standardized sector (-0.149*0.123=-0.018).
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equation (4.6) and equation (4.7) are shown in Table 4.6.
Column 1 of Table 4.6 show the interactions between stock of inventories and the size
terms. The inventory management motive is higher for smaller rms than for their larger
counterparts. Stock of inventories play a greater (lesser) role on trade credit extended
for smaller (larger) rms. This is consistent with the literature on nancial constraints
(Guariglia, 2008; Spaliara, 2009) according to which small rms su¤er from higher levels
of information asymmetry and nd it more di¢ cult to access external capital markets.
More importantly, empirical ndings provide evidence that smaller rms have higher
costs of storing goods and provide credit to decrease their storage goods. Once more, for
both interactions the coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from each other. To see the
economic magnitude, both coe¢ cients on the interaction terms should be consider. The
magnitude of the change in the provision of trade credit when stock of inventories takes
its average value for small and large rms is -0.081 and -0.022, respectively.86 Clearly,
the inventory management motive is much higher for smaller rms than for their larger
counterparts. Results are consistent with the ndings of Bougheas et al. (2009) for a
sample of U.K. rms.
In column 2 of Table 4.6, results remain largely una¤ected for all type of rms. There
is no trade-o¤ between stock of inventories and trade credit taken. This is in line with the
work of Bougheas et al. (2009) for a sample of U.K. rms.
86In row 1, the magnitude of the change is calculated as the coe¢ cient of the stock variable multiplied
by the mean value of stock for small rms (-0.689*0.118=-0.081).
In row 2, the magnitude of the change is obtained by multiplying the coe¢ cient of the stock variable
with the mean value of stock of large rms(1-Small
it
). This value is obtained as:-0.139*0.163=-0.022.
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Table 4.6: The e¤ect of rmssize
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Small
it
-0.689*** -0.119
(-3.88) (-0.94)
Stock
it
*(1-Small
it
) -0.139** 0.053
(-2.04) (0.78)
Prot
it
0.529** -0.110
(2.34) (-0.66)
Liq
it
-0.399*** -0.009
(-2.70) (-0.09)
Loans
it
0.527*** 0.219
(8.11) (1.61)
Coll
it
-0.415*** 0.014
(-5.13) (0.81)
Size
it
-0.005 -0.010
(-0.54) (-1.22)
Age
it
0.006 -0.023***
(1.46) (-5.68)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.077 0.932
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.063 0.248
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock small vs. non-small 0.003 0.181
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 16 in column 1 and 12 in column 2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.7.4 The e¤ect of size and product characteristics
Results for equation (4.8) and equation (4.9) are shown in Table 4.7. In it, it is ex-
plored whether changes in the stock of inventories have a di¤erent impact on trade credit
(extended and taken) of small/large rms in the di¤erentiated and standardized sectors.
Focusing on column 1 rows 1 and 2, empirical ndings show that the variable stock of in-
ventories exhibits a much larger coe¢ cient for smaller rms which produce di¤erentiated
products. The di¤erences in the coe¢ cients on the stock of inventories for small rms in
the di¤erentiated/standardised sectors are statistically signicant.
When comparing rows 3 and 4, results indicate that the estimate coe¢ cient on the stock
of inventories variable is negative and only signicant for larger rms in the di¤erentiated
sector.
Overall results show that rms which are in the di¤erentiated sector, especially small
rms sell more on credit when stock of inventories are high. For instance, the economic
impact of stock of inventories across small and large rms in the di¤erentiated sector is
clear: in the di¤erentiated sector, the magnitude of the change in trade credit when stock
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Table 4.7: Firmssize and product characteristics
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Small
it
*Di¤
i
-0.691*** -0.656
(-3.28) (-1.42)
Stock
it
*Small
it
*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.209* 0.080
(-1.79) (0.28)
Stock
it
*(1- Small
it
)*Di¤
i
-0.277** 0.267
(-2.31) (0.95)
Stock
it
*(1- Small
it
)*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.160 0.090
(-1.45) (0.81)
Prot
it
-0.536 0.171
(-1.08) (0.44)
Liq
it
-0.762*** 0.135***
(-4.62) (2.26)
Loans
it
0.366*** -0.527***
(4.60) (-3.50)
Coll
it
-0.469*** -0.099*
(-6.39) (-1.66)
Size
it
0.005 -0.014
(0.32) (-0.82)
Age
it
0.014** -0.020***
(2.12) (-3.86)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.029 0.179
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.343 0.304
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock small di¤ vs non-small di¤ 0.031 0.160
Stock small di¤ vs small non-di¤ 0.032 0.115
Stock small non-di¤ vs stock non-small non-di¤ 0.691 0.973
Stock non-small di¤ vs stock non-small non-di¤ 0.247 0.571
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 24 in column 1 and 9 in column 2.. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
of inventories has its average value for small (large) rms is -0.094 (-0.049).87 The P-values
of the test of the di¤erences in the coe¢ cients are once again statistically signicant.
Finally, column 2 of Table 4.7 shows that trade credit taken is once more not inuenced
by the inventory management cost theory. Overall, empirical ndings suggest that the
e¤ect of inventories on the trade credit extended depends on the size and the characteristics
of the goods which are transacted.
87In row 1, the magnitude of the change is calculated as the coe¢ cient of the stock variable multiplied
by the mean value of stock for small rms in the di¤erentiated sector (-0.691*0.135=-0.094).
In row 3, the magnitude of the change is obtained by multiplying the coe¢ cient of the stock variable
with the mean value of stock of large rms(1-Small
it
) in the di¤erentiated sector. This value is obtained
as:-0.277*0.178=-0.049.
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4.7.5 The impact of the crisis
Having established that the variable stock of inventories has a direct negative e¤ect on
trade credit extended, the next focus is on the implications of the crisis. Table 4.8 presents
the estimates for equation (4.10) and equation (4.11), respectively. In the rst two rows, it
is reported the impact of stock of inventories on trade credit extended during and outside
of the crisis periods.
Table 4.8: The nancial crisis
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Crisist -0.405*** 0.032
(-6.41) (0.18)
Stock
it
*(1-Crisist) -0.285*** 0.042
(-4.92) (0.60)
Prot
it
-0.711 -0.126
(-1.29) (-0.79)
Liq
it
-0.260 -0.126
(-1.49) (-0.79)
Loans
it
-0.186 0.120
(-0.37) (1.00)
Coll
it
-0.250 0.009
(-0.70) (0.21)
Size
it
0.075*** -0.001
(3.60) (-0.15)
Age
it
-0.014 -0.024***
(-1.29) (-5.19)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.012 0.809
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.176 0.480
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock Crisis vs non-Crisis 0.000 0.958
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisist refers to the Crisis period between 2007 and
2009.The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry,
time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except
age and crisis) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under
the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 5 in column 1 and 11 in column 2. m1
(m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1)
under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Starting with column 1 of Table 4.8, results show that the inverse relation between
stock of inventories and trade credit extended increases signicantly during periods of
tight monetary policy when comparing with the trade-o¤outside of the crisis. This nding
reinforces the idea that during the crisis, rms face a higher demand uncertainty and
therefore, they prefer to sell their stock on credit to boost their sales and decrease their
costs of holding stock. This can be explained in the light of the nancial accelerator
theory. Bad economic conditions increase the cost of nance of rms, deteriorating its
balance sheet positions (Vermeulen, 2002).
To assess the economic importance of the nancial crisis let us focus on the coe¢ cients
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on the interaction terms (Stock
it
 Crisist and Stockit(1  Crisist)). The magnitude of
the change in trade credit when stock of inventories takes its average value for crisis and
non-crisis period is -0.056 and -0.040, respectively.88 In other words, the overall trade-o¤
between inventories and trade credit extended is much higher during the turmoil period
than outside. The magnitude of the response is greatly di¤erent. The p-value for the
di¤erences between the two coe¢ cients is statistically signicant. Finally, column 2 of
Table 4.6 shows that there is no trade-o¤ between stock of inventories and trade credit
taken even when the nancial crisis is considered.
4.7.6 The e¤ect of nancial development
Finally, it is tested whether the link between stock of inventories and trade credit (extended
and taken) is inuenced by the development of the banking system in terms of liquidity
and size. Empirical ndings for equation (4.12) and equation (4.13) are provided in Table
4.9 and Table 4.10, respectively.
Results in Table 4.9 show that the inverse relation between trade credit extended and
stock of inventories remains negative and statistically signicant. When considering the
interaction term (Stock
it
 FDt), it is clear that the coe¢ cient also captures the indirect
e¤ect of nancial development on the inventory management motive. More importantly,
the stock of inventory-nancial development interaction has a lower impact on the trade
credit extended.
To ascertain the overall economic e¤ect, I consider for example the coe¢ cients on the
stock variable (Stock
it
) and the interaction term (Stock
it
 FDt), as shown in row 1 and
2 of column 1. Moving from the 25th percentile of the distribution of private bank credit
to the 50th percentile and given the mean value of inventories, the trade credit extended
fall more for rms which are located in a more developed banking system.89 Results are
robust to other measures of nancial development (column 2 and column 3).
88In row 1, the magnitude of the change in the trade credit extended during the crisis is given by the
coe¢ cient associated with the stock variable multiplied by the mean value of the stock variable during
the crisis (-0.405*0.138=0.056).
In row 2, the magnitude of the change is provided by the coe¢ cient associated with the stock variable
multiplied by the mean value of stock outside of the turmoil period (-0.285*0.142=-0.040).
89The full magnitude of the change of nancial development on the inventory management motive is
given by the sum of the coe¢ cients associated with the stock variable and the interaction term multiplied
by the overall mean value of stock. To compute the total e¤ect of nancial development, the 25th and
50th percentile are evaluated. This is calculated as follows: (-0.203*0.140)+(-0.101*0.14)*0.936=-0.039;
(-0.203*0.140)+(-0.101*0.140)*1.071=-0.046, where -0.203 and -0.101 are the coe¢ cient on the stock of
inventories variable and the interacted term.
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Table 4.9: Trade credit extended and nancial development
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank & other
(1) (2) (3)
Stock
it
-0.203* -0.142* -0.418***
(-1.69) (-1.81) (-4.44)
Stock
it
*FDt -0.101** -0.079*** -0.053**
(-1.96) (-3.79) (-1.97)
FDt 0.020* 0.115*** 0.076***
(1.68) (7.48) (7.09)
Prot
it
0.929*** -0.706 -0.398
(3.21) (-1.18) (-0.79)
Liq
it
-0.458*** -0.415*** -0.353**
(-3.29) (-2.97) (-2.41)
Loans
it
0.841*** 0.877*** 0.821***
(3.61) (5.66) (5.26)
Coll
it
-0.615*** -0.588*** -0.580***
(-7.42) (-7.28) (-8.28)
Size
it
0.004 0.033*** 0.026***
(0.49) (3.92) (2.74)
Age
it
0.021** 0.001 0.010*
(2.56) (0.21) (1.68)
Observations 364,868 364,868 364,868
Firms 83,700 83,700 83,700
Sargan 0.044 0.010 0.017
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.002 0.018 0.072
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank
to GDP (column 1), deposit money bank assets to GDP (column 2) and private bank credit by deposit money banks and
other nancial institutions to GDP (column 3). The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust
to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included.
Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions,
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 12 in
column 1, 19 in column 2 and 12 in column 3. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Overall, these empirical ndings suggest that a more developed and liquid banking
system mitigates the need of rms to sell their stock on credit. This o¤ers support to the
conjecture which is developed in sub-section 4.4.6. In a more developed banking system
rms prefer not to sell as much of their stock on credit since they are able to cover the costs
of storing goods through external nance. A more developed banking system stimulates
new rm formation and helps small rms to expand by giving them access to external
nance (Beck et al., 2010a). This is a novel result which expands the nding of Bougheas
et al. (2009) and highlights the role of nancial institutions in the euro area.
It is worth emphasizing that the coe¢ cient of the nancial development variable is
positive and statistically signicant across the three di¤erent columns. These ndings are
in line with the previous literature which shows that trade credit extended is a complement
to a countrys nancial institutional development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002;
Cassia and Vismara, 2009).
Finally, Table 4.10 shows that nancial development has no impact on the trade-o¤
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between inventories and trade credit taken. Once more there is no inventory management
motive when trade credit taken is considered.
Table 4.10: Trade credit taken and nancial development
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank & other
(1) (2) (3)
Stock
it
-0.961 0.757 -0.147
(-1.28) (0.94) (-0.54)
Stock
it
*FDt 0.659 -0.777 0.144
(1.11) (-0.90) (0.65)
FDt -0.043 0.062 0.057
(-0.40) (0.29) (0.73)
Prot
it
0.203 -0.115 0.317
(0.88) (-0.43) (1.27)
Liq
it
0.454* -0.180 0.166***
(1.83) (-1.11) (2.66)
Loans
it
-0.215 0.089 -0.310***
(-1.62) (1.26) (-4.04)
Coll
it
-0.132 -0.125 -0.062
(-0.90) (-1.27) (-0.82)
Size
it
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.08) (-0.20) (-0.17)
Age
it
-0.010 -0.023*** -0.020***
(-1.12) (-4.63) (-5.25)
Observations 348,138 348,138 348,138
Firms 75,891 75,891 75,891
Sargan 0.275 0.141 0.074
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.066 0.302 0.720
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank
to GDP (column 1), deposit money bank assets to GDP (column 2) and private bank credit by deposit money banks and
other nancial institutions to GDP (column 3). The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust
to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included.
Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions,
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 9 in
column 1, 9 in column 2 and 8 in column 3. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.7.7 Trade credit and nancial development by sector
As a rst robustness check, in Chapter 4 it is tested whether the e¤ect of nancial de-
velopment on the inventory management motive is linked with the characteristics of the
inputs purchased. Equation (4.2) and equation (4.3) are re-estimated and the sample of
rms is split into those producing di¤erentiated and standardized products. Table 4.11
and Table 4.12 show the results.
Table 4.11 demonstrates that once the sample of rms is divided into di¤erentiated
and standardized industries, the inverse relation between the volume of stock of inventories
and the amount sold on credit remains only signicant for rms producing di¤erentiated
goods. More importantly, when considering the impact of nancial development, the
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trade-o¤ between inventories and trade-credit extended is smaller and only signicant in
the di¤erentiated sector. These results provide evidence that the characteristics of the
goods not only a¤ect the extension of trade credit as it is provided by Giannetti et al.
(2011) but also the sensitivity of trade credit extension to nancial development.
Finally, empirical ndings in Table 4.12 demonstrate once more that the trade-o¤
between inventories and trade credit taken is not signicant even when considering the
natured of the transacted good.
Table 4.11: Trade credit extended, nancial development and product characteristic
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank &other
(1) (2) (3)
Di¤. Stand. Di¤. Stand. Di¤. Stand.
Stock
it
-0.603** -0.194* -0.192** -0.289*** -0.175* -0.430***
(-2.27) (-1.65) (-2.00) (-2.90) (-1.90) (-3.37)
Stock
it
*FDt -0.170* -0.068 -0.086*** -0.041** -0.071** 0.030
(-1.68) (-1.59) (-2.62) (-2.11) (-2.27) (0.73)
FDt 0.044** 0.048*** 0.077*** 0.061** 0.029* 0.107***
(2.22) (5.85) (3.19) (2.05) (1.77) (7.49)
Prot
it
-0.086 -0.595 0.434 0.549 0.653 0.335
(-0.21) (-1.24) (0.60) (0.92) (1.09) (0.62)
Liq
it
0.120 0.321** -0.535** -0.502** -0.253 -0.340**
(0.54) (2.20) (-2.28) (-2.58) (-1.12) (-2.39)
Loans
it
0.005 0.759*** 0.740*** 0.929*** 0.766*** 0.050***
(0.98) (3.30) (3.23) (3.79) (3.43) (8.05)
Coll
it
-0.299* -0.042 -0.457*** -0.756*** -0.436*** -0.641***
(-1.71) (-0.50) (-3.64) (-3.93) (-4.03) (-7.19)
Size
it
-0.030 0.002 0.020* 0.043*** 0.009 0.023***
(-1.38) (0.14) (1.81) (5.14) (0.72) (2.61)
Age
it
0.049** 0.004 0.011 -0.001 0.014 0.010
(2.23) (0.41) (1.24) (-0.09) (1.63) (1.46)
Observations 120,102 244,766 120,102 244,766 120,102 244,766
Firms 27,891 56,038 27,891 56,038 27,891 56,038
Sargan 0.376 0.087 0.139 0.014 0.122 0.322
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.377 0.087 0.431 0.004 0.220 0.005
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Di¤. denotes rms in the di¤erentiated sectors while
Stand. represents rms in the standardized sector. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank to GDP (column 1),
deposit money bank assets to GDP (column 2) and private bank credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions
to GDP (column 3). The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include
all regressors (except age) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-
square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 11 in column 1, 14 in
column 2, 13 in column 3, 12 in column 4, 15 in column 5 and 14 in column 6. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See
Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.12: Trade credit taken, nancial development and product characteristic
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank &other
Di¤. Stand. Di¤. Stand. Di¤. Stand.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock
it
0.157 -0.095 0.130 0.356 -0.343 -0.518
(1.46) (-0.50) (0.56) (1.37) (-1.02) (-1.41)
Stock
it
*FDt -0.016 -0.131 -0.099 -0.259 0.274 0.390
(-0.19) (-0.94) (-0.37) (-0.74) (1.04) (1.31)
FDt -0.006 -0.002 0.024 0.100 -0.026 0.074
(-0.38) (-0.09) (0.34) (1.24) (-0.26) (0.94)
Prot
it
-0.381 -0.558 -0.071 -0.963 0.421 -0.212
(-0.81) (-1.09) (-0.38) (-1.56) (1.07) (-0.73)
Liq
it
0.444*** 0.713*** 0.122 0.268 0.292*** 0.277***
(2.66) (2.67) (1.47) (1.25) (4.63) (3.84)
Loans
it
0.001 -0.384** 0.126* 0.436 -0.045 -0.186**
(0.01) (-2.50) (1.68) (1.55) (-0.36) (-2.04)
Coll
it
0.057 -0.399*** 0.027 0.027 -0.030 -0.020
(0.40) (-3.19) (1.05) (0.56) (-0.28) (-0.24)
Size
it
-0.008 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.014**
(-0.80) (1.14) (1.00) (0.10) (0.45) (2.46)
Age
it
-0.029*** -0.012 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.027***
(-3.17) (-1.46) (-7.86) (-2.78) (-3.70) (-8.58)
Observations 115,146 232,992 115,146 232,992 115,146 232,992
Firms 25,550 50,566 25,550 50,566 25,550 50,566
Sargan 0.017 0.266 0.076 0.011 0.037 0.092
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.415 0.027 0.855 0.034 0.942 0.843
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Di¤. denotes rms in the di¤erentiated sectors while
stand. represents rms in the standardized sector. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank to GDP, deposit money
bank assets to GDP and private bank credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions to GDP. The gures
in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies,
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged
three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 15 in column 1, 9 in column 2, 14 in column 3, 4 in column
4, 12 in column 5 and 14 in column 6. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.7.8 SMEs vs non-SMEs
Chapter 4 takes into account also whether SMEs and non-SMEs respond di¤erently to the
trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit. The estimates for trade credit extended
and taken are reported in Table 4.13 Table 4.14. provides the results for trade credit
separating the sample of rms by di¤erentiated and standardized sectors.
In table 4.13, the relation between trade credit extended and inventories is negative
and statistically signicant for SMEs and non-SMEs. The e¤ect is stronger for SMEs.
The ndings suggest that SMEs su¤er from higher levels of information asymmetry and
have higher holding costs of storing goods than non-SMEs.
Once more that there is no statistically signicant e¤ect of stock of inventories on trade
credit taken when the sample is split into SMEs and non-SMEs (column 2).
Finally, column 1 of Table 4.14 provides evidence that the trade-o¤ between stock of
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inventories and trade credit extended is only signicant for SMEs and non-SMEs in the
di¤erentiated sector. The e¤ect is found to be higher for SMEs. This nding is robust to
the theoretical assumption that in a di¤erentiated sector products are more specic and
the seller-buyer relation is closer(Cuñat, 2007; Giannetti et al., 2011). The inverse relation
between trade credit taken and inventories remains statistically insignicant which is in
line with the expectations (column 2).
Table 4.13: Baseline models for SMEs and non-SMEs
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*SMEs
it
-0.506*** -0.027
(-3.76) (-0.33)
Stock
it
* (1-SMEs
it
) -0.293*** -0.067
(-3.16) (-0.80)
Prot
it
-0.068 0.242
(-0.23) (1.44)
Liq
it
-0.015 0.307
(-0.08) (1.60)
Loans
it
0.562*** -0.193**
(8.42) (-2.25)
Coll
it
-0.341*** -0.060
(-4.79) (-1.10)
Size
it
0.019*** -0.007
(3.14) (-1.10)
Age
it
0.008 -0.016***
(1.58) (-2.76)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.595 0.136
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.166 0.169
F-test of equality (p-value)
Investment SMEs vs non SMEs 0.001 0.325
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 12 in column 1 and 11 in column 2.. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.14: SMEs and non-SMEs and product characteristics
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*SMEs
it
*Di¤
i
-0.379*** -0.084
(-2.63) (-0.80)
Stock
it
*SMEs
it
*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.047 -0.041
(-0.30) (-0.48)
Stock
it
*(1-SMEs
it
)*Di¤
i
-0.196** -0.101
(-2.35) (-1.21)
Stock
it
*(1-SMEs
it
)*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.063 -0.091
(-0.84) (-1.01)
Prot
it
0.216 0.169
(0.80) (1.02)
Liq
it
-0.119 0.369*
(-0.88) (1.93)
Loans
it
0.405*** -0.120
(5.34) (-1.35)
Coll
it
-0.306*** -0.054
(-5.10) (-0.98)
Size
it
-0.008 -0.008
(-0.62) (-1.22)
Age
it
0.015** -0.015***
(2.17) (-2.63)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.461 0.071
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.129 0.132
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock SMEs Di¤ vs non-SMEs Di¤ 0.066 0.760
Stock SMEs Non-Di¤ vs non-SMEs non-di¤ 0.075 0.592
Stock non-SMEs Di¤ vs non-SMEs non-di¤ 0.021 0.922
Stock SMEs Di¤ vs SMEs non-di¤ 0.070 0.807
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 13 in column 1 and 15 in column 2.. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.7.9 Alternative cut-o¤ points
In the main empirical results, the 50th percentile is used as a cut-o¤ value for small and
large rms. To ensure that the results are not driven by the way the sample is divided ,
in Chapter 4 it is also employed the 75th percentile as an alternative cut-o¤ point. Small
rms are classied as those whose total assets are below the median of the distribution of
the assets of all the rms in a particular country, year and industry, and 0 otherwise. The
models which are dened in sub-section 4.4.3 and sub-section 4.4.4 are re-estimated based
on this criteria. Results are reported in Table 4.15 and 4.16.
Empirical ndings are robust to the the previous results. Starting with Table 4.15, it
is clear that smaller rms have a higher sensitivity to the stock of inventories than their
larger counterparts. The inverse relation between stock of inventories and the amount sold
on credit is higher for smaller rms. The coe¢ cient on the stock of inventories variable
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remains insignicant when trade credit taken is considered.
Table 4.15: The e¤ec of rm size (alternative cut-o¤ point)
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Small
it
-0.213*** -0.016
(-3.51) (-0.19)
Stock
it
*(1-Small
it
) -0.112* 0.025
(-1.69) (0.29)
Prot
it
0.641 -0.095
(1.03) (-0.52)
Liq
it
-0.585*** -0.006
(-4.14) (-0.06)
Loans
it
0.446*** 0.250
(5.38) (1.43)
Coll
it
-0.416*** -0.011
(-6.67) (-0.21)
Size
it
-0.003 -0.003
(-0.24) (-0.43)
Age
it
0.015*** -0.022***
(2.68) (-4.03)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.031 0.846
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.061 0.237
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock inventories large vs small 0.077 0.846
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 15 in column 1 and 14 in column 2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Turning to Table 4.16, column 1 demonstrates that the inventory management motive
remains statistically signicant for rms in the di¤erentiated sector and for smaller rms in
the standardized industries. The trade-o¤ e¤ect is higher for smaller rms which produce
di¤erentiated products. Finally, for all type of rms the inverse relation between stocks of
inventories and trade credit taken remains statistically insignicant. Overall, the results
provide evidence that the main empirical ndings are robust to di¤erent cut-o¤ values.
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Table 4.16: Firm size and product characteristics (alternative cut-o¤ point)
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Small
it
*Di¤
i
-0.732*** -0.237
(-3.37) (-1.07)
Stock
it
*Small
it
*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.209* 0.108
(-1.76) (1.01)
Stock
it
*(1- Small
it
)*Di¤
i
-0.300** -0.152
(-2.41) (-1.09)
Stock
it
*(1- Small
i
)*(1-Di¤
i
) -0.174 0.025
(-1.52) (0.12)
Prot
it
0.298 -0.150
(0.41) (-0.46)
Liq
it
-0.944*** 0.142***
(-5.14) (2.59)
Loans
it
0.439*** -0.433***
(4.63) (-4.23)
Coll
it
-0.496*** -0.080
(-6.56) (-1.47)
Size
it
0.003 0.009
(0.17) (0.72)
Age
it
0.018** -0.023***
(2.48) (-4.98)
Observations 364,868 348,138
Firms 83,700 75,891
Sargan 0.277
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.195 0.712
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock small di¤ vs non-small di¤ 0.029 0.711
Stock small di¤ vs small non-di¤ 0.023 0.138
Stock small non-di¤ vs stock non-small non-di¤ 0.778 0.635
Stock non-small di¤ vs stock non-small non-di¤ 0.227 0.403
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 14 in column 1 and 6 in column 2.. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for
the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4.8 Concluding remarks
The literature on trade credit and inventories has mainly considered the response of ac-
counts receivables and accounts payables to changes in the cost of inventories and other
rmsbalance sheet variables. Trade credit can be considered as a substitute and/or a
complement to other sources of external nance (Love and Zaidi, 2010; Casey and OToole,
2014). Bougheas et al. (2009) also refer that there is an inventory management motive
for suppliers to extend trade credit to their nancially constrained customers. The former
prefers to increase their sales rather than accumulate costly inventories stocks. Recently,
Giannetti et al. (2011) also link the relation between trade credit and bank loans to the
characteristics of the goods transacted.
In Chapter 4 it is examined for the rst time the trade-o¤between inventories and trade
credit (extended and taken) for a sample of 12 euro area countries in the di¤erentiated and
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standardized sectors. In other words, this chapter accounts toghether for the assumptions
of Bougheas et al. (2009) and Giannetti et al. (2011). Furthermore, the investigation in
Chapter 4 also takes a di¤erent approach. It tests for the rst time, the role of the nancial
crisis and banking development on the inventory management motive for a comparable
multi-country data.
The empirical ndings are based on rm-level data over the period 2003-2011. They
provide evidence of a trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit extended. The inverse
relation between the volume of stocks of inventories and the amount sold on credit is higher
for smaller rms which produce di¤erentiated products. This is in line with the previous
literature (Giannetti et al., 2011; Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). Furthermore, the inven-
tory management motive is found to be stronger during the recent turmoil period when
comparing with the more tranquil periods. During this period, rmsface higher uncertain
demand for their products. They are more likely to provide credit to their customers to
increase their sales and to avoid holding costly stock of inventories. When considering
the e¤ect of banking development, empirical ndings demonstrate that larger and liquid
banking systems reduce the inverse relation between the volume of stocks of inventories
and the amount sold on credit. These abovementioned empirical ndings remain the same
when the lag of the dependent variable is included in the main specication models.90
In line with the study of Bougheas et al. (2009) results show no trade-o¤between inven-
tories and trade credit taken. Overall, the ndings of Chapter 4 show that to fully explain
the extension of trade credit, the inventory management motive needs to be complemented
by the monetary policy transmission and the nancial development theories.
90Appendix C, sub-section C.7 provide the results for the main empirical models of Chapter 4 when
considering a dynamic specication.
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5 Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Contribution
The scope of this thesis is to investigate the rm-level behaviour in the euro area econ-
omy during the 2003-2011 period. The main focus is on three aspects of rmsnancial
behaviour: rm-level employment and nancial pressure (Chapter 2), cash holdingsdif-
ferences among private and public rms (Chapter 3) and the relation between trade credit
and rmsstock of inventories (Chapter 4). All the aforementioned chapters use a system
GMM estimator. This chapter (Chapter 5) provides the overall conclusion of the thesis
with an emphasis on the main contributions to the literature, potential limitations and
future research extensions.
The rst empirical chapter (Chapter 2) is motivated by the literature on nancial
constraints, employment level and the nancial crisis. The chapter makes three main con-
tributions. Firstly, it explores empirically the relation between nancial pressure on rms
employment decisions by di¤erentiating the impact of interest burden on employment for
non-crisis and crisis periods. The empirical ndings provide evidence that employment is
more sensitive to the changes of rmsservicing debt during the turmoil period. This is also
a signicant result which demonstrates the role of debt-servicing costs on the workforce
level of rms in the euro area, especially during the recent nancial crisis.
Moreover, Chapter 2 also explores the di¤erential e¤ect of interest burden on em-
ployment for periphery and non-periphery countries during and outside crisis periods.
Countries at the periphery of the eurozone are considered as weaker countries (Arghyrou
and Kontonikas, 2012). The results show that nancial pressure exerts a more signicant
impact on employment decisions in the periphery of the euro area during the crisis. Fur-
thermore, this chapter exploits rm-level heterogeneity and classies rms into nancially
constrained and unconstrained using three di¤erent criteria. Empirical ndings show that
only within the periphery group, the sensitivity of employment to nancial pressure is
stronger for nancially fragile rms.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) links the literature on cash holdings with
nancial constraints. Specically, the purpose of this chapter is to provide for the rst
time a systematic analysis on the cash holdings di¤erences of private and public rms
in which 90% are not listed in the stock market. This allows me to contribute to the
on-going debate on the role of nancial constraints on rmsreal activities. Contrary to
previous studies, this chapter shows that private rms hold more cash than their public
counterparts. This is in line with the precautionary motive and the notion that rms
which su¤er from higher levels of nancial constraints (i.e. restricted access to external
markets) should hoard more cash. This is an important result which highlights the role of
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small rms in the euro area.
In addition, Chapter 3 adds value to the literature by considering the role of nancial
pressure (in form of the coverage ratio). Specically, it is explored the extent to which
nancial pressure has an impact on the relative cash holdingsdi¤erences across private
and public rms. Acharya et al. (2012) highlights the role of nancial pressure on cash
holdings. This chapter goes one step further and explores this relation for the cash hold-
ingsdi¤erences across private and public rms. After taking into account the nancial
pressure measure, empirical ndings show that the di¤erences in cash holdings of private
and public rms is of a U-shaped. Finally, the third contribution of this chapter is to
test if both type of rms follow a target cash levels and if so whether they achieve it at
the same speed. The ndings denote that both rms follow a target cash level and that
private rms are slower to achieve it than their public counterparts. Overall, these results
extend those of private and public rms. They demonstrate the behaviour of relatively
small rmscash holdings.
The third and last empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4) is mainly concentrated
on the literature of trade credit and inventories. The rst contribution of Chapter 4 is
to explore the role of stock of inventories on trade credit extended and taken taking into
account the type of goods which are transacted and the role of nancial constraints. The
results indicate that rms reduce their stock of inventories by selling on credit, especially
in the di¤erentiated industries and for nancially constrained (i.e. small) rms.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 evaluates for the rst time the e¤ect of the recent nancial
crisis on the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit. This chapter investigates the
di¤erences in the inventory management motive for crisis and non-crisis periods. Empirical
ndings indicate that the inverse relation between stock of inventories and trade credit
extended is higher during the turmoil period than outside. Chapter 4 also contributes
the literature on trade credit, inventories and nancial development. It is also tested
the impact of nancial development (i.e. banking development) on the trade-o¤ between
inventories and trade credit extended. The results show that nancial development reduces
the inverse relation between the volume of stock of inventories and the amount which is
sold on credit. This is an important result which highlights that a more developed and
liquid banking system mitigates the need of rms to sell their stock on credit. Finally,
inventory stocks do not exert any signicant e¤ect on trade credit taken for any of the
consider aforementioned hypothesis.
5.2 Implications of research
This sub-section accounts for possible policy implications of each of the aforementioned
empirical chapters. The rst empirical chapter (Chapter 2) considers the role of rm-
specic interest payments (i.e. interest burden) in determining rmsemployment. The
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results show that there is a strong negative link between interest burden and rmsem-
ployment, especially for nancially constrained rms in the periphery region during the
crisis. To be specic, the results suggest that higher levels of interest payments, espe-
cially during the turmoil period exert a crucial role in the propagation of the crisis. The
chapter also shows that nancially constrained rms are those with more di¢ culties in
accessing external markets due to the higher cost of nance, especially during the turmoil
period. Hence, policy initiatives should be developed with the aim of increasing credit
availability and relaxing the nancial constraints which smaller rms at the periphery
face. This should help the euro area authorities to recover the economy of the euro area
while improving the shortage of credit and avoid job cuts for nancially constrained rms.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) rst investigates the cash holdingsdi¤er-
ences of private and public rms. The results conrm that private rms hold more cash
than their public counterparts which contradict the recent studies on this issue (Akguc
and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013). One important aspect is that for the previous studies
private and public rms are relatively large, since the former can actually issue public
debt. Thus, the argument behind this chapter is that the relatively small size of rms in
the sample explain the di¤erences in the results. Next, Chapter 3 focuses on the cash hold-
ingsdi¤erences of private and public rms for di¤erent levels of nancial pressure. When
considering this e¤ect, results indicate that the cash holdingsdi¤erential decreases (in-
creases) for higher (lower) levels of nancial pressure. Finally, private rms adjust slower
to their target cash levels than their public counterparts. From a policy perspective, the
results suggest that the cash build-up is a pervasive issue across all rms, especially small
ones. However, it also highlights the di¢ culties in accessing external markets for small
rms. Since small rms are the drivers of the euro area economy that means that poli-
cymakers, economists and business experts should take the behaviour of relatively small
rms into account.
The last empirical chapter (Chapter 4) explores the role of stock of inventories on trade
credit (extended and taken). The results provide evidence that rms prefer to sell their
stock on credit rather than accumulate them. In other words, there is an inverse relation
between rmsstock of inventories and trade credit which is consistent with the inventory
management motive of Bougheas et al. (2009). Further, it is tested whether the nature of
the transacted goods and rmssize have an e¤ect on the trade-o¤between inventories and
trade credit. Empirical ndings emphasis that the provision of trade credit is higher for
small rms in the di¤erentiated sectors. The results imply that to fully comprehend the use
of trade credit as an alternative source of nance, policy makers need to be informed about
rms inventories, size and industry location. On the other hand, in the last empirical
chapter it is also considered the impact of the nancial crisis and the nancial development
on the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit. The inventory management motive
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is more pronounced during the nancial crisis and the e¤ect is reduced when development
of the banking system is considered. The results imply that the existence of the trade
credit channel through the inventory management motive weakens the inuence of adverse
shocks (such as the crisis). This type of short-term nancing is mainly provided when the
banking system is not able to do so. Hence, this is of particular importance for policy
makers since this type of nance can help nancially constrained rms to avoid shortage
of credit and perform their day-to-day business operations.
5.3 Prospects of future research
This thesis sheds light on the behaviour of rms in the euro area by presenting novel
empirical ndings on rmsemployment, cash holdings and trade credit. However, it is
still possible to further strengthen the empirical evidence following this thesis.
The second chapter studies the relation between rm-specic interest burden and the
level of employment focusing on the recent nancial crisis and periphery/non-periphery
countries. For possible future extension of this research it would be interesting to increase
the time span of the dataset by including rm-level information until 2014. This corre-
sponds to the total period of the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012) and the implementation
of non-conventional monetary policy, i.e. the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
program (2012-2014).
The third chapter analysis the cash holdingsdi¤erences of private and public rms in
the euro area. Future work could test whether these results hold for private and public
rms in transition economies in Europe. Nevertheless, it would also be interesting to
further examine the role of nancial development on private and public rmscash holdings
decisions. Finally, the fourth chapter tests the relation between stock of inventories and
trade credit extended, while controlling for the goods transacted, the recent nancial
crisis and the development of the banking system. Future studies could explore how the
trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit (extended and taken) is a¤ected by the
characteristics of the traded goods across crisis and non-crisis periods. In addition, this
chapter also accounts for the role of nancial constraints in the form of rm size. It would
also be enlightening to consider other measures of rm-level heterogeneity distinguishing
for example between private and public rms, young and old. Finally, this thesis has
mainly explored the behaviour of manufacturing rms. It would be also worthwhile to
extend the analysis to other sectors of the economy.
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Appendices
A Appendix A Chapter 2
A.1 Firmsdenition according to Amadeus database
Table A.1: Denition of rmsaccording to Amadeus
Firms size categories Conditions
Very large size Operating revenue >= 100e million;
Total assets >= 200e million
Employees >= 1000
Listed
Large size Operating revenue >= 10e million
Total assets >= 20e million
Employees >= 150
Not very large
Medium size Operating revenue >= 1e million
Total assets >= 2e million
Employees >= 15
Not very large or Large
Small size All the rms which are not included
in the abovementioned categories are considered small
Notes: Table A.1 describes the criteria which is used in Amadeus database to dene rmssize. All the rms should match
at least one of the conditions which are described above.
A.2 Denition of the variables
Table A.2: Variables denition
Variable Denition
nit Logarithm of number of employees.
IBit Ratio of interest payments to cash ow.
wit Employment costs divided by number of employees and deated by the GDP deator.
wit Log di¤erence of wage.
it Log di¤erence of real sales (total sales divided by the GDP deator).
kit Logarithm of xed assets minus depreciation and working capital less provisions.
Crisist Dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise.
Peripheryi Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rm is operating in periphery economies
(i.e. Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 0 otherwise.
Constrainedit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rm is private and exhibits BankDep (size) at the top (bottom).
50% of the distribution of all rms, 0 otherwise.
Cowit Ratio of cash-ow to capital stock.
Liqit Ratio of cash and equivalent to capital stock.
Netdebtit Ratio of liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash and equivalent to capital stock.
Bondyit 10-year government bond yield.
Unemt Ratio of total sales to number of employees.
Creditt Dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise.
Debtt Dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise.
Crisisnt Dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise.
IBdit Ratio of interest payments to 3-year moving average of total debt.
Notes: Table A.2 provides the denitions for all the variables which are employed in this chapter.
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A.5 Structure of the unbalanced panel per year
Table A.5: Structure of the panel (per year)
Year Freq. Percent Cumulative
2003 82,765 7.90 7.90
2004 96,091 9.17 17.07
2005 114,803 10.95 28.02
2006 130,650 12.47 40.49
2007 136,143 12.99 53.48
2008 139,905 13.35 66.83
2009 140,158 13.37 80.20
2010 135,715 12.95 93.15
2011 71,798 6.85 100.00
Total 1,048,028 100.00
Notes: Table A.5 reports the number of observations, percentage and cumulative values per year.
A.6 Structure of the unbalanced panel according to the number
of observations
Table A.6: Structure of the panel (number of observations)
Observations Frequencies Percent Cumulative
3 22,167 2.12 2.12
4 35,780 3.41 5.53
5 84,645 8.08 13.61
6 135,973 12.96 26.56
7 154,973 14.79 41.35
8 283,504 27.05 68.40
9 331,173 31.60 100.00
Total 1,048,028 100.00
Notes: Table A.6 describes the number of observations in the sample.
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B Appendix B Chapter 3
B.1 Denition of the variables
Table B.1: Variables denition
Variables Denition
Cashit Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets.
Sizeit Log of total assets.
Cowit Ratio of cash ow to total assets.
CFVit Standard deviation of industry-median adjusted yearly cash ow.
over the previous 3 years.
Sgrowthit Change in total sales.
Levit Total debt scaled by total assets.
NWCit Di¤erence between current assets and current liabilities.
excluding cash scaled by total assets.
CAPEXit Change in xed assets plus depreciation normalised by total assets.
Ageit The di¤erence between the present year and rmsdate of incorporation.
Privatet 1 if rm is private, 0 otherwise.
Coverage ratioit Cash ow divided by interest payments.
NWCit Change in the di¤erence between current assets and current liabilities.
excluding cash scaled by total assets.
Cashit Change in the log of cash and equivalents to total assets
Stdebtit Change in short-term debt to total assets
Crisist Dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise.
Dummyit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rmtotal assets are at the bottom
75% of the distribution of all rms, and 0 otherwise.
Notes: Table B.1 presents a summary of the main variables which are implemented in Chapter 3.
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B.4 Structure of the unbalanced panel by year
Table B.4: Structure of the panel (per year)
year Frequencies Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 66,725 8.05 8.05
2004 75,597 9.12 17.16
2005 87,131 10.51 27.67
2006 102,677 12.38 40.06
2007 106,780 12.38 52.93
2008 109,228 13.17 66.11
2009 110,501 13.33 79.43
2010 109,776 13.24 92.67
2011 60,763 7.33 100.00
Total 829,178 100.00
Table B.4 indicates the number of observations, percentage and cumulative values per year.
B.5 Structure of the unbalanced panel according to the number
of observations
Table B.5: Structure of the panel (number of observations)
Observations Frequencies Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 19,830 2.39 2.39
4 34,423 4.19 6.58
5 76,505 9.23 15.81
6 101,625 12.26 28.06
7 122,316 14.75 42.81
8 223,316 26.95 69.76
9 250,714 30.24 100.00
Total 829,178 100.00
Table B.5 shows the minimum and maximum number of observations in the sample, percentage and cumulative values.
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B.6 Alternative specication for rmstarget cash levels
This subsection of Appendix B considers an alternative specication to the target cash
model which is dened in sub-section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3. Following the literature on cash
holdings (Gao et al., 2013), a partial adjustment model for rmstarget cash level is used.
Table B.6 presents the results. Empirical ndings are robust to those of Table 3.4. To
be specic, The coe¢ cient on the (Cash
it
-Cash
it 1) is positive and statistically signicant
which indicates that both private and public rms adjust to target cash levels. Conversely,
the coe¢ cient on the interaction term (Privatet*(Cash

it
-Cash
it 1)) is negative which denotes
that private rms adjust slower to their cash target than their public counterparts.
Table B.6: Alternative specication for target cash levels
(1)
Privatet 0.015***
(16.59)
Privatet*(Cash

it
-Cash
it 1) -0.020***
(-6.13)
(Cash
it
-Cash
it 1) 0.010*
(1.80)
Observations 327,688
Firms 71,761
Sargan (p-value) 0.467
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.373
The dependent variable is the change in the cash ratio (4Cash
it
), Cash
it
is the predicted cash ratio based on column 1
of Table 3.3. All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included in the specication.
Instruments include all regressors (except Privatet and ln(Ageit)) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-
identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan
test equal to 2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for the denitions of the
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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C.2 Denition of rmscategories-characteristics of the goods
Table C.2: Classication of the goods (SIC codes)
U.S. Sectors Di¤
SIC code
10 Metal mining 0
20 Food and kindred products 0
22 Textile mill products 0
23 Apparel and other nished products made from fabrics and other similar materials 0
24 Lumber and wood products, except furniture 0
25 Furniture and xtures 1
26 Paper and allied products 0
27 Printing, publishing and allied industries 1
28 Chemicals and allied products 0
29 Petroleum rening and related industries 0
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 1
31 Leather and leather products 0
32 Stone,clay, glass and concrete products 1
33 Primary metal industries 0
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 1
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 1
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment 1
37 Transportation equipment 1
38 Instruments;photographic, metal and optical goods; watches and clocks 1
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 1
Notes: Table C2 corresponds to the classication of industry groups, distinguishing between di¤erentiated and standardized
products in the manufacturing sector based on Amadeus database. This classication follows Giannetti et al. (2011) and it
is based on Rauch (1999). Finally, in column 3, the number 1 denotes rms in the di¤erentiated sector whereas 0 indicates
rms belonging to the standardized sector.
C.3 Number of rms per country
Table C.3: Number of rms (per country)
Countries Number of rms
Austria 3,499
Belgium 3,604
Finland 2,267
France 20,874
Germany 33,036
Greece 1,819
Ireland 755
Italy 41,495
Luxembourg 138
Netherlands 5,190
Portugal 5,056
Spain 18,756
Total 136,489
Notes: Table C3 describes the total number of rms per country during the 2003-2011 period.
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C.6 Structure of the unbalanced panel according to the number
of observations
Table C.6: Structure of the panel (number of observations)
Observations Frequencies Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 40,799 4.96 4.96
4 66,648 8.10 13.06
5 125,265 15.23 28.29
6 158,034 19.21 47.51
7 145,005 17.63 65.14
8 163,088 19.83 84.96
9 123,669 15.04 100.00
Total 822,488 100.00
Table C6 shows the minimum and maximum number of observations in the sample, percentage and cumulative values.
C.7 Dynamic models of the main specication models
As a robustness check of the main empirical specications, it is tested whether by in-
cluding the lag of the dependent variable trade credit (extended and taken), the results
remain robust to the empirical ndings which are discussed in subsection 4.7 of Chapter
4. The results sugges that the inverse relation between stock of inventories and trade
credit extended remain statistically signicant and it is higher for rms which are smaller
and produce di¤erentiated products. More importantly, it is clear that the inventory
management motive is higher during the turmoil period than outside of it and that the
development of the banking system decreases the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade
credit extended. Finally, there is no relation between inventories and trade credit taken.
Empirical results are provided in the below tables.
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Table C.7: Trade credit extended and taken
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
-0.181*** 0.063
(-2.94) (1.40)
TD
it 1 0.573***
(4.05)
TC
it 1 0.782***
(7.90)
Prot
it
0.409* 0.001
(1.72) (0.48)
Liq
it
-0.291* 0.034*
(-1.89) (1.84)
Loans
it
0.255*** -0.209**
(2.76) (-2.23)
Coll
it
-0.178** -0.009
(-2.36) (-0.30)
Size
it
0.016*** -0.006
(3.45) (-1.32)
Age
it
0.002 0.001
(0.77) (0.13)
Observations 265,464 246,252
Firms 75,916 67,995
Sargan 0.010 0.207
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.802 0.248
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TDit 1(TCit 1) indicates the lag of the trade
credit extended (taken).The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include all
regressors (except age) lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square
under the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 7 in column 1 and 16 in column
2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.8: Firmsproduct characteristics
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Di¤i -0.967*** 0.137
(-2.68) (0.40)
Stock
it
*(1-Di¤i) -0.177 -0.008
(-0.71) (-0.05)
TD
it 1 0.389*
(1.68)
TC
it 1 0.763***
(6.38)
Prot
it
-0.385 0.521***
(-1.22) (2.59)
Liq
it
0.032 -0.218***
(0.22) (-2.96)
Loans
it
0.271** 0.252**
(2.14) (2.06)
Coll
it
-0.162* -0.040
(-1.90) (-0.74)
Size
it
0.012** 0.002
(2.16) (0.52)
Age
it
0.007 0.001
(1.166) (0.06)
Observations 265,464 246,252
Firms 75,916 67,995
Sargan 0.581 0.002
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.768 0.685
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock di¤ vs non-di¤ 0.099 0.747
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TDit 1(TCit 1) indicates the lag of the trade
credit extended (taken).The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include
all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under
the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal
to 10 in column 1 and 13 in column 2. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.9: The e¤ect of rmssize
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Small
it
-0.459*** 0.023
(-3.11) (0.28)
Stock
it
*(1-Small
it
) -0.116*** 0.028
(-2.24) (0.66)
TD
it 1 0.513***
(3.73)
TC
it 1 0.778***
(8.06)
Prot
it
0.489*** -0.188
(2.00) (-1.52)
Liq
it
-0.376** 0.023
(-2.28) (0.31)
Loans
it
0.261*** -0.106
(2.95) (-1.20)
Coll
it
-0.231*** -0.020
(-2.95) (-1.52)
Size
it
0.001 0.008***
(0.12) (3.12)
Age
it
0.005 0.003
(1.44) (0.88)
Observations 265,464 246,252
Firms 75,916 67,995
Sargan 0.020 0.019
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.827 0.119
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock small vs. non-small 0.011 0.937
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TDit 1(TCit 1) indicates the lag of the trade
credit extended (taken). The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include
all regressors lagged three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under
the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 15 in column 1 and 16 in column 2. m1
(m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1)
under the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.10: The nancial crisis
TD TC
(1) (2)
Stock
it
*Crisist -0.262*** -0.178
(-3.78) (-1.59)
Stock
it
*(1-Crisist) -0.194*** 0.042
(-2.79) (0.52)
TD
it 1 0.896***
(10.04)
TC
it 1 0.773***
(8.57)
Prot
it
0.046*** 0.018
(4.26) (1.58)
Liq
it
-0.268 -0.026
(-1.21) (-0.93)
Loans
it
-0.722 -0.226**
(-1.41) (-2.42)
Coll
it
-0.683** -0.009
(-2.05) (-0.29)
Size
it
0.102*** -0.004
(5.42) (-1.01)
Age
it
-0.011 0.002
(-1.62) (0.66)
Observations 265,464 246,252
Firms 75,916 67,995
Sargan 0.010 0.546
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.488 0.645
F-test of equality (p-value)
Stock Crisis vs non-Crisis 0.000 0.004
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TDit 1(TCit 1) indicates the lag of the trade credit
extended (taken). Crisist refers to the Crisis period between 2007 and 2009.The gures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except age and crisis) lagged three times or more.
Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity, with degrees
of freedom for the sargan test equal to 11 in column 1 and 13 in column 2. m1 (m3) is a test for rst (third) order serial
correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See
Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.11: Trade credit extended and nancial development
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank & other
(1) (2) (3)
Stock
it
-0.343* -0.156*** -0.238***
(-1.95) (-5.68) (-5.07)
TD
it 1 0.689*** 0.718*** 0.726***
(9.61) (4.93) (8.09)
Stock
it
*FDt -0.058* -0.097*** -0.125***
(-1.69) (-3.49) (-8.84)
FDt 0.029* 0.442*** 0.385***
(1.94) (8.27) (3.82)
Prot
it
-0.043 0.308 0.012*
(-0.65) (0.59) (1.88)
Liq
it
0.240** 0.114 -0.114
(2.49) (0.54) (-0.95)
Loans
it
0.434*** 0.571*** 0.405***
(3.98) (2.96) (3.57)
Coll
it
-0.149** 0.011 -0.204***
(-2.24) (0.09) (-2.73)
Size
it
-0.004 -0.009 0.001
(-0.91) (-1.56) (0.007)
Age
it
0.008* 0.006 0.008**
(2.55) (0.95) (2.22)
Observations 265,464 265,464 265,464
Firms 75,916 75,916 75,916
Sargan 0.005 0.359 0.001
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.478 0.215 0.417
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TDit 1indicates the lag of the trade credit
extended. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank to GDP (column 1), deposit money bank assets to GDP
(column 2) and private bank credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions to GDP (column 3). The gures
in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies,
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged
three times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity, with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 15 in column 1, 9 in column 2 and 18 in column 3. m1 (m3)
is a test for rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under
the null of no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.12: Trade credit extended and nancial development
FD= FD= FD=
Private bank Bank assets Private bank & other
(1) (2) (3)
Stock
it
0.732 0.105 0.306
(1.33) (0.20) (1.06)
TC
it 1 0.736*** 0.680*** 0.798***
(7.07) (6.10) (9.81)
Stock
it
*FDt -0.536 -0.092 -0.234
(-1.29) (-0.17) (-1.02)
FDt 0.134 -0.068 0.068
(1.62) (-0.51) (1.11)
Prot
it
-0.135 -0.413* -0.026
(-0.54) (-1.71) (-0.15)
Liq
it
-0.042 -0.030 -0.141
(-0.34) (-0.24) (-1.63)
Loans
it
-0.095 -0.111* -0.073
(-1.42) (-1.90) (-1.30)
Coll
it
-0.002 -0.053 -0.039
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-0.78)
Size
it
-0.012* -0.004 -0.007
(-1.88) (-0.70) (-1.54)
Age
it
0.002 -0.001 -0.011
(0.62) (-0.13) (-0.62)
Observations 246,252 246,252 246,252
Firms 67,995 67,995 67,995
Sargan 0.291 0.093 0.274
m1( p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.649 0.571 0.561
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. TCit 1 indicates the lag of the trade credit
taken. The variable FDt indicates in turn private bank to GDP (column 1), deposit money bank assets to GDP (column
2) and private bank credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions to GDP (column 3). The gures in
parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and
time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors (except age) lagged three
times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity,
with degrees of freedom for the sargan test equal to 11 in column 1, 9 in column 2 and 12 in column 3. m1 (m3) is a test for
rst (third) order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of
no serial correlation. See Table C.1 in the Appendix C for the denitions of the variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectivel
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